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5The environmental policy of a state should aim, among others, to 
achieve sustainability regarding energy production. Sustainability can be 
described as the goal to save the capacity of the earth for future generations 
which includes transnational resources such as water and air. Therefore 
the effect of environmental policy does not stop at the border of a country, 
but to the contrary: has an effect on all of us. Although Korea has linked its 
industrialization to environmental problems such as air pollution and acid rain 
- sustainable energy systems are not yet integrated in South Korea’s economy. 
Therefore the government’s policy needs to create incentives for the economy to 
create and use sustainable methods of energy production.
The current South Korean Minister of Environment, Yoon Seong Kyu, 
has stated that it is his first aim to raise Korea’s environmental welfare to the 
level of advanced countries during the period of President Park Geun-hye’s 
administration. He emphasizes that a clean environment is important for the 
health and happiness of the people and therefore the government has a duty to 
achieve high ecological standards. This statement sets a focus on an issue that 
was not dealt with in the first two decades of Korea’s rapid industrialization. 
This issue of the KAS journal analyses the Korean environmental policy within 
its specific challenges. 
In order to build awareness for the issue of environmental welfare it is 
essential to institutionalize a green movement in a democracy. The Green Party 
of Korea was established in 2012 after the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis in Japan 
had occurred. The party has set a political platform aimed at implementing a 
nuclear-free energy changeover by 2030. Yet in the 19th national parliamentary 
election in 2012 the party only achieved a result of 0,48% of the votes. This 
disappointment indicates that it is difficult for a Green Party to establish itself in 
a democratic system that is still in a state of flux where it has to compete against 
established parties focusing on other agendas obviously perceived as more 
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important by the electorate. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Korea is a member of the Kyoto Protocol, it 
has not signed the Annex I of the Protocol which determines binding targets 
concerning the reduction of CO2 emission. Korea is the 9th biggest producer of 
CO2 of all the OECD countries with an annual emission of 11,8 tons per head. 
However, Korea has announced to voluntarily reduce its emission of CO2 by 
30% of the business-as-usual level by 2020 at the Climate Change Conference in 
Copenhagen in 2009 – which is certainly a step in the right direction. However, 
without binding goals it’s a well-intentioned promise but not an international 
contract. Nevertheless, there is the risk of border tariffs on South Korean exports 
of the EU and other developed countries in case Korea does not limit greenhouse 
gas as set out in their reduction goals.
Moreover, Korea is a resource limited region and is therefore one of the top 
five importers of coal, liquid natural gas and mineral. Therefore, the country’s 
economy is extremely susceptible to changes on the energy market. In order to 
compensate this dependence Korea still focuses on nuclear power. The capacity 
of nuclear power plants should be enlarged until 2029, although nuclear power 
causes the issue of hazardous waste. 
Furthermore, the topic of the green energy potential will be discussed in this 
issue. Korea, as a peninsula, has a great potential to use wind energy through 
building off shore wind farms. Additionally, Korea has a population over 
50 million inhabitants and bio waste could be used to create energy as well. 
Unfortunately the topic of green energy for energy supply is not a focus of the 
Park government. 
The KAS would like to thank the authors of this issue for their interesting 
contributions on the topic of environmental policy. We hope to raise awareness 
on this relevant topic. 
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7Ⅰ. Background
This study focuses on the possibilities and limitations of the Green 
Party in the context of Korea’s political regime based on the process and 
elements of institutionalization of green movements in Korea. The recent 
green politicization clearly shows that the discourse on environment is 
going beyond the realm of environmental protection to expand into the 
discussion on the future development direction of the Korean society. 
Such green movements are now having an impact on the political circles 
through civil society, and by analyzing the dynamism and political 
opportunity structure within the movement itself, which is becoming 
institutionalized, will allow us to provide an outlook on the limitations 
and possibilities of institutionalizing Green Party in Korean society. 
In Korea, a discourse on green politics, green nation is an initiative 
to expand public’s interest in the environmental movement to the entire 
society, and the potential for such attempt has been already proven 
in western European countries like Germany, France etc. After the 
1970s, the environmental movement has taken firm root as a strong 
civic movement in many countries around the world, evolving into a 
green party that is newly shaping the landscape of human life at the 
national and international level. Most civic movements do exist outside 
the institutional politics, however, their evolution into a green party has 
a great impact not only on the decision making process of the entire 
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society but also on the changes in the power structure as they enter the 
political system. Then, will institutionalization of green movements be 
also possible in Korea? And is the political opportunity structure in Korea 
favorable or unfavorable towards institutionalization of green movements? 
In Korea, green politics was first discussed with the concept of ecology 
as a an alternative to avoid the development and growth-oriented social 
trend, and with the development of the civil society, ecology-based 
environmental movement defying the development logic was sustained. 
Specific discussions on the green politics took place starting from 
the regional elections in 2002, which was after experiencing a minor 
victory as well as failure during the 1995 local elections. Until then, 
there had existed times when environmental group candidates won in 
the local elections, however, even until today, it is difficult to say that 
an environmental group or the green movement has gained a political 
empowerment. However, in 2011 occurred a strong initiative to create a 
new party with green and environment as slogan, and in 2012, the Green 
Party was finally established, putting forward district and proportionate 
representative candidates during the general election. The Party also took 
part in the 2014 local elections, however failed to obtain meaningful 
election outcome. Meanwhile, prominent environmentalist took the lead 
to form green political blocks in order to reinforce the environmental 
agenda within the existing political order or within the business-political 
realignment structure. 
This study aims to explain the possibility and limitations of 
institutionalizing green movements in Korea with a focus on the forming 
process and political opportunity structure of the green politics in Korea. 
The development process of green movements can serve as the basis for 
establishing the green politics, however, when external factors, including 
the political opportunity structure is not favorable, institutionalization 
may not take place properly, despite its historical maturity. Therefore, 
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it is important to have a look at both the forming process and political 
opportunity structure. Here, institutionalization is the process by which 
organizations and procedures acquire value and stability from the 
public (Huntington 1968). Political institutionalization means securing 
continuity, passing through the threshold of an institutional system, 
and in this study, this refers to movement forces gaining independent 
empowerment in the form of a political party and making inroads into 
the parliament with a meaningful gain of votes during the elections. 
Chapter II focuses on Korea’s green movements by period, based on 
the perspective political empowerment, and in particular, tracks the path 
of environmental groups becoming politically institutionalized by taking 
part in the local elections. Chapter III reviews the political opportunity 
structure and institutional context that allows or limits the political 
institutionalization of green movements in Korea in order to discuss 
the potential political institutionalization of the Green Party in Korean 
society. Based on such discussions, we hope to provide an outlook on 
the potential, limitations, and sustainability of political empowerment of 
green movements in Korea. 
1. Literary Analysis
A movement party refers to the union of political activists who began as 
a social activists and intend to apply the organization and strategic ability 
of social movements to the realm of party competition. They barely invest 
in official and organizational party structure and social choice problem 
solving process, and is characterized by taking a two-way approach 
combining activities within the official competition realm with additional 
institutional mobilization. Such movement parties are believed to have 
derived from the intensity of the interaction between the official and 
unofficial barriers to entering into the electoral competition game and the 
10
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intensity of political interests that had not been represented within the 
scope of existing political parties (Kitschelt 2006).1
Most studies on such movement parties focus on Western European 
cases, (Jang Hoon 1996; Kim Young-tae 2007; Jung Sang-ho 2007; 
Jin Young-jae․ Seo Myung-ho 2008), and there are very few studies 
dealing with the political institutionalization of green movements in 
Korea or the green politics of Korea. Insufficient number of studies can 
be explained by the fact there has almost never been any attempt for 
political empowerment of environmental movements in Korea, and also 
very few cases of environmental candidates with green value entering the 
political institutional circles, thus failing to gain attention from scholars. 
Studies focusing on Korea were mostly based on political empowerment 
perspective, and even if a study is themed around environment or the 
green politics, they tend to call for the necessity for the green politics 
from a critical and ought-to-be perspective rather than providing 
objective explanation. 
Other than studies with normative, ought-to-be perspectives, there 
also exist case studies focusing on election participation. Park Jae-mook 
(2000) analyzed the discussions surrounding the formation of the Green 
Party in Korea and political empowerment based on the outcome of 
environmentalist groups’ participation in the local elections in 1995 and 
1998. Based on the participation in the two elections, Park concluded 
that environmental movements gaining an independent political 
1  According to Kitschelt, there is a high chance for social movement parties to emerge in 
the following cases. First, when collective interests are strongly dominated by massive 
voters, that is when they voluntarily and clearly express the voters’ requirements in 
a divisive manner, through additional institutional behaviors. Second, when existing 
parties, for fear of their election voters’ division, fail to make any attempt to embrace 
such interests. Third, when the political representative’s official or unofficial limitation 
or threshold is appropriate or low. (Kitschelt 2006).
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empowerment was not a easy task. He interpreted that nominating an 
“environmental candidate” and “citizen candidate” was due to legal 
limitations, lack of internal capacity of civil movement groups, limited 
public support for environmental movement etc. In 2002, Cho Hyun-
ok (2002), studied the case of the Korean Federation for Environmental 
Movement (KFEM)’s participation in the local elections, citing the 
following as problems: communication of insufficient information 
to the Federation’s members, insufficient number of candidates, lack 
of networking activity with other civic groups, lack of specific policy 
on the green politics, insufficient campaign funding and support for 
organization. Nevertheless, Cho argued that alternative forces with a 
focus on the green politics can seize new opportunities when the existing 
political circle becomes increasingly conservative and fail to address the 
civic needs. 
2. Analysis Framework
This study adopts an approach focusing on social structure and political 
opportunity structure as an analysis framework to explain the possibilities 
and limitations of the development and political institutionalization of 
the green politics in Korea. This approach was presented in the studies of 
Jang Hoon (1996), Jung Sang-ho (2007), Kitschelt (2006) to present the 
key to successful institutionalization of green parties in the West and the 
relationship between civic social movements and political parties. This 
approach focusing on the structure as a tool to examine the success and 
failure of the Green Party, is very useful for explaining the kind of context 
needed for the Green Party to become politically institutionalized. 
The socio-structural approach focuses on the process where the social 
cleavage structure is reflected in the political structure, in particular on 
the cleavage structure based driven by post-materialistic values. The 
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political process-centered approach focuses on the political opportunity 
structure that promotes or restricts the emergence of new political forces, 
which includes an electoral system, party system, political coalition, etc.
Structural Factor: Post-Materialism 
According to the cleavage theory that explains the party competition 
structure, a major social group based on the social structure forms a 
political coalition with a party. That is, the conflict structure or cleavage 
structure at the social level determines the nature or formation of a 
party system. The major cleavage that determines the party competition 
structure in Europe used to be the center and periphery, nation and 
church, primary industry and secondary industry, capital and labor, 
etc (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). However, with transition into the post-
industrialized society, there have been some changes regarding such 
cleavage structure. In particular, physical prosperity allows citizens to 
perceive that their material needs and desires are fulfilled, therefore a 
new middle class seeking post-materialistic values began to grow. This 
new middle class became interested in values (self-esteem, quality of life, 
sense of belonging, will for participation) that they would have never 
been interested unless their existing physical requirements were fulfilled 
(Inglehart 1977; 1990). The emergence of people with post-materialistic 
views can be seen to have lead the conventional cleavage structure to the 
new cleavage structure of materialism-post materialism. Post-materialistic 
values piqued high interest for environment, and this in the end led to the 
political empowerment of green parties which emphasize new political 
issues and ideologies such as natural protection, protection of minority 
rights, new political participation, rather than traditional political values 
such as economic growth or public order etc. That is, transition into 
the post-materialistic society can become a socio-structural background 
13
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of green parties, and post-materialistic values and the growth of green 
parties can be seen as intimately related. 
Election System and Party System 
This political process-based approach focuses on how the opportunity 
structure within the political system impacts and restrains the 
emergence of new forces. In particular, political institutionalization can 
be determined by not only the interaction between concentration and 
salience of voters in seeking movement profit but also by the election 
laws limiting the growth of new challengers and entry barriers created 
by official constraints (Kitschelt 2006). Here, institutional mechanisms 
constitutes the essence of the opportunity structure are an election system 
and political party system. Studies of green parties in Western Europe 
found that the growth of new parties under a relatively liberal electoral 
system such as the proportionate representation system can be much 
easier, whereas under a closed electoral system such as a simple majority 
system, it can be quite restricted. Moreover, the composition of the 
existing political party system is also an important factor that constitutes 
the opportunity structure, however, if one or many small size parties exist 
within the existing political system, it is not easy for a new party like the 
green party to make a new entrance. Yet, if such small size parties already 
exist, these parties tend to mobilize support by putting forward one issue, 
therefore, it is not easy for the green party to secure unique differentiation 
against these small existing parties and mobilize support (Jang Hoon 
1996). 
Structure of Environmental Policy 
For movement parties to enter and grow within the existing party system, 
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the policy response of the existing parties, which compete for voters 
within the same party system, is also a critical political factor. That is, 
when the political interests that are born by a large number of voters are 
not represented in the existing political system, it is highly likely that civic 
movements will join the realm of elections (Kitschelt 2006). In a political 
system where the existing parties fail to actively respond to the new 
political requirements such as environmental protection and maintain 
passive pro-environmental policies or anti-environmental policies, there 
is a high chance for a green party to seek growth. Moreover, in a closed 
system, the government’s environmental policy structure fails to actively 
embrace the opinions of its citizens, thus it will be easier for green 
parties to mobilize citizens’ support, than in a system maintaining open 
environmental policy (Jang Hoon 1996).
Political Coalition
Political coalition is a key element for the continuity and survival of the 
political empowerment of social movements, in particular. A political 
coalition between a party and social movement refers to a continued 
and institutional cooperation for a considerable period of time, which 
can occur in the areas of election or political fundraising, sharing of 
information or strategy, e policy collaboration on a case and issue basis 
etc. In order for a social movement to become politically institutionalized, 
the reformatory political forces need to assume a certain position or role 
within the system. The political coalition cases of the Western Europe 
shows that the new political forces generally formed a coalition and 
cooperated with the socialist party and new social movements rather than 
with conservative parties. They, as part of the New Left, developed major 
forces of the left and the green party in the form “Red-Greens Alliance” in 
the 1980~1990. That is, in a political coalitions, the existence and status 
15
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of a left-wing party is an important factor to assess a stable coalition 
with movements.2 In particular, the opposition party status of the left-
wing party and a strategic consideration for winning the elections are the 
main drivers leading to a political coalition. The political empowerment 
and the sustainability of a new party depends on the existence of left-
wing party that can be used as political ally or reformatory party that can 
integrate the values and requirements of social movements (Jung Sang-ho 
2007).
The correlation among the four conditions above-post-materialism, 
electoral system and party system, structure of the environmental policy, 
and political coalition-and the political empowerment of green parties 
is as shown in Table 1. The structural factor called post-materialistic 
society, the proportionate representative system, the passive and closed 
nature of environmental policy of existing government and parties, and 
the existence of political coalition enable political institutionalization of 
green movements and restrain the oppose. 
2  Generally, left parties consider labor voters’ views as an important barometer when 
setting their major policy position, and they were not largely favorable towards 
environmental protectionism that alleviates or refrains from growth-oriented policy 
(Muller-Rommel 1989). This can be seen as a conflicting structure of human-oriented 
vs. ecology-oriented. However, exploitation of laborers and devastation of nature are 
no separate issues, the problem-defining itself should shift from human-oriented vs. 
ecology-oriented towards the socially privileged vs. socially vulnerable, therefore green 
politics and left-wing or progressive politics can be connected (Kim Min-jeong 2010).
16
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Table 1: Correlation between socio-Structural and political Opportunity structural 
Factors and political Institutionalization of Green Movements 
Post-materialism Election system
Environmental 
policy of 
government or 
existing parties3
Political coalition 
(left-wing party)
Favorable 
condition
Post-materialistic 
society
Proportionate 
representative 
system 
Passive/closed Exist
Unfavorable 
condition
Materialistic 
society
Simple majority 
system
Active/open Does not exist
Source: Excerpt and redrafted from Jang Hoon(1996), Jung Sang-ho(2007)
 
Ⅱ. Process of Formation of Green Politics in Korea
The path of formation towards the political institutionalization of green 
movements in Korea can be divided into the following periods: pre-
political institutionalization, political institutional trial period, transition 
to party and participation in general elections. 
1.  Pre-Political Institutionalization Period: Environmental 
Movement as Dissent Movement (1960s-1991)
The history dates back 40 years, with the increasing complaints 
and claims for compensations from residents affected by frequent 
environmental damages following industrialization in the late 1960s. 
However, the environmental problems in Korea suffered setbacks until 
the late 1980s due to restricted citizens’ freedom and political openness 
The first environmental movement in Korea was the pollution dispute 
3
3  Here "passive and active" means whether the government and existing parties place 
environmental policy as their priority, and "closed and open" refers to the way they 
implement policies. 
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case of the Busan Gamcheon Thermal Plant in May 1966. A the time, the 
environmental movement was very restricted in that it was carried out 
to ensure the right to survival of farmers who lost their living space or 
whose livelihood was affected with the development of environmental 
facilities including massive plants.
The environmental movement in the 1970s can be defined as “anti-
pollution movement.” During this period, it was a difficult for the 
environmental movement to take root because it was perceived as a 
resistance against the political system. thus difficult to lay the ground to 
gain public support base. The first environmental group was the “Pollution 
Research Center” created in the late 1970s. The Pollution Research Center 
began to inform the public about the environmental problems that were 
identified through research and data gathering of the environment-
affected regions in a limited way. 
In the 1980s, the Pollution Research Center that led by Choi Yeol 
researched and studied the source of pollution with local residents who 
were suffering from pollution issues caused by industrial activities in 
Ulsan, Onsan etc. and initiated activities to exert pressure on businesses 
and the government to provide measures for the victims. The anti-
pollution movement was not an anti-capitalistic movement, but was 
conducted as a way to call for preventive and adequate management of 
environmental issues arising from industrial process. However, at the 
time the major forces that led the anti-pollution movement were one 
faction of the democratic movement forces, therefore anti-pollution 
movement was perceived as “dissident movement.”
In the mid 1980s, the environmental movement became increasingly 
generalized and developed into various forms. In 1986, it integrated with 
the Council for Anti-Pollution Citizens’ Movement to form Association 
for Anti-Pollution Movement with members from all walks of life with 
a nationwide network. Furthermore, in 1988, Mokpo Green Research 
18
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Association, in 1989 the Federation of Busan Anti-Pollution Citizens’ 
Movement, the Society for Environment and Pollution, and the Alliance 
for Ulsan Anti-Pollution Movement were formed. In the 1980s, formation 
and characteristics of environmental movement organizations were at 
the stage of informing the necessity of the seriousness and environmental 
movement of the environment and pollution issues to the citizens driven 
by activists interested in some environmental and pollution problems, 
and the size of organization was quite small. In this process, there was a 
growing awareness on environmental issues and also internal discussions 
within environmental groups to establish theories and methodologies on 
the environmental movement. Moreover, environmental groups, through 
integration and formation, came to take the form of a social movement. 
It was then that the ability of the environment movement constituted 
an important part of the social movement. That is, the environmental 
movement, with the help of private, professional environmental groups, 
began to evolve into a social movement. 
In particular, as democratization took shape with the Democratic 
Uprising in June 1987, many social issues that converged into democratic 
movement came to gain public attention, and the civic movement 
emerged as a new social movement in participation of citizens responding 
to such issues. With the Federation for Anti-Pollution Movement as a 
start, followed Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice in 1989, Green 
Korea United in 1991, People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in 
1994 to establish the framework for an integrated citizens’ movement to 
realize economic justice, environmental justice and social justice. 
2.  Attempt for Political Institutionalization: From Environmen-
tal Movement to Participation in Local Elections (1991~2002)
In the 1990s, the environmental movement becomes an important part of 
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the social movement, and citizens became more keen on environmental 
issues. Socially, religious groups like Catholic, Christian, Buddhist groups 
began to take part in environmental movements, and existing citizens’ 
groups once established for other purposes began to develop interest in 
environment issues to appeal to the public. 
During this period, the ecological aspect of environmental movements 
was highlighted and expanded across the nation, leading to initiatives 
to establish the mass base. The reason being, there existed public trust 
in the civic groups than in the government or businesses as problem-
solver for environmental issues (Yoon Kyung-hwan 1999, 12). That is, 
from this period and on, the environmental movement shifts away from 
its form of the 1980s and undergoes a process of differentiation into the 
realm of consistently functional movement through the development and 
integration of organizations to build a nationwide network. Moreover, 
one of the most politically influential citizen’s group actively engaged 
in environmental movements, the Korean Federation of Environment 
Movement (KFEM) put forward an environmental candidate during the 
local elections, thus making inroads into the realm of institution. 
The KFEM, since its foundation in 1993, has experienced numerous 
public office elections to lead an array of activities for political 
empowerment of environmental movements. Among others, the KFEM’s 
participation in elections took place in multi-faceted ways, however, 
in almost all elections process, they not only analyzed and announced 
the electoral promise of each party and individual candidate but also 
joined together with other civic movement groups especially in the local 
elections to insist on “citizens’ candidate” or independently nominate an 
“environmental candidate” and lead activities at the organizational level 
for the election of these candidates (Park Jae-mook 2000).
The KFEM selected “environmental candidates” during the two 
local elections in 1995 and 1998 and led activities in support of these 
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candidates. The reason why the KFEM put forward the so-called 
“environmental candidates” while going beyond the limitations of 
the positive law and lead activities for candidates’ success in the local 
elections was because it wanted to focus its support in the regions with 
candidates with high chance to be elected in order to create an “exemplary 
local government.”
During the 1995 local elections, all 46 candidates were selected as 
“environmental candidates” and were supported and sponsored by the 
KFEM. More specifically, out of 46 candidates, 4 were for head of local 
governments, 5 candidates for metropolitan city council members, and 
37 candidates for local assembly members. Out of 46 environmental 
candidates, 31 were selected as members (67.4% of the registered 
candidates), and they consisted of 2 heads of local government, 4 
metropolitan council members, and 25 local assembly members. 
During the 1998 local elections, only 39 environmental candidates 
were nominated including 3 for local government heads, 8 metropolitan 
council members, and 28 local council members. Out of 39 
environmental candidates, 22 were elected as members (56.4% of all 
candidates). The 22 elected members included 2 local government heads, 
6 metropolitan council members and 14 local council members. 
The number of environmental candidates and their percentage of 
election varied according to the timing of the local elections. First of 
all, the number of environmental candidates decreased slightly in 1998 
compared to 1995. Overall, the reason was because the prominent 
environmental figures’ desire to enter the local politics also slightly 
decreased. In another word, it can be said that the activists’ desire to enter 
the institutional political circles was particularly high in 1995 when the 
local elections revived for the first time after the reestablishment of local 
governments which had been pending for the past 30 years. 
The environmental candidates elected in 1995, especially, many 
21
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of the local council members were elected in Korea’s highly polluted 
regions known for active environmental activities such as Ulsan region, 
Ongjin-gun in Incheon, Gochang in Jeonbuk, Inje in Gangwon, Pohang 
in Gyeongbuk, Yangcheon in Seoul, and Gunpo in Gyeonggi etc. 
This clearly shows that local figures who became leaders in their local 
community through local environmental activities are becoming leaders 
in the realm of institutional politics (Park Jae-mook 2000). 
3.  Transition to Party and Participation in General Elections 
(After 2002~) 
It was during the 2002 local elections when the green politics were 
specifically discussed under the theme of political empowerment of the 
civil society. The Green Peace Party was established and the Korean 
Federation for Environmental Movement(KFEM) also established the 
Green Autonomy Committee to nominate their own green candidates, in 
order to realize greening of the politics. The Green Peace Party was led 
by few KFEM management and put forward proportionate representative 
candidates in 7 cities and provinces including for the Seoul mayoral 
elections. Its candidates earned many votes in some cities and regions 
including 4.8% in the Jeonbuk region. Meanwhile, the KFEM also 
established the Green Autonomy Committee to nominate about 50 
candidates nationwide including for the Goyang mayoral election, and 
15 of them were elected as local council members in Goyang, Busan and 
Seoul etc.
Then, the elected local council members took the initiative to establish 
Greens Korea, and in the 2006 local elections, 21 grassroots candidates 
were nominated including the ten incumbent local council members. 
However, only two were elected with the implementation of the party 
nomination system for the local government election and predominance 
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of the Grand National Party (Joo Yo-seob 2007). 
During the two general elections that followed the Negative Campaign 
Against Parliamentary Candidates of Chongsonyondae(Citizens’ 
Alliance for the 2000 General Election), with formation of new party 
and intervention of the citizens’ political movements, a new movement 
to change the politics was started. This meant shifting from merely 
excluding bad politicians to placing values of labor, job, welfare, 
ecosystem and peace at the forefront. 
The civil society launched campaigns to stop the Four Major Rivers 
Restoration Project that continued from 2009, which led to growing 
public interest. In the 2010 local elections, the environmental groups 
defined the agenda of the elections as “free meal for in schools and Four 
Major Rivers Restoration Project”, thus supporting and contributing to 
the election of the local political forces that oppose the Four Major Rivers 
Restoration Project and support the free-of-charge school meals. 
Such political behavior and empowerment of green citizens and the 
increasing demand for denuclearization around the world following the 
Fukushima Nuclear Accident in 2010, some prominent environmentalists 
took the initiative to take part in the 2012 general election by forming the 
“Green Party.” However, it ended up gaining only around 100,000 votes, 
representing only 0.48% of all party votes, therefore its registration in the 
National Elections Commissions was revoked. However, they reinitiated 
the formation of the Green Party and re-registered it as a party the very 
same year.
The Green Party is the first initiative of its kind in Korean politics 
to prepare the formation of nationwide party while emphasizing 
environment as its core value unlike other existing parties.4
4  This study focuses on the case of the Green Party in Korea which is different from 
other existing parties, which is based on the ecology that exceeds ideologies and 
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Political parties that newly emerged in Western Europe pursued 
specific ideologies, preferred a participative political structure, and 
were supported by voters who were very different from advocates of 
other parties (Muller-Rommel 1996). The Green Party of Korea today 
also share some similarities. First of all, the Green Party was built on a 
different ideology compared to other existing parties. The Green Party 
called for the need to address not only environment issues such as 
denuclearization, environmental degradation but also social issues such 
as job creation for the youth, reduced working hours, and guarantee of 
livelihood income. That is, they advocate not only environmentalism, 
ecology but also an alternative lifestyle, and adopts doctrine and 
perceptions that are different from the conventional left wing-right wing 
ideology, but also advocates alternative values that are different from the 
existing parties. Second, the Green Party is formed as a participatory, 
decentralized organization that was different from conventional parties. 
The Green Party has a different culture compared to conventional parties. 
First of all, women’s representation in the Green Party is high, playing 
key roles within the Party. There is a system called the Gender Equality 
Representation System ensuring the equal number of men and women’s 
participation. Moreover, the Green Party is the party of youth. A part of 
its representative body is assigned to youth, so the younger generations 
can initiate their own organizations and carry out activities aligned with 
their interest. Meanwhile, the Green Party is a grassroots party. It is not 
a party led by few elites but by grassroots members and local residents. 
Policies at local level are created by local people, and nationwide policies 
are also elaborated based on the party members’ participation. In the 
places environment as core agenda. The Green Political Forum did not try to initiate 
a political party, and the Green Social Democratic Party was more focused on 
progressive values rather than environment, therefore was not the focus of this study. 
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Green Party, at times very heated discussions do occur, but also rational 
conclusions are made through a horizontal debate culture.” (Ha Seung-
soo 2011). 
Third, the Green Party’s supporter base is different from the existing 
parties. The declaration of the party formation committee of the Green 
Party clearly states that : “we want to seek change in the politics with the 
power of grassroots people. Until now, we want to seek that change with 
the power of socially marginalized women, youth, teenagers, minority, 
non-regular job workers and all ordinary people in this centralized society 
dominated by the vested interests”. In fact, existing environmentalists, 
those who returned to the rural area from city, members of the 
cooperatives, readers of Green Review, local grassroots activists, Chorok 
Party members, a minority of progressive party members all were 
engaged with the Green Party. Moreover, young people and women 
with ecological emotions and preferences, animal protection groups who 
are not the mainstream among civic social groups, as well as alternative 
medicine groups are interested in the Green Party. Breaking away from 
the left wing-right wing spectrum, they are interested in everyday politics, 
which makes them different from voters of conventional political parties. 
Ⅲ.  Opportunity Structure of Political Institutionalization of 
Green Movements in Korea 
During the 19th general election in 2012 and the local elections in 
2014, the Green Party in Korea failed to achieve a successful outcome. 
However, it can be viewed as a meaningful attempt in Korea’s green 
politics history as it opened up the possibility for a transition into a party 
with a nation-wide coverage and also took part in the elections. Then, can 
we say that Korea’s political opportunity structure still restrains political 
institutionalization of green movements? Is there a political space that 
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enables such political institutionalization or a potential room for creating 
such space? These questions can be explained by an approach focusing 
on Korea’s social structure and political opportunity structure
1. Structural Factors: Post-Materialism
Korea has enjoyed economic prosperity driven by its economic growth 
for the past few decades, and the public’s interest in environment has also 
increased since the 1980s. According to a survey on public awareness 
on environmental protection conducted by the Ministry of Environment 
in 2008, 79.0% of Koreans said they are “interested in environmental 
protection”(Ministry of Environment 2008). A survey on global awareness 
revealed that Korea, like most countries, ranked high in the number of 
materialists, and is showing the fastest increase in the number of post-
materialists in Asia together with Taiwan (Inglehart 1997). In particular, 
between 1990 to 2001, the younger the generation, the more they were 
oriented towards post-materialism. However, generations born after the 
1960s who experienced relatively more prosperous economy are at the 
same time showing a trend of returning to materialism-oriented values, 
and during this period, the attitude that we should value environmental 
protection is diminishing whereas the call for prioritizing economic 
development is increasing (Kim Doo-sik2005).5 The 2010 study by Na 
Eun-young and Cha Yoo-ri shows that after the Asian financial crisis in 
1997, the percentage of materialists decreased to 46.05% and the hybrid 
5  With regards to the return to materialism among the youth, Uh Soo-young(2004) 
explains that it is because they are faced with getting a job after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. The trend for post-materialism on the rise since 1997 has become 
stagnant and seemed to slightly regress towards materialism, and the change in the 
opposite direction was much faster in young people (Na Eun-young, Cha Yoo-ri 
2010).
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type increased to 43.75%, with a slight increase in post-materialists by 
2.35%. This study concluded that there is a decrease in materialism and 
increase in hybrid type close to post-materialism which was much faster 
in older generations, and this was also in line with the pace of change in 
overall values (Na Eun-young, Cha Yoo-ri 2010). This study shows that 
Korea is gradually undergoing a process of a social transition towards a 
post-materialistic society. 
Nevertheless, evidences exist as to why we cannot define Korea as a 
post-materialistic society. Inglehart argued that high environmentalism 
in Korea is not formed because of post-materialistic values in Korea but 
rather due to the direct environmental pollution and problems, thus 
cannot be regarded as a true environmentalist attitude (Inglehart 1997). 
In the 2008 Ministry of Environment’s survey, most Koreans were 
interested in environmental issues, but their level of interest decreased by 
9.3%, 9.8% compared to the 1997 and 2000 surveys respectively, and 
as for the correlation between environmental regulation and economic 
growth, 59.8% Koreans answered that “there should be deregulations 
to promote the economic growth” (Ministry of Environment 2008). The 
survey conducted by the National Election Commission, the Korean 
Association of Party Studies, and Chosunilbo also revealed that 60% of 
Koreans were for environmental protection by saying “we have to shut 
down nuclear power plants” (4.6%) and “we have to shutdown nuclear 
power plants and transition into renewable energy (57.8%). However, 
in terms of additional electricity fee, 27.3% answered “electricity tariff 
increase is inacceptable.” and 52.3% responded “ 10% range increase 
is acceptable” whereas “5.1% said they were “ready to accept increased 
electricity tariff to substitute nuclear energy” and only 13.4% answered 
they “can accept the 20% range increase” (Chosunilbo 2012/3/26). That 
is, despite Korean people’s high interest in environment, they did not 
agree to tariff increase, which shows that there exists a gap between the 
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public’s interest, awareness and the actual participation. 
Moreover, we can also question whether the transition into post-
materialism b individual Koreans has something to do with collective 
environmental action. In a 2010 study, it was found that the impact 
of age and income on the environmental awareness is minimal, and 
the younger generations were found to be more passive regarding 
environmental issues, which shows how environmental awareness has 
less impact on the collective environmental action. In terms of the level 
of environmental awareness, no generational gap was found, however, 
the level of participation of the younger generations in pro-environmental 
actions was much lower than the older generations, which demonstrates 
that the gap between awareness and action is much greater among the 
youth. That is, environmental awareness is not being translated into 
collective environmental action, and latter in Korean society still remains 
inactive despite its potential (Park Hee-jae, Huh Joo-young 2010). 
2. Electoral System and Party System 
Korea has always maintained a plurality-based electoral system 
however, it also combines the two-ballot system and the proportional 
representation system to complement the weaknesses of the plurality 
system. This hybrid electoral system, combining single member district-
based simple plurality and proportional representation, was theoretically 
adopted to reduce the distortion due to the increasing power of the two-
party system based on the simple plurality principle, the distortion of 
representation due to imbalanced proportional representation and also to 
better represent the minority’s public opinion.6
6  Kim Wang-sik (2006), through his study on the non-proportional representation and 
intra-parliamentary arrival of minor parties after introduction of the two-ballet system, 
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In fact, during the 17th parliamentary elections, the Democratic Labor 
Party won 2 constituency seats and 8 proportionate representation seats, 
thereby earning 10 seats to become the no. 3 party in the parliament. The 
Democratic Labor Party represented ideologies and policies such as issues 
regarding the socially marginalized including the laborers, farmers who 
had been under-represented in the National Assembly until then. 
However, the hybrid electoral system did not fully address the issue 
of non-proportion. Today, the electoral system in Korea is still based 
on plurality, therefore non-proportion is very high. That is, the single-
member electorate (constituency) system seeks political stability through 
plurality, therefore large parties tend to garner more votes and seats, 
benefitting more, whereas small minority parties are underrepresented, 
which poses a problem (Kim Yong-ho 2000). However, the seats earned 
through proportional representation, which was designed to address 
this problem, is increasingly decreasing in number, and the proportional 
representatives (including nationwide district) during the 11th, 12th 
was 33.33%, 25% in the 13th, 20.73% in the 14th, 15.38% in the 15th, 
16.48% in the 16th, 18.7% in the 17th, and 18.1% in the 18th National 
Assembly. For example, the Democratic Labor Party won 10 seats in the 
17th National Assembly, but given the 13% party approval rating and 
the 3.3% of 10 seats, we can see that the non-proportional issue is quite 
evident. Also, the proportional representation system failed to strengthen 
the party politics, because it was used as a mean to bring in external 
figures to enhance the party image and raise political funds (Kim Yong-
bok 2009). That is, even though the proportional representation system 
was introduced to increase representation, the problem seems to persist. 
argued that the two-ballet system did not have a great impact on large parties but 
helped small sized parties to take part in the parliament, which proved to be effective 
in addressing to a certain extent the imbalanced proportional representation(Kim 
Wang-sik 2006).
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Unlike other countries, Korea has a very difficult process of forming 
a party, which serves as a barrier for small parties to enter the political 
circles. The requirements to form a political party in Korea are as 
follows: poetical parties shall be comprised of a central party located 
in the capital, and City/Do parties located respectively in the Special 
Metropolitan City, and in each Metropolitan City and Do, must have 
more than 5 City/Do parties, and the latter should have more than 1000 
members residing within the competent district of the City/DO, and shall 
come into existence when its central party is registered with the National 
Election Commission. Moreover, as for the members’ qualifications, the 
President, the Prime Minister, State Council members, members of the 
National Assembly, members of local councils, publicly elected heads 
of local governments, secretary officials and secretaries of a member 
of the National Assembly, assistant officers, administrative secretary 
officials for the representatives of the negotiation groups of the National 
Assembly, the policy research members and administrative assistants of 
the negotiation groups of the National Assembly, and presidents, deans, 
professors, assistant professors, and associate professors can be members, 
however, public officials, teaching staffs of schools cannot be party 
members. (The National Election Commission website: www.nec.go.kr). 
Moreover, if a party fails to obtain more than 2/100 of total number 
of effective votes, it shall revokes its registration (Article 44 of the 
Political Party Act), and these provisions combined with the Korea-
specific electoral system, serve as an obstacle for new parties to enter the 
political circles in Korea. The majority of voters supporting the Green 
Party are teachers, and the Green Party has an electoral strategy centered 
on citizens’ action and proportionate representation. However, Korea’s 
electoral system based on the single-member constituency system and 
requirements for party establishment and member qualifications seem to 
restrict the political institutionalization of the Green Party. 
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3. Structure of Environmental Policies
Korea’s environmental policies should be viewed in relation to its 
economic policies and deregulation policies. It was the Lee Myung-bak 
administration that first placed the green politics on the top national 
agenda (2008~2012). President Lee emphasized the importance of 
environmental policies since his speech commemorating Korea’s 
Independence day in August 15, 2008. During his speech, he presented 
“low-carbon green growth” as the new national development paradigm.7 
Then in February 2009, the Presidential Committee on Green Growth 
was established and the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth 
bill was presented to the National Assembly, in July, the government 
came up with a national strategy and a five-year plan on green growth, in 
November set national mid-term goals on the reduction of green house 
gas emissions, and in December, the Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth was enacted and finally implemented in 2010. This is 
a comprehensive framework which covers climate change, energy and 
sustainable development policies, which focuses on the elaboration 
of the national strategy for green growth and also includes matters on 
investment in green technologies and green industries, implementation of 
low carbon society, etc. 
However, in major political decision making process, environment 
7  The Presidential Council for Future and Vision which is assumed to have provided 
the ideological basis for green growth has rephrased the conceptual definition of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific(UN ESCAP) 
to define green growth as the "national development strategy to improve the overall 
quality of life by taking green industry (based on green technologies in renewable 
energy, energy resource efficiency, environmental pollution reduction and relevant 
convergence technologies) as new engine growth to transition the economic/industry 
structure as well as the life style into low carbon/pro-environmental(Presidential 
Council for Future and Vision 2009).
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is not fully taken into account, and most focus is placed on economic 
policy, with limited impact of the Ministry of Environment. In particular, 
the position of the existing parties -especially the Grand National Party 
and the Democratic Party- around environment policies is that most of 
these parties did not complete a blueprint on the green politics but placed 
economy-related development agenda as their core electoral promise 
whereas the environment-related agenda was suggested as a supplement. 
Moreover, electoral promises regarding the synergy between economy 
and environment were in fact intended to view the environment as a new 
growth engine to seek economic growth, being reflected in the policies of 
these parties (Cho Myeong-rae 2007).
First of all, the environmental policy of the former Grand National 
Party (current Saenuri Party)’s environmental policy was based on neo-
liberalism, which is a pro-business policy, focusing on harmonizing the 
environment and the economic development. Moreover, in order to 
address the socio-economic inequalities, it pursues policy that supports 
improving individual’s competitiveness rather than reducing institutional 
inequalities. At the time, the Democratic Party (the opposition party), 
unlike the Grand National Party’s economic policy, did not implement 
pro-business policies outright, however, emphasized the importance of 
harmonizing growth and distribution with the market economy system 
as the basis while addressing and adjusting major economic conflicts. 
Moreover, it proposed a social integration by ensuring health equity and 
practical gender quality. The two existing parties’ environmental policies 
had similarities in that they both sought to secure opportunities to hit 
two birds with one stone, that is, to achieve economic growth as well as 
environmental protection. The two parties did not take issue with the 
economy system that incurs environmental problems, but only targeted 
to take measures required to minimize the impact of economy on the 
Earth’s ecosystem (Kim Min-jung 2010).
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Meanwhile, progressive parties criticized the environmental policies 
of the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party and proposed 
policies for a sustainable society. The Democratic Labor party proposed 
to implement a democratic economic system that overcomes the 
capitalistic paradox as the goal of economic policy, while calling for an 
all-out transition in all parts of the society towards a sustainable social 
structure with a goal to achieve pro-environmental alternative society. 
On the other hand, the New Progressive Party pursues a new economic 
system that goes beyond the principle of neo-liberalistic capitalism 
to expand the majority public’s democracy in all areas of economic 
activities. Moreover, from environmental policy perspectives, unlike the 
Democratic Labor party, the New Progressive Party emphasizes ecologic 
values and perspectives, which reflect the values of transitioning into 
an alternative system focusing on the regions that the eco-community 
movements are advocating. That is, these two progressive parties point 
out that environmental issues are not only about natural environment 
but are closely linked to human and social issues. Moreover, they both 
share a common element in approaching the social welfare policies as the 
fundamental right of the socially vulnerable (Kim Min-Jung 2010).
The comparison of different positions on environmental policies by 
political party is summarized as below. 
Table 2: Comparison of Environmental Policies by Political Party
Progressive Party Democratic Party
Former Grand 
National Party
Policy Objective
Complete reform of 
capitalism 
Harmonized capitalism 
Neo-liberalistic 
capitalism 
Core Values
Equality, democracy, 
sovereignty, ecology, 
peace and solidarity, 
diversity 
National integration, 
practical democracy, 
strong middle-class 
nation, fair market 
economic order
Big market and small 
government, business-
friendly country, value 
of family 
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Driver for 
Economic 
Growth
Social welfare, green 
industry
Financial sector, high-
tech industry
Construction, 
engineering project
Environmental 
Policy
Increased government 
regulation
In between government 
regulation and 
government support 
Business-support 
measures
Social Justice Inequality perspective
Conflict-based 
perspective
Equality perspective
Core Supporter 
Base
Laborers, low income 
families 
Entrepreneurs in SMEs, 
middle-class
Capitalists centering on 
large companies 
Source: Kim Min-jeong (2010).
With regards to environmental policies of political parties in Korea, 
the existing progressive parties included environmental agenda, however, 
today even the conservative parties have come to embrace "greenism", 
gradually making environmental ideology to become more complex 
and diversified. Nevertheless, the existing parties in Korea hold a 
rather passive view on environmental policies, and instead of viewing 
environmental policies as just environmental policies, they view them as 
an extension of economic or welfare policies. 
The Green Party places nuclear development at the forefront of 
all environment policy-related issues.8 For denuclearization, the 
Green Party established a strategy to first, legislate the "Framework 
on Denuclearization and Energy Transition" by 20309, second, raise 
8  “Even though the current generations may use electricity at a cheap price, the next 
generations may need to bear the cost of dismantling nuclear power plants as well as 
disposing nuclear wastes. However, if there is no political party that raises questions 
about the expansion of nuclear energy, our future in 20 to 30 years will be gloomy. 
The Green Party at least thinks about and tries to responsible for our future 20, 30 
years after...The goal of the Green Party is to allow our adolescents and youth in the 
future to not boggle their minds because of climate change or nuclear wastes like the 
younger generation today, but to enjoy the pleasure of life.”(Ha Seung-soo 2011). 
9  This will include mandatory shut-down of life-ended nuclear power plants, suspension 
of construction of new nuclear power plants, expansion of energy efficiency and 
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denuclearization as an electoral issue to help elect a candidate advocating 
denuclearization, third pursue energy transition at the regional level, 
fourth achieve energy supply based on the principles of decentralization, 
self-supply, autonomy. That is, the Green Party criticizes the current 
government policy for trying to address climate change issues by building 
additional nuclear power plants. As such, since the direction that existing 
parties and the current government take in nuclear issue is different and 
not of priority, the Green party has a high chance of earning support and 
mobilization of those who believe in the value of denuclearization. 
4. Political Coalition 
 
Until today in Korea, the political institutionalization of environmental 
movements in Korea failed to take place and existed only as a way to 
nominate an environment-related candidate for the elections, so there has 
never been a case of a specific political coalition or union being formed 
to have an impact on their continuity. However, there was a case when 
a progressive party formed a coalition with environmental movement 
forces. 
In particular, the political coalition between the Democratic Labor 
Party and the progressive environmental movement forces is a case in 
point that linked the two possibly conflicting values, environment and 
labor. During the 17th National Assembly in 2004, the Democratic Labor 
Party put forward a slogan “Huge Small Party”, and built a progressive, 
reformatory network that covered experts and civic groups from all 
areas.10 
renewable energy, etc.
10  At the time, Dan Byeong-ho, member of the National Assembly who served as the 
president of the Korean Federation of Trade Union, iconic organization of Korea’s 
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However, through the attempt to form a coalition among the 
Democratic Labor Party, civil society, and environmental movement 
groups, a progressive, reform network was built, which provided 
the opportunity to include the green values into political parties. For 
example, Jo Seung-Soo a member of the Democratic Labor Party, said 
that with regards to the green politics of progressive parties, we should 
embrace their ecological values. Yet, Jo was critical of the confrontational 
perspective of mankind vs. ecology and argued that we should approach 
environmental issues in the context of social inequalities that in human 
society. "The ecological values that the green politics of the Democratic 
Labor Party embrace are as follows: we embrace the socialist values that 
eliminate the destructive attributes of the capitalistic market economy and 
the socio-economic inequalities that occur in the process and believe that 
the existing method geared to growth and productivity cannot ensure a 
sustainable ecosystem.” (Jo Seung-Soo 2007). 
Since a political coalition can ensure the continuity of political 
institutionalization, the existence of an experience of green movements 
forming a coalition with the progressive party in Korea can be a favorable 
condition for the Green Party to transition into a political party. However, 
the differences of opinion within green movements can serve as an 
obstacle to ensure the continuity of the Green Party in the future. 
Ⅵ. Conclusion
Green movements in Korea began when some democratic forces, 
driven by their ideological values, began to inform the public of the 
seriousness of pollution issues, and such movement can be defined as a 
progressive environmental democratic movement. Above all, following 
labor movement, was assigned to the Environment-Labor Committee. 
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the Democratic Uprising in 1987, many social movement forces calling 
for transformation and democratization under the authoritarian regime 
were absorbed into the environmental movements. In particular, after the 
resurrection of the 1995 local elections, environmental movement groups 
nominated and supported “environmental candidates” to gain their 
independent political institutionalization, and by forming the Green Party 
in 2012 also nominated candidates during the general election and the 
2014 local elections, however, failed to achieve an independent political 
institutionalization, with limited effectiveness. 
However, the path for historical development of the green movements 
has served laid the ground for the political institutionalization within the 
framework of the green politics. The expertise and the network of green 
movements in Korea have served as the internal driver for the political 
institutionalization of green movements, which include: solidarity 
between the central and local organizations who set up a joint committee 
whenever important environmental issues were raised, securing public 
support while shifting away from being a movement organization 
that deals with issues temporarily to become a permanent movement 
organization that covers overall local environmental issues, and in 
particular the organizational ability at the local level. Green movements 
played a role of providing assistance for operation, basic guideline, policy 
direction as well as well as political resources such as staffing in the 
process of transitioning into a political party, although not official.
The historical development of green movements in Korea expanded 
the inner strength of movements and served as the basis for political 
institutionalization, whereas the social structure and political 
opportunity structure of Korea had an external impact on the political 
institutionalization of green movements. The following Table 3 sums 
up the structural factors of Korean politics and the opportunities and 
limitations of the political institutionalization of the Green Party. 
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Table 3: Political Institutionalization Conditions and Possibilities of the Green Party in Korea 
Elements for 
Political 
Institu
tionalization
Post-Materialism Electoral System
Environmental 
Policies of 
Government and 
Conventional Political 
Parties
Political Coalition
Description
•  Post-materialism of 
individuals, Hybrid 
type of materialism-
post-material ism 
increases 
•  Failed to develop 
into a  col lect ive 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
action. Gap between 
awareness and action 
•  Hybrid e lectora l 
system of simple 
p l u r a l i t y  b a s e d 
on  propor t iona l 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
system 
•  Non proportionality 
of National Assembly
•  Strict party formation 
r e q u i r e m e n t s , 
Political Party Act
•  Passive attitude of 
conventional political 
parties regarding 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l 
policies
•  Environmental policy 
is not regarded as 
independent issue, 
bu t  l inked  wi th 
economic, welfare 
policies 
•  E x p e r i e n c e  o f 
coalition between 
progressive party and 
green movements  
•  Difference of opinions 
a m o n g  f o r c e s 
attempting political 
e m p o w e r m e n t 
of environmental 
movements / → issue 
of cohesion 
Possibility Average Unfavorable Favorable Average
Table 3 shows that the absence of a political party, going beyond 
the existing ideologies, to consider environment as a core issue, is a 
favorable condition for the Green Party. However, post-materialism 
values still remain at the periphery, and the closed electoral system, 
especially, makes it difficult for new parties to enter the political circles, 
which serve as obstacles for the political institutionalization of the Green 
Party. Moreover, as for the political alliance that has an impact on the 
continuity and survival of new parties like the Green Party, there is a 
chance of a coalition with a progressive party being formed. However, the 
difference of positions within the environmental movement forces poses 
a problem of cohesion, which is not a very favorable condition. Korea’s 
political structure has some room for political institutionalization of green 
movements, and yet restrains their growth, and the foundation for an 
influential environmental movement to be politically institutionalized 
still remains weak. However, it should be noted that there exists de-
growth, post-materialism-oriented voter base who are not mired in the 
existing ideological crevice, many voters not supporting any party, and 
38
Political Opportunity Structure and the Institutionalization of Green Movements 
in Korea 
also an increasing participation from young generations, all of which 
create a favorable condition for the Green Party to become politically 
institutionalized as an alternative party or a niche party. 
In the future, in order to review the political institutionalization 
and sustainability of green movements in Korea, this subject should be 
linked with other elements such as the Green Party’s internal strategy to 
attract more voters, the relationship between parties and social changes, 
changes in party organizations, and the relationship between parties 
and the government. In particular, we are living in a world where daily 
politics that value specific life such as environment, going beyond the 
existing ideology-based politics is emerging, and individuals are directly 
participating in the politics as main actors, and structured organization 
of political participation through IT and social network development 
is taking place. This situation is highly like to have an impact on the 
political institutionalization and continuity of the Green Party, therefore 
the relationship of all the said elements need to be addressed in further 
studies. 
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Ⅰ. Introduction
Climate change has been a major issue in the international relations for at 
least two reasons. First, climate change is a global threat which requires a 
collective action of the international society. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC), the most authoritative epistemic community, 
in its Fifth Assessment Report published in 2014, found that climate 
change effects such as rising ocean surface temperature, melting snow 
and ice, and rising mean sea level are indisputably evident phenomenon, 
that all substances and processes resulting in the perturbation of the 
global energy balance are causing climate change, and that increase in 
CO2 concentration in particular, is the main culprit. The Earth’s mean 
temperature was highest during the last three decades (1983-2012) 
than any preceding decade since 1850 and increased by 0.85 °C for 
the period of 1880-2012. The sea level has risen by 19 cm over the 
1901-2010. Therefore, if the current trend of greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions continue without any mitigation, atmospheric concentrations 
of CO2 during 2081-2100 will reach 936ppm, causing the Earth’s mean 
temperature to rise by 3.7°C and the sea level by 63cm relative to the 
1986-2005 levels. The IPCC expects that an apocalypse will be inevitable 
if mankind fails to control the atmospheric concentrations of CO2 under 
the 550 ppm level (IPCC 2014).
Korea and the Green Climate Fund:  
Expectations and Limitations of Seoul’s 
new Role in World Climate Protection
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The apocalyptic risks caused by an increase in GHG emissions cannot 
be managed with the efforts of few countries alone. Therefore, since the 
end of the 20th century, the international society has taken a collective 
action led by the United Nations (UN) to respond to the threats of climate 
change, which led to the establishment of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 and adoption of 
the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The Kyoto regime was greatly restricted 
in that it defined emission targets based on a top-down approach by 
making a distinction between countries with or without obligations of 
GHG limitations. As a result, following many controversies and conflicts 
surrounding the post-Kyoto regime, a new climate regime is underway 
based on the concept of “Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDC)” focusing on a voluntary participation of individual countries. 
Going forward, all UNFCCC members including developing countries 
will need to establish and fully implement measures to reduce the GHG 
emissions according to their respective capabilities and measures. If not, 
criticisms from the international society will be unavoidable.
Second, climate change is an area of North-South conflict, where 
developed and developing countries have long been in fierce opposition. 
The developing world, emphasizing the historical responsibilities of the 
developed world, has strongly called on the latter to take innovative 
measures to reduce GHG emissions and also provide them with financial 
assistance and technological transfer. Article 3(1) (“common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”) and Article 3(2) 
(“specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties”) 
on the principles of the UNFCCC stipulate that primary responsibilities 
and obligations to climate change lie in developed countries, providing 
the ground for the claim for “climate justice”. However, for developed 
countries, mandatory reduction of GHG emissions implied bearing 
massive costs as well as fulfilling an array of assistance requirements of 
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developing countries, which was not easy to accept. Moreover, the fact 
that advanced developing countries like China and India were avoiding 
reduction obligations and transferring the burden to only developed 
countries was a serious conflict-causing issue that could undermine the 
very existence of the Kyoto regime.
In particular, adaptation to climate change in developing countries 
was an issue that developed countries had long avoided discussing 
about. Mitigation of massive greenhouse gases emitted by developed 
countries was the key to responding to climate change, however, if 
during the UNFCCC COP (Conference of the Parties), the adaptation 
issue of developing countries like the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and vulnerable 
states like African countries was applied to the concept of historical 
responsibilities of developed countries, the latter would have to assume 
huge additional costs. As developed countries were already struggling to 
handle mitigation which was undermining their national interests and 
competitiveness, the least they wanted was to further develop the issue of 
adaption within the framework of “climate justice” and make the financial 
assistance of developed countries a mandatory measure. However, as it 
became clear that countries responsible for climate change were avoiding 
taking adequate measures, ever since the COP13 in Bali in 2007, both 
mitigation and adaptation became the core agenda items in the UNFCCC 
discussions (Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan 2013, 51-53).
The Green Climate Fund (GCF) holds both of these two international 
political issues. Born out of the conflicts and consensus of developed 
and developing countries at the initiative of the UNFCCC COP, the 
GCF, on one hand focuses on “institutional cooperation” calling for a 
collective action of all members of the international society, and on the 
other hand on “climate justice” calling for developed countries to lead 
the climate change response of vulnerable developing countries. This 
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new organization is drawing much expectation, since its successful 
operationalization is the key to the global climate change problem 
solving. Therefore, there is a pressing need to understand the major 
issues surrounding the GCF operations and discuss measures for its 
future development. In particular, Republic of Korea, as the host of the 
GCF Secretariat and advocate of the “Green Growth” concept must not 
remain complacent with its diplomatic feat but assume a more significant 
and essential role for the successful operationalization of the GCF. In this 
regard, this paper will address the different issues regarding the GCF and 
examine challenges and problems that need to be addressed for Korea to 
go beyond national centralism and display powerful green leadership.
Ⅱ.  Historical Background and Major Issues on Development 
of GCF
1. Background
The GCF is a global fund established to support the GHG emissions 
reduction of developing countries and their adaptation to the negative 
impact of climate change. Numerous global funds have existed prior 
to the GCF including the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) 
and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) governed by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) established by the World 
Bank, yet they all had problems in terms of their objectives, governances, 
and sizes. However, the international society began to take climate 
change as a serious issue, and as there was a growing need to provide 
focused and effective support to the most vulnerable states, a large scale 
fund focusing solely on climate change issue was needed. To this end, 
active discussions on establishing a new financial mechanism to support 
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the developing countries have begun since the UNFCCC COP13. 
The development of GCF was first documented during the COP15 
in Copenhagen in 2009. The establishment of the Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund in support of the developing countries was proposed in 
the Copenhagen Accord. The document stipulated that a short-term 
fund of USD 30 billion to be raised over the period of 2010 -2012 to 
help the vulnerable states like LDCs, SIDS, African countries, and a 
long-term fund of USD 100 billion each year until 2020 through grants 
from developed countries to support the GHG emissions mitigation 
and adaptation to climate change in developing countries, and that a 
significant portion of the fund be raised through the Copenhagen Green 
Climate Fund (UNFCCC 2009, 3). However, the Copenhagen Accord 
was not officially adopted due to the deadlock of negotiations among 
member states and ended up being a document to “take note of.” There 
was particularly a fierce confrontation between the umbrella group and 
developing countries regarding the amount of resources to mobilize, 
actors, nature, governance of the GCF, which did not result in the 
consensus on the fund. 
It was in 2010, during the COP16 in Cancun that the decision was 
made to establish the GCF. All GCF related matters included in the 
Cancun Agreements, which is the outcome document of the COP16, 
corresponded exactly to those in the Copenhagen Accord. That is, it 
was agreed that over the period of 2010-2012, USD 30 billion would be 
raised in a new and additional manner to implement a fast start finance 
in support of mitigation and adaptation, and in the long-term, USD 100 
billion would be raised annually until 2020 in support of developing 
countries, out of which a significant share would be raised through the 
GCF. In Cancun, the basic framework of the GCF was defined including 
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the constitution of the GCF Board1, designation of interim trustee2, 
establishment of professional Secretariat3, and a Transitional Committee 
consisting of 40 members was established to explore the Fund’s concrete 
design, with a mission to last until 2011 (UNFCCC 2011, 16-18). Then 
in 2011 during the COP 17 in Durban, following the opinion raised by 
the Transitional Committee, the GCF was established in the form of an 
international organization with juridical personality, and the governance 
and institutional arrangements of GCF were established (UNFCCC 2012, 
55-66).
2. Major Decisions of the Board
The GCF held ten Board meetings from August 2012 to July 2015 
to finalize the modalities for the operation of the Fund.4 The 1st 
Board meeting in Geneva, Swiss in August 2012, discussed additional 
operational procedures of the Fund and the Board and the selection 
procedure of observers, and members agreed to continue the discussions 
on the composition of the Interim Secretariat and Interim Trustee and 
1	 	The Board oversees and governs all relevant components of the Fund and has full 
responsibility for funding decisions. The Board has 24 members with 3 year term (with a 
possibility for renewal), with an equal representation of 12 developing and 12 developed 
countries. Developing countries should include the SIDS and LDCs. Each Board member 
has an alternate member. Alternate members do not have the right to vote, however, in 
the absence of its Board member, it may hold the right to vote. Decisions are made based 
on both one vote per one Board member and consensus approach. 
2	 	Trustee is responsible for managing the GCF funds according to the Board decisions 
and also assesses and records the financial status of the GCF. The UNFCCC COP decided 
to designate the World Bank as interim trustee.
3  The Secretariat supports the Board and is tasked with all administrative affairs for the 
operation of the GCF.
4 http://www.gcfund.org/documents/all-board-documents.html
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budget for the operation. Moreover, an evaluation was conducted on 
six candidate countries for hosting the Secretariat. During the 2nd 
Board meeting held in Songdo, Korea in October, Korea’s Sondo was 
selected as the host city of the GCF Secretariat, and the plans for the 
operational budget of the Fund, composition of the Interim Secretariat 
and Independent Secretariat were established. Moreover, discussion on 
the election of the Executive Director was made, and the World Bank was 
designated as the Interim Trustee.
During the 3rd Board meeting held in Berlin, Germany in March 2013, 
in-depth discussions took place on the approval on the administrative 
procedure of the Secretariat, measures to mobilize resources, selection 
process of the Executive Director, selection of the business model. The 
4th Board meeting held in Songdo, Korea elected Héla Cheikhrouhou 
as the Executive Director, and the framework was developed to select 
the Fund’s business model. During the 5th Board meeting in Paris, 
France, members established performance indicators on mitigation and 
adaptation programs, led discussions on the plan for the initial operation 
of the Secretariat, ways to mobilize resources, and officially announced 
the launch of the Secretariat.
During the 6th Board meeting in Bali, Indonesia in February 2014, 
the members approved the resource allocation model among the business 
models and established measures to establish External Audit and guidance 
on the operation of the Secretariat. The host country, Indonesia, officially 
pledged USD 250,000 to the GCF, becoming the first country to pledge, 
other than Korea (USD 10 million) and Germany (Euro 15 million) 
which had pledged to the GCF during the bidding race to host the 
Secretariat. In May, during the 7th Meeting of the Board held in Songdo, 
Korea, members agreed on the GCF business model framework and 
began discussions on the initial resource mobilization process. During the 
8th Board meeting in Bridgetown, Barbados, members decided to select 
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a permanent Fund Trustee until the end of 2017 and agreed on concrete 
measures for the operation of the business required for the initial resource 
mobilization process agreed on during the previous Board meeting.
During the 9th Board meeting held in Songdo, Korea in March 
2015, seven implementing entities (IE) were accredited and the existing 
business model was improved. Commitments to contribute USD 10.2 
billion were received from 34 countries prior to the Board meeting to 
secure initial resource mobilization, which laid the ground for initiating 
different projects5. Moreover, members further developed the project 
selection and evaluation criteria. The 10th Board meeting in Songdo, 
Korea in July, 13, accredited additional 13 IEs, and the business model 
was further elaborated to solidify the foundation for supporting the 
developing countries. Prior to 11th Board meeting planned for the 
approval of projects in support of developing countries, a total of 74 
countries have applied for projects and the review of a total of USD 1.9 
million has been completed.
Table 1: Major Decisions of GCF’s 1st to 10th Board Meetings
No. Date and Venue Agenda
1 Aug. 23-25, 2012. Geneva, Swiss
·  Composition and modalities for the operation of 
the Board
·  Six Candidates for bidding Secretariat begins 
promotional activities 
2 Oct. 18-20, 2012. Songdo, Korea
· Songdo was selected as host city of Secretariat
·  Elaborated plan for discussing modalities of 
operation 
3 Mar. 13-15, 2013. Berlin, Germany
·  Approved headquarters agreement between 
GCF and Korea 
· Discussed Business Model Framework
5  Through agreement with 21 countries, a total of USD 5.5 billion has been secured. 
The GCF plans to raise USD 2.5 billion of fund every year over the period of 2015-
2018 to secure USD 10.2 billion.
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4 June 25-28, 2013. Songdo, Korea
· Elected first Executive Secretary
· Developed Business Model Framework 
5 Oct. 7-10, 2013. Paris, France · Selected Initial Result Areas Indicators 
6 Feb. 17-21, 2014. Bali, Indonesia 
·  Agreed to place high-priority on readiness of 
developing countries
7 May 18-21, 2014. Songdo, Korea
· Confirmed Business Model Framework 
· Confirmed initial resource mobilization process
8
Oct. 14-17, 2014. Bridgetown, 
Barbados
· Principles of grant regarding initial resource 
·  Progress on discussing Business Model Framework 
·  Developed implementation strategy on capacity 
building 
9 Mar.24-26, 2015. Songdo, Korea
· Accredited seven IEs
·  Progress on discussing Business Model Framework 
10 Jul. 6-9, 2015. Songdo, Korea
· Accredited additional 13 IEs
·  Progress on discussing Business Model Framework 
3. Issues on Modalities of the GCF Operations 
There have been conflicts between the developed countries (donors) and 
the developing countries (beneficiaries) on diverse issues surrounding 
the modalities of the operation within the GCF, which was established 
to help developing countries better respond to climate change. The 
first issue involved defining the relationship between the GCF and the 
UNFCCC COP. Developing countries were expecting that the COP, with 
majority of member states to gain more influence, whereas developed 
countries wished to minimize the influence of the COP and improve the 
efficiency of the GCF operations. After much controversy, during the 
COP17 in Durban, a document defining the governing instrument of the 
Fund was drafted. The relationship between GCF and COP defined in 
this document is as follows (GCF 2011, 3).
“The Fund will be designated as an operating entity of the financial 
mechanism under Article 11 of the Convention and will be accountable 
to and function under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties.”
Here, it is important to note the term “under the guidance.” In Durban, 
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developing countries wanted to use the term “under the guidance and 
authority” to have the GCF under the direct influence of the COP just 
like the Adaptation Fund (Kim and Kim 2015, 113-114). However, due 
to the opposition from developed countries, it was decided to keep the 
phrase as of today (Chung 2013, 217). The developed world believed 
that when all COP member states intervene in the GCF operations, its 
efficient operation would be impossible. In the end, it was decided that 
the GCF Board makes the final decision on the GCF operations, and 
that the COP would not be allowed to become directly involved with 
the decisions of the Board and the Secretariat. Therefore, the GCF Board 
will receive guidance from the COP and only submit an annual report to 
the COP. Redressing the Board’s decisions will not be done by the COP 
as in the GEF, but by an internal independent entity within the GCF, 
which relatively reduces the COP’s authority while ensuring the GCF’s 
independence.
The second issue surrounding the governance of the GCF was 
whether to allow the beneficiary countries’ direct access to the Fund. 
Until now, since the majority of the global funds including the GEF 
allowed international access through globally specialized entities, the 
issue of direct access was an important issue to resolve for developing 
countries, who would generally be beneficiaries of the Fund. The claim 
of developing countries was adopted in the end, recognizing both direct 
access and international access to the GCF.
For direct access, the beneficiary country should establish a National 
Designated Authority (NDA) or a focal point. An NDA is tasked to assess 
the level of the country’s sustainable development to approve the most 
suitable project and submit the project proposal to the GCF.6 Also, 
6	 	As of July 31, 2015, 133 NDA or focal point applications were made. The type of 
NDA can be international, regional or national. For example, Korea’s NDA is under 
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NDA has the authority to designate IEs accredited by the GCF Board 
so that the designated IEs can directly receive or spend the fund for the 
implementation of projects in its country.
Such measure was taken because until now the implementing entities 
of the GEF were limited to a small number of international organizations, 
such as World Bank or UNDP, making it impossible for developing 
countries to directly access the GEF. During the 9th and 10th Board 
meetings, a total of 20 (seven during the 9th and 13 during the 10th) 
IEs were accredited (GCF 2015a, 6; GCF 2015b, 6-7), and additional 
accreditations are expected to follow.
Table 2: GCF Accredited Entities
No. Accredited Entities
1 Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE)
2 Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas (PROFONANPE)
3 Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)
4 Acumen Fund, Inc.
5 Asian Development Bank (ADB)
6 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW)
7 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
8 Environmental Investment Fund of Namibia (EIF)
9 Ministry of Natural Resources of Rwanda (MINIRENA)
10 National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD)
11 Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF)
12 Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC)
13 Africa Finance Corporation (AFC)
14 Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft (Deutsche Bank AG)
15 Agence Française de Développement (AFD)
16 Conservation International Foundation (CI)
the national type, which is the Ministry of Ministry of Strategy and Finance. http://
www.gcfund.org/operations/readiness/designations.html
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17 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
18 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
19 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)
20
World Bank - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) + 
International Development Association (IDA)
The third issue regarding the operation of the Fund is the modalities 
for resource mobilization. The financial inputs of the GCF are defined as 
follows (GCF 2011, 9).
“The Fund will receive financial inputs from developed country 
Parties to the Convention. The Fund may also receive financial inputs 
from a variety of other sources, public and private, including alternative 
sources.”
This agreement, which aims to focus on the paid-in public capital 
contributions and supplementing the lacking resource from the private 
sector fails to address the specific measures for resource mobilization. Out 
of the agreed long-term fund of USD 100 billion, how much should be 
raised through the GCF? How can such fund be raised through developed 
countries since they are already feeling the huge financial burden? How 
to attract the private participation, which is likely to take up the largest 
share, after the public contributions?
The amount agreed for the GCF to raise primarily based on the 
UNFCCC discussions was USD 10.2 billion equivalent, which is likely 
feasible through the paid-in public capital contributions pledged by 33 
countries. The condition for the GCF to become effective is to secure over 
50% of the pledged contributions, and in May 21, 2015, 58.5% of the 
amount pledged to the Fund (USD 5.47 billion) was mobilized for the 
Fund, allowing the GCF to take effect (GCF 2015d, 1). However, since 
this amount is far from reaching the goal of long-term finance, there are 
on-going discussions to seek specific measures for resource mobilization. 
The GCF Board will continue to discuss ways to receive financial inputs 
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from the four public sources including: (1)Other developed countries, (2)
Developing countries that may be willing to contribute, (3)Sub-sovereign 
entities/local governments in mostly developed countries, and (4)State-
owned entities mostly in developed countries and also from philanthropic 
foundations and non-public and alternative resources (GCF 2015d, 4). In 
other word, the possible options are paid-in public capital contributions 
from developed countries, private fund consisting of private investment 
and private finance as well as funding from alternative sources such as 
maritime and aviation shipping sectors, financial transaction taxes, global 
carbon taxes, etc..
Since bilateral grants between the GCF and countries pose many 
limitations today, the GCF needs to receive financial inputs from the 
private sector at least from 2020 in order to mobilize resources at a 
massive scale. The private fund input has been a hot topic causing 
divergent opinions to form between the developed and developing 
countries since the beginning of the GCF (Park 2014, 276-277). 
Developed countries stressed that in reality, it was extremely difficult to 
mobilize USD 100 billion solely by contributions and that a significant 
share of public fund must be mobilized, and wished to establish 
a separate window for the private sector. On the other hand, the 
developing countries have argued that the roles of the private sector will 
be limited due to low predictability of the private fund, distortion of the 
economic status of the countries due to capital investment, non-activation 
of financial inputs in low profitable areas, etc. The private fund is highly 
likely to be concentrated in advanced developing countries (China, 
India etc.) with relatively low risk and high revenue potential, and not 
in the LDCs, SIDS, and African countries vulnerable to climate change, 
ultimately undermining the objective of the GCF. All in all, the proposal 
to set a separate funding window for the private sector was not adopted, 
and instead the Private Sector Facility (PSF) to promote private funding 
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was established to efficiently and effectively support private investments 
(GCF 2013c, 6).
Nevertheless, expectations are high for the private sector in raising 
fund for the GCF, however, without ensuring the cash flow and 
credibility of the Fund, mobilizing private capital will not be an easy 
task. Therefore, the initial funding of the GCF will probably depend on 
contributions from developed countries, and the volume of financial 
inputs from the private source will be determined by the project success 
and investment environment of developing countries. Therefore, in 
the short run, the GCF needs to take differentiated measures to secure 
the limited resources in the hands of the developed countries and in 
the long run focus on building the capacity of developing countries by 
strengthening their NDAs, supporting to fulfill IE accreditation standards, 
developing local human resources for monitoring and evaluation of 
project performance in order to attract investments of the public and 
private sectors of developed countries. 
Ⅲ.  The GCF for ROK: Korea as the Host Country of GCF 
Secretariat and Thereafter
1. Korea’s Green Growth Strategy and Selection as Host 
Country of GCF Secretariat
Climate change policy and diplomacy in Korea were practically inexistent 
prior to the Lee Myung-bak administration. The Lee Myung-bak 
government, inaugurated in February 25, 2008, adopted the “Low Carbon 
Green Growth (LCGG)” as a national vision of the top priority and 
implemented many changes home and abroad. First, domestically, Korea 
established the Presidential Committee on Green Growth, announced 
the National Green Growth Strategy and Five-Year Plan, enacted the 
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Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, the Smart Grid Act, the 
Green Building Act, and defined the GHG emissions reduction targets 
by sector. Furthermore, externally, Korea announced its commitment to 
reduce GHG emissions7, established an international organization called 
the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), established a government-
initiated green technology research institute, Green Technology Center-
Korea (GTC-K), expanded Green ODA (official development assistance), 
elaborated the G20 Declaration on Green Growth, and proposed 
Rio+20 Strategy on Green Growth, leading the international society by 
example in the field of green growth. That is, Korea’s climate change 
diplomacy is characterized by its “me first” attitude of taking the initiative 
even as a developing country with no binding obligations to cut GHG 
emissions and the “bridge” role as a middle power liaising developed and 
developing countries (Kim 2014, 19-25).
Korea, hosting the GCF Secretariat, would naturally serve as the bridge 
connecting the developed and developing countries, and its success in the 
bid will be recorded as an important milestone in Korea’s climate change 
diplomacy. When it was decided to establish the GCF in Cancun at the 
end of 2010, Korea began considering hosting its Secretariat. By hosting 
the GGGI specialized in strategy, the GTC in technology and the GCF in 
finance, Korea hoped to realize the vision of the “Green Triangle” (Lee 
2015, 597-598). During the 112th International Economic Ministerial 
Meeting held on November 25, 2011, Korea decided to bid for the GCF 
Secretariat, and during the COP17 held Durban from November 28, 
it officially announced its bid to host the GCF. The Korean Minister of 
Environment who was the chief negotiator was the first among member 
states to express the intention to bid for the GCF Secretariat in the COP 
keynote speech, and during informal negotiations, Korea proposed to 
7	 30 percent cut from the expected 2020 BAU(business-as-usual) level
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hold the 2nd GCF Board meeting, support the operational budget of the 
Interim Secretariat, and host an international forum on the GCF. Such 
as active attitude was welcomed by both developed and developing 
countries, and the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, Germany, 
Switzerland from the developed group and Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
Philippines, Egypt, Indonesia from the developing group welcomed 
Korea’s proposal (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013, 23).
Korea argued that it had ample commitment and ability to host 
the GCF Secretariat based on the six following grounds. First, Korea 
understands the concerns of both the developing and developed world, 
therefore is a nation optimized to serve as the bridge connecting the 
two groups. Korea’s symbolic role as a bridge within GCF is one Korea’s 
most salient strength since Korea transitioned from an ODA-receiving 
developing country to a country having joined the ranks of developed 
countries. Second, Korea is an exemplary country in responding to 
climate change since it even adopted “Low Carbon, Green Growth 
(LCGG)” as its national vision. Third, most of the environment-related 
international organizations are concentrated in Europe and North 
America. Even Africa has UNEP, however, there is none of its kind 
in Asia. Fourth, Korea is recognized as a developing country, but will 
voluntarily fund USD 40 million to the GCF. Fifth, Songdo, Incheon is 
a city of outstanding geographical conditions eco-system. Sixth, I-Tower 
(after renamed “G-Tower”) is located in Songdo, which can be used for 
immediate purposes and provided permanently to the GCF free of charge 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013, 40-41).
There were six candidates in the race bidding for the GCF Secretariat: 
Germany (Bonn), Mexico (Mexico City), Namibia (Windhoek), Poland 
(Warsaw), Switzerland (Geneva), and Korea (Songdo) (GCF 2012a, 6-7). 
For a successful bidding, the candidate had to win more than 13 votes, 
which is a majority out of 24 Board members, and since there were nine 
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European members on the Board (seven EU countries, Norway, and 
Georgia), the chances of Korea being selected were very slim.8 Europe 
decided to endorse Germany, and the votes of developing countries 
would be distributed among Korea (Asia), Mexico (Latin America), 
Namibia (Africa) (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013, 38). Against 
this backdrop, the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environment, Incheon 
Metropolitan City and the National Assembly focused all their time and 
efforts in the success of the bid.
Six countries -the United States, Spain, Czech Republic, Belize, 
Egypt and the Philippines- were selected to sit on the GCF Evaluation 
Committee. The Board proceeds with the vote based on the report 
presented by the Evaluation Committee and the evaluation criteria were 
based on the following four items: (1) legal status, (2) privileges and 
immunities, (3) financial arrangements, administrative and logistical 
support, (4) local facilities and conditions. After the evaluation, Mexico 
received yellow light in (4) and Poland a red light in (2), and Namibia 
a yellow light in (1) and (4), whereas Switzerland, Korea and Germany 
received green lights in all items (GCF 2012b, 7, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 
and 23). Then, during the second GCF Board meeting, a secret ballot 
was held and Korea was finally chosen as the country to host the GCF 
Secretariat (GCF 2013b, 7).
Reasons for Korea’s selection by the GCF Board members are as 
8	 	The Board of 24 members (12 developed countries, 12 developing countries) consists 
of the following: seven EU countries including the U.K, Sweden, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Spain as well as the United States, Australia, Japan, Russia and Norway in 
the developed country group and China, Indonesia, India (three from Asia), Mexico, 
Belize, Colombia(three from Latin America), Benin, Egypt, South Africa (three from 
Africa), Zambia (one LDC and Africa), Barbados (one AOSIS and Latin America), 
Georgia (others) in the developing country group.
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follows: First, Korea promised to provide an independent juridical 
personality to the GCF by through measures of the domestic law. Second, 
it was the first country with non-binding obligations to pledge a large 
sum of USD 2 million to the GCF. Third, the UNFCCC Secretariat was 
based in Bonn, Germany, therefore the predominant opinion was that 
the GCF Secretariat be located far from Bonn. Fourth, the region, which 
Korea is part of, would see the highest economic growth in the world, 
and accordingly the highest increase in GHG emissions. Fifth, the 18 
members of the GGGI founded at the initiative of Korea overlapped with 
the GCF Board members. Lastly, the shift of paradigm of the LCGG that 
Korea has long advocated was one of the important pillars of the GCF 
(Schalatek 2013, 14). In other word, it can be said that the commitment 
to financial contribution, geographical conditions combined with Korea’s 
internal and external efforts were finally recognized in the international 
diplomatic circles. 
2. After Selection as the Host Country of the GCF
Selected to host the Secretariat of a mammoth international organization 
for the first time in its history, Korea deemed that its internal and 
external efforts to deploy green growth were finally appreciated by the 
international society and spared no effort to provide an institutional 
support for the operationalization of the GCF. It enacted the “Law 
on Support of Operationalization of the Green Climate Fund” and 
promulgated and enforced the Act as of July 30, 2013 while signing 
a headquarters agreement with the GCF, which was ratified by the 
National Assembly on August 27. All these measures were taken to fulfill 
its promise made during the bidding process of providing the juridical 
personality to the GCF or recognizing prerogatives and exceptions, and 
ensuring diverse assistance. Moreover, Korean government made living 
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arrangements for the Secretariat which was launched on December 4, 
2013 by providing office spaces and equipment within G-Tower for its 
use (Incheon Metropolitan City 2014, 84).
By hosting the GCF Secretariat, Korea expects to enhance its 
diplomatic status and benefit from diverse economic effects such as 
increasing knowledge service industries, boosting consumption, and job 
creation (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2013, 99-100). Korea’s top 
social science think tank, Korea Development Institute (KDI), estimated 
that with hosting of the GCF Secretariat, Korea’s annual economic 
benefit would be KRW 381.239 where as the representative think tank 
of Incheon where the GCF Secretariat is based in, Incheon Development 
Institute (IDI), estimated the annual economic gain to be KRW 191.7 
billion10(Kim 2012). Korea is also expected to gain economic benefits 
by taking the lead in environment-related issues, expanding domestic 
capital market, revitalizing the local economy and modernizing the 
service industry (KB Financial Research Institute 2012, 2-3). However, 
compared to the number of analyses on the GCF’s economic impact 
on Korea, there has not been enough discussions and awareness on the 
kind of responsibilities and global leadership Korea should demonstrate 
internally and externally after the hosting the GCF Secretariat to fully 
operationalize the Fund and address the climate change issues of the 
9	 	Consumption expenditure of Secretariat expatriates (KRW 65 billion), consumption 
expenditure of local workers (KRW 12.5 billion), consumption expenditure of foreign 
participants international meeting (KRW 34.2 billion), consumption expenditure 
of foreign tourists (KRW 11.355 billion), impact on GDP (KRW 254.3 billion), job 
creation (KRW 3.83 billion) 
10	 	Expenditure on international conference participants (KRW 124.2 billion), 
consumption expenditure of GCF staffs (KRW 32.5 billion), local consumption of 
the GCF (KRW 5 billion), local consumption of relevant institution staffs (KRW 25 
billion), local consumption of relevant institutions (KRW 5 billion)
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developing countries.
The GCF was created to mobilize massive funds to ensure its adequate 
allocation in helping developing countries to reduce GHG emissions and 
adapt to climate change. It also is tasked oversee and evaluate the overall 
procedure. If Korea as an OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development) member, having joined the ranks of advanced 
countries, continues to merely national interests, rather than seriously 
thinking about how to take the lead in bridging the developed countries 
and developing countries as the host country of the GCF, then, it is 
doomed to face concerns from the international society. Moreover, since 
Korea succeeded in the bid through its diplomatic efforts, if it fails to 
ensure the sustainability of green grown within its own country, a bumpy 
road lies ahead for Korea to display its leadership within the international 
society. 
The issue at hand is that the commitment of the current administration 
lags far behind that of the former government, and that the current 
government tends to not follow in the footsteps of its predecessors’ 
accomplishments with regards to climate change issues and matters. Park 
Geun-hye administration having inaugurated in February 25, 2013, has 
maintained the stance that Korea needs to respond to energy security 
and climate change issues by promoting energy related new industries as 
part of the government’s core strategy of “Creative Economy.” President 
Park seems to have avoid the burden of directly inheriting the symbolic 
rhetoric of “Green Growth” of her predecessor who used to be her 
political rival, although from the same party, and decided to continue 
on with the green growth at the “at a necessary level” by implementing 
energy policies as part of realizing her vision of “Creative Economy.”
Therefore, green growth which was the former government’s first 
and foremost national strategy has become just one the many themes 
required to implement the creative economy, and this massive-scale 
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issue of climate change adaptation at national and global level has 
been incorporated in the overall national energy policy. Moreover, the 
Presidential Committee on Green Growth which was the control tower 
of the former administration’s green growth policies, was downgraded 
to a prime minister’s committee level, losing its influence, and the Green 
Growth Planning Division within the Committee tasked to establish the 
LCGG strategies was abolished. The scope of activities and roles in the 
field of “green” was drastically reduced in major ministries including 
the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Trade, Industry & Energy, 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Image 
of the Korean government preaching the importance of the LGCC in all 
international conferences was no longer to be found. Korea has managed 
to host the GCF Secretariat after relentless efforts, however, ever since, 
has failed to provide any specific plan regarding the country’s role. After 
all, Korea is now faced with the possibility of being degraded into a “Green 
Wash” country which puts forward only short-term international rhetoric 
without sincere commitment and any major internal changes. Therefore 
for Korea to secure its leadership as a middle power, playing the bridge 
role in different climate change issues, it must go beyond the diplomatic 
rhetoric to develop and implement a strong plan and accordingly focus 
first on enhancing its global reputation.
Korea is also making efforts for the fully operationalization of the 
GCF as the host country of its headquarters and is aware that the most 
essential matter to this end is securing sufficient funding. Therefore, the 
Park Geun-hye administration seems determined to lead by example by 
providing preemptive grants and persuading complaining countries to 
help facilitate the expansion of assistance coming from other developed 
countries. Since 2013 and till now, the focus of President Park’s official 
address has been on securing long-term finance of the GCF.
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Table 3: GCF Comments in President Park Geun-hye’s Remarks
Date Event Comment
Dec. 4, 2013
Opening Ceremony of 
the Headquarters of the 
Green Climate Fund
Emphasized the goal  implementat ion of 
Korea, support for climate change response of 
developing countries, assistance for the successful 
operationalization and development of the GCF
Sep. 23, 2014
Keynote Speech at the 
UN Climate Summit
Reported the development of Korea’s new energy 
industries and ETS(emissions trading system) 
implementation, pledged up to 100 million which 
is an increase from existing pledge of 50 million
Sep. 25, 2014
Keynote at the 69th UN 
General Assembly
Will work for the full and early operationalization 
of the GCF and for the expansion of the GGGI`s 
assistance to developing countries
Oct. 17, 2014
S u m m i t  R e m a r k s 
during the 10th ASEM 
Summit Meeting
Confirmed the pledge up to 100 million 
*source: Cheongwadae, Republic of Korea. President Speech. http://www1.president.go.kr/
president/speech.php
During the UN Climate Summit held in September 2014, President 
Park called on the developing world to make efforts for adaptation to 
climate change and the developed world to provide financial assistance 
and technical transfer to this end. Also, as the leader of the host country 
of the GCF Secretariat, she emphasized the importance of securing 
funding for the GCF to implement its roles and promised to double its 
pledge to the Fund up to USD 100 million.
“First, we need to see climate action not as a burden, but as an 
opportunity... Investing in the chance to unlock new energy industries 
and jobs can ignite fresh engines of future growth. Second, technology 
and market-based solutions should be at the center... To encourage the 
private sector to lead, markets should reward carbon-cutting innovations. 
Third, all countries need to be on board. For developing countries, 
however, cutting CO2 can be a burden. To help them invest in needed 
capabilities and build markets, the developed world should transfer 
technology and know-how... The early capitalization of the GCF is vital to 
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the launch of a new climate regime next year... The Korean Government 
pledges up to 100 million dollars to the GCF, including the 50 million 
we are currently paying.”
In June 2015, Korea, by signing a payment agreement with the 
GCF, fulfilled this promise (GCF 2015d, 6). However, Korea needs to 
go further than paying the pledged amount to the Fund and assume a 
bigger leading role in the international society as the host country of the 
GCF headquarters, which requires commitment to identify channels to 
mobilize resources and make proposals to the GCF as a way to contribute 
to responding to climate change in developing countries.
Ⅵ.  ROK for the GCF: Korea’s Action Plan for the Successful 
Operationalization of the GCF 
1.  Internally: Ensure Sustainability of Green Growth and De-
velop Climate Finance Cluster
The Park Geun-hye administration, while announcing the National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap in January 2014, 
declared that the government would send “clear signals to the industry 
as a way of expressing firm commitment to reductions” (Joint Statement 
of Relevant Ministries, ROK 2014, 1). The Roadmap includes the GHG 
emissions reduction targets set by the Lee Myung-bak administration and 
reconfirms the government’s commitment to cut the level by 30% relative 
to the BAU level by 2020. To this end, the Roadmap proposes the vision 
of implementing the ETS, Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), Bonus-
Malus system11 and developing new energy technologies based on the 
11	  Bonus-Malus System which was expected to be implemented from January 2015 was 
delayed to post January 2021 due to opposition from the industry.
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creative economy strategy to achieve low carbon society in all areas. The 
current green growth strategy of Korea, however, has failed to enrich its 
substance and seems to remain as mere political rhetoric.
There are two evidences that support this argument. First is a matter 
of “behavior”, and second, a matter of the “will”. The former is associated 
with the current status of GHG emissions. As of today, Korea is the 
world’s 7th largest emitter of GHG, 8th largest energy consumer, 9th 
oil consumer, and the total GHG emissions in 2012 recorded around 
688.3mtCO2, representing about an 133% increase compared to 
295.5mtCO2 in 1990 (GIR 2014, 31). The year-on-year decrease of the 
GHG emissions decreased occurred only once in 1998 when the country 
suffered from economic downturn due to the Asian financial crisis. Other 
than that, there has always been on upward trend. The same goes for 
energy consumption, except for the one-off slight reduction in 1998 due 
to the Asian financial crisis, over the past three decades from 1981 to 
2013, energy consumption was on constant increase. Korea consumed 
46 million toe of energy in 1981, which increased to 280 million toe in 
2013, showing a six-fold increase for the past three decades (International 
Energy Agency 2014, 183).
With Korea relying heavily on fossil fuels, increased consumption in 
energy naturally leads to increased GHG emissions. As of 2013, Korea’s 
primary energy mix consisted of oil (37.8%), coal (29.2%), natural gas 
(18.7%) with fossil fuels representing 86%, and the reliance on oil and 
coal was at 67%, which was higher than the developed world’s 60% (Korea 
Energy Economics Institute 2014, xxi). The share of non-fossil fuel energy 
sources remained at relatively low with nuclear (10.4%), hydro (0.6%) 
followed by the renewable energy (3.2%). Moreover, as for the energy 
sources for generating electricity whose 75% of primary energies are 
converted or lost, coal represented 38.8%, natural gas 24.7%, followed 
by oil 6.1%, showing that fossil fuels accounted for a high share of some 
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70%. Given Korea’s energy-intensive industrial structure focused on steel, 
petrochemical, and cement sectors, innovation of its industrial structure 
is essential, if not, the GHG emissions limitation will be a distant future.
Second, Korea indicated in its INDC report submitted to the UNFCCC 
that it “plans to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% from the BAU level 
by 2030 across all economic sectors” (UNFCCC 2015b). In numbers, 
it means that Korea will cut the GHG emissions from 850.6mtCO2 
(BAU level) to 536mtCO2 by 2030. In 2009, the Lee Myung-bak 
administration pledged to cut the GHG emissions by 30% compared to 
BAU level by 2020, which meant reducing the BAU level of 813mtCO2 
to 543mtCO2 by 2020. The plan was applying the maximum level of the 
IPCC recommendation to developing countries, which was “15-30% of 
BAU”, and Korea’s decision was considered as the best practice in the 
international society as it had shifted its direction from the “me first” 
behavior towards an “early mover”. However, the INDC proposed by 
Korea in 2015 showed that the emissions reduction target was changed 
from 543mtCO2 in 2020 to 536mtCO in 2030, indicating that only 
7mtCO2 emissions would be cut over the period of 2020-2030. The 
international society expressed concerns over Korea’s proposed INDC, 
which was also rated “inadequate” by the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), 
a consortium of renowned climate change research institutes.12
Measures to achieve reduction target also involves many problems. 
Korea proposed in the INDC report it would use international market 
mechanism (IMM), however, domestically, it reported using statistics, 
that out of the 37% mitigation target, 25.7% would be achieved 
through domestic policies and 11.3% through IMMs (Joint Statement 
of Relevant Ministries, Republic of Korea 2015, 4). However, with the 
12	 	Climate Action Tracker. “South Korea.” http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/
southkorea.html
70
Korea and the Green Climate Fund
imminent adoption of the post-Kyoto climate regime, it is yet unclear 
how such mitigation of 11.3% will be possible through IMM. Internally, 
many policies are planned including the reform on the electricity 
policy, implementation of the ETS and RPS, and further deployment 
of the renewable energies, however, in most cases, Korea is extremely 
dependent on imported fossil fuels and is centered on energy-intensive 
manufacturing industries. Therefore, achieving the target of 25.7% GHG 
emissions reduction does not seem easy. Moreover, the fact that 11.3% 
will be mitigated through IMMs and 25.7% through domestic measures, 
implies that although Korea is not in outright violation of the “No 
Backsliding” principle13 agreed in the COP20 in Lima it is hardly in line 
with the spirit of the principle, which could undermine its reputation in 
the world. 
As a result, in terms of the “behavior” and the “will”, Korea has 
failed to implement the vision that it once proposed to the international 
society. As many countries around the world are preparing the transition 
into a low carbon society with the upcoming adoption of the new 
climate regime in COP21 in Paris in 2015, Korea, as a country that first 
advocated for the green growth and made successful diplomatic outcome 
as middle power in climate change issues by becoming the host of the 
GCF recognized for accomplishment, needs to first and foremost focus 
on the following: adhering to the norms and values that it once proposed 
to the international society and enriching their substance. If Korea wishes 
to take the initiative and demonstrate leadership in climate finance as the 
host country of the GCF Secretariat, it needs to implement a practical 
strategy as an “early mover” and a “norm diffuser” by defining first a 
13  “The Conference of the Parties agrees that each Party’s intended nationally determined 
contribution towards achieving the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 
2 will represent a progression beyond the current undertaking of that Party (UNFCCC 
2015a, 3).”
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clear national vision to improve its fundamentals and diffuse it to its 
neighboring countries.
Together with enriching the substance of the green growth, the Korean 
government needs to focus its energy in successfully developing a climate 
finance cluster in Songdo to seek further development of the GCF. 
With the full and early operationalization of GCF, Songdo is expected 
to become the hub gathering global experts on climate change issues 
from all over the world. The Korean government but also the Incheon 
city housing the GCF, have taken note of this and are determined to 
make Songdo as the world’s leading climate finance hub, but a specific 
road map is yet to be developed. Incheon has provided guidelines for 
development such as fostering Korean consulting experts on climate 
change, supporting Korean firms hoping to enter the green sector, 
building green finance capacity of Korean financial institutions, and 
improving the living conditions of Songdo (Incheon Metropolitan City 
2014, 85-86), however these plans merely focus on Korea’s utilization of 
the GCF for the capacity building of domestic actors. However, if Korea 
wishes to show true leadership on climate change issues in the world, it 
should stop thinking of taking advantage of the GCF for the benefit of 
its national interests but seriously think about how it can contribute to 
the successful operationalization of the GCF. Such change in the way of 
thinking will serve as a win-win strategy benefitting both Korea and the 
GCF as a whole in the long run. 
For this, above all, strong development assistance policies of the 
Korean government are required. Different policy measures need to 
be designed and implemented based on firm commitment, including: 
allocation of special budget for developing Songdo as knowledge-
sharing platform and cluster in climate finance; creation of a government 
organization tasked with the mission to develop and expand transport 
infrastructure to ensure increased access to and from Seoul and Incheon; 
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development of communications & energy infrastructure within Songdo; 
creation of the R&D complex specialized in low carbon technologies; 
development of support mechanisms for training on climate finance; 
development of incentives such as tax favor for relevant industries; and 
establishment of laws and regulations to control speculations in the 
property market, etc. In particular, full implementation of institutional 
frameworks through enactment of laws will add credibility to the Korean 
government’s firm commitment and facilitate attracting massive internal 
and external financial and human resources to Songdo.
2. Externally: Demonstrate Leadership of Middle power 
through Readiness
In order to limit the global temperature rise to 2 degrees relative to 
pre-industrial levels and minimize the impact of climate change, it is 
crucial to secure a massive funding of USD 900 billion every year until 
2050, of which USD 531 billion (59%) needs to be used for adaption 
of climate change in developing countries (Polycarp, Brown, and Fu-
Bertaux 2013, 12). However, the amount of contributions pledged by 
developed countries is only USD 100 billion each year, and it is uncertain 
whether such target can be met. With such a huge gap between the 
amount required and that can be mobilized in reality, there is a growing 
awareness on the need to support the readiness of developing countries 
to address the current issues.
What is “readiness” in terms of climate finance? UNDP defines 
readiness as “the capacities of countries to plan for, access, deliver, and 
monitor and report on climate finance, both international and domestic, 
in ways that are catalytic and fully integrated with national development 
priorities and achievement of the MDGs (Vandeweerd, Glemarec, and 
Billett 2012, 4).” In climate finance terms, readiness refers to developed 
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countries supporting the developing countries to create a more favorable 
environment for the latter so that the former can provide more financial 
and technical investments to the latter to better respond to climate 
change. For example, readiness activities would include all activities to 
support developing countries in assisting the elaboration of strategies 
including national plans, establishment of mechanisms (laws, polices, 
organizations, etc.), feasibility studies, pilot projects, capacity building of 
the banking sector for financial assistance, capacity building in operation 
and governance of projects, etc. 
The GCF has been aware from the beginning that the efficient use 
of the Fund would also require capacity building of the developing 
countries so that the latter would be ready to make use of the Fund. The 
3rd Board meeting made a reference to the experience of the existing 
CIFs and GEF, analyzing that, “a lack of focus on readiness activities can 
delay and reduce the effectiveness of larger-scale investments in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation (GCF 2013a, 2).” That is, even the 
existing international funds relatively overlooked the readiness activities 
for creating investment-friendly environment for developing countries, 
which resulted in lesser efficiency of the carried out. In this regard, 
developing countries need to attain a certain level of capacity in order 
for massive investments from developed world flow in. Therefore, the 
Board has been very aware of the fact that readiness activities in support 
of developing countries to build capacity to elaborate adequate strategies, 
mobilize and operate massive funds from different sources, monitor the 
progress of projects and evaluate their impact are one of the important 
pillars that underpin the GCF activities. Consequently, the 5th Board 
meeting proposed five modalities14 of readiness activities that could be 
14  (1) Assessment of readiness and support needs, (2) Country programming and portfolio 
development, (3) Communication, outreach and knowledge sharing, (4) Advisory 
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implemented by the GCF (GCF 2013d, 5-7), and five pillars of readiness 
activities15 to be supported by the Secretariat with high priority (GCF 
2014, 12-18) were selected during the 8th Board meeting. According 
to the four reports on readiness activities submitted to the 10th Board 
meeting, some progress has been made for modality (1) and (5). With 
regards to (1), USD 1.9 million was allocated to seven countries (Comoros, 
the Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Rwanda, Thailand and Togo) to establish NDAs, focal points or delivery 
partners, and in the future some USD 0.89 million is scheduled for 
allocation in four countries (The Plurinational State of Bolivia, Cook 
Islands, Gabon and Mali). Moreover, regarding (5), the Secretariat carried 
out various activities such as holding regional workshops and webinars, 
launching websites and providing relevant information, to name a few 
(GCF 2015c, 1-7). 
Until now, the GCF’s focus of readiness programmes has been 
supporting the institutional framework setting of developing countries 
for increasing their access to the GCF such as establishment and 
reinforcement of NDAs. Of course, readiness in such a limited sense 
may be needed in the beginning, however, the ultimate goal of readiness 
activities is to develop laws and policies, train human resources, raise 
awareness on climate change response, and build capacity of the banking 
sector and businesses in order to create an environment for developing 
countries to attract massive green investments. Therefore, the GCF is 
now faced with the task of developing readiness programmes to seek a 
fundamental change from developing countries in the long-term while 
service, and (5) Training, mentorship and twinning arrangements
15  (1) Establishing and strengthening NDAs/focal points, (2) Strategic frameworks, 
including the preparation of country work programmes, (3) Selection of intermediaries 
or implementing entities and support for accreditation, (4) Initial pipeline of 
programme and project proposals, and (5) Information, experience and learning
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implementing at the same time the initial model of readiness activities, 
namely providing assistance in setting up institutional mechanisms to 
establish and reinforce NDAs. In the end, without creating an investment-
friendly environment in developing countries, it is impossible to attract 
massive grants from developed countries and private funds which are the 
key to securing long-term finance.
Further development of readiness programmes serving as the basis 
for securing the GCF’s long-term finance can be the role assumed by 
a middle power state like Korea. Given the governance of the GCF 
entitled to all rights and responsibilities of the Fund’s operations, it is in 
fact difficult for Korea to take the initiative as a leader in the decision-
making process of the GCF as it is not part of the 24 Board members16. 
In fact, it seems appropriate for Korea needs to focus on fulfilling its role 
as the bridge connecting the developing and developed world, which 
it had underscored during the bidding for the Secretariat, in order to 
enhance its global reputation as the host country of the GCF Secretariat. 
Readiness is a domain optimized for Korea to transfer its know-how to 
developing countries based on its experience of having transitioned from 
a developing country into a developed one. Therefore, Korea is required 
to continue to assess the requirements of developing countries vulnerable 
to climate change and provide relevant technologies, resources and labor 
related to meet such demand, thus their investment conditions and 
identifying projects to support the climate change adaptation in these 
nations. Readiness activities will allow Korea to showcase its commitment 
to support the green growth strategies of the developing nations and 
will invite active participation from many countries around the world 
to fully operationalize the GCF. And this is the type of leadership and 
accountability that country like Korea, as the host of the GCF Secretariat, 
16 Korea is an alternate member to China which is the Board member.
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can pursue.
Furthermore, the Korean government needs to collaborate with AEs 
with vested experience when identifying projects. As of now, Korea has 
proposed the Export-Import Bank of Korea(Korea Exim Bank)and Korea 
Development Bank(KDB) as the implementing entities. Out of the two, 
since the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) of Korea 
Exim Bank is responsible for providing bilateral concessional ODA of 
Korea and has extensive experience in implementing diverse green ODA 
projects, it is highly likely to be chosen as an AE. However, it is not 
desirable for the Korean government to cooperate solely with the EDCF. 
To have a clear understanding of the demand and identify new creative 
ideas to enhance project effectiveness, the Korean government will 
need to seek active cooperation from the world’s specialized institutions 
including the UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, and ADB, etc. The GGGI, a 
Korea-based international organization specialized in developing green 
growth strategies, also has a high potential to be chosen as an AE. The 
international society expects that Korea makes responsible efforts, as the 
permanent board member to GGGI and host country of the GCF, so that 
the GGGI’s strategies and the GCF’s funds are ideally utilized to support 
developing countries (O’Donnell 2015, 73).
Ⅴ. Conclusion
The GCF announced that it would hold its 11th Board meeting to initiate 
programs in support of developing countries, during the COP21 to be 
held in Paris from November 30 to December 11 prior to the launch of 
the new climate regime. The programs of highest priority for the GCF 
will be in readiness of developing countries which include strengthening 
their ownership to enhance direct access to the Fund, supporting micro-, 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and building the capacity 
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of NDAs (GCF 2015e). When the GCF readiness programs kick off 
smoothly with the launch the post-climate regime, it is expected to send 
a positive signal to the international society. As a results, it will serve as 
the turning point for other countries who have not yet pledged to pledge 
contributions, attract more financial inputs from those who have already 
pledged to the Fund, and secure more funds from the private sector to be 
channeled into responding climate change issues.
However, such blueprint is the most idealistic one. As aforementioned, 
the GCF is a newly established organization that has just made a first 
step, without any long-term solutions to many of the challenges it faces. 
The GCF needs to mobilize massive resources from both developed 
and developing countries, and more sustainable resource mobilization 
inevitably requires engagement of the private sector. The Fund has many 
goals to achieve: creating investment-friendly conditions for developing 
countries, supporting readiness of the most vulnerable countries 
to climate change, reducing global GHG emissions, and ultimately 
transitioning into the low carbon world. 
This presents both opportunities and challenges for Korea in 
demonstrating its middle power leadership in the field of climate 
change. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal referred to the typical behavior of 
the middle powers, the “middlepowermanship” as “[the] tendency to 
pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, [the] tendency 
to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and [the] 
tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide 
its diplomacy (Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993, 19).” Moreover, due to 
such middlepowermanship, middle powers take three forms of identity 
as catalysts, facilitators, and managers: catalysts tend to highlight the 
importance of issues, facilitators create associations through cooperation 
and managers establish formal institutional frameworks and develop 
them into norms. Cooper believed these three behavioral patterns of 
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middle powers are associated with the niche diplomacy, “concentrating 
resources in specific areas best able to generate returns worth having 
(Cooper, Higgott and Nossal 1993, 25-26).”
Until now, Korea has advocated the concept of green growth and 
diffused it to the international society, developing it as a national brand. 
However, for Korea to display true leadership as a middle power, it needs 
to go beyond the diplomatic rhetoric, work hard in seeking substance of 
the green growth at the national level and act befitting its middle power 
status vis-a-vis the international society. That is, as the host country of 
the GCF Secretariat, Korea needs to assume the three aforementioned 
roles: catalyst by promoting diverse ideas through raising awareness on 
the threats of climate change and importance of the GCF, facilitator by 
encouraging engagement of many different countries in GCF activities, 
and manager by contributing to developing the green finance cluster as 
the knowledge-sharing platform centered on the GCF and leveraging it as 
a hub to diffuse green norms worldwide. Moreover, it should be stressed 
one again that Korea needs to go beyond the nationalistic approach of 
merely focusing on calculating the economic impact of hosting the GCF 
Secretariat and seek to comply with the values and objectives of the GCF 
and leverage its experience for the full operationalization of the Fund. 
This will certainly be a wise approach for Korea to adopt to maximize 
its national interests while addressing the global challenges of climate 
change. 
79
Sungjin Kim
<References>
Cheongwadae, Republic of Korea. “President’s Speech.” http://www1.
president.go.kr/president/speech.php
Chung, Min-jung. 2013. “Governance of Green Climate Fund(GCF): 
Focused on Organizational Structure.” Seoul International Law 
Journal. 20(2).
Ciplet, David, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan Khan. 2013. “The Politics 
of International Climate Adaptation Funding: Justice and Divisions 
in the Greenhouse.” Global Environmental Politics. 13(1).
Climate Action Tracker. “South Korea.” http://climateactiontracker.org/
countries/southkorea.html
Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, 1993. 
Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing 
World Order. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Green Climate Fund (GCF). 2011. “Governing Instrument for the Green 
Climate Fund.” http://www.gcfund.org/documents/key-documents.
html.
Green Climate Fund. 2012a. “Selection of the Host Country of the Fund.” 
GCF/B.01-12/09.
Green Climate Fund. 2012b. “Report of the Host Country Evaluation 
Committee.” GCF/B.02-12/04.
Green Climate Fund. 2013a. “Modalities for Readiness and Preparatory 
Support.” GCF/B.01-13/08.
Green Climate Fund. 2013b. “Report of the Second Meeting of the Board, 
18-20 October 2012,” GCF/B.02-12/13.
Green Climate Fund. 2013c. “Decisions of the Board – Fourth Meeting of 
the Board, 26-28 June 2013.” GCF/B.04/17.
Green Climate Fund. 2013d. “Modalities for Readiness and Preparatory 
Support.” GCF/B.05/14.
80
Korea and the Green Climate Fund
Green Climate Fund. 2014. “Revised Programme of Work on Readiness 
and Preparatory Support.” GCF/B.08/10.
Green Climate Fund. 2015a. “Decisions of the Board – Ninth Meeting of 
the Board, 24 - 26 March 2015.” GCF/B.09/23.
Green Climate Fund. 2015b. “Decisions of the Board - Tenth Meeting of 
the Board, 6-9 July 2015.” GCF/B.10/17.
Green Climate Fund. 2015c. “Progress Report on the Readiness and 
Preparatory Support Programme.” GCF/B.10/Inf.06.
Green Climate Fund. 2015d. “Status of the Initial Resource Mobilization 
Process.” GCF/B.10/Inf.09.
Greenhouse Gas Inventory & Research Center of Korea (GIR). 2014. 
“2014 National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report of Korea.”
Green Climate Fund. 2015e. “GCF Board to Assess First Project Proposals 
at Its 11th Meeting in Zambia.” GCF News (July 10).
http://www.gcfund.org/fileadmin/00_customer/documents/Press/release_
GCF_2015_07_10_Board_Meeting.pdf
Incheon Metropolitan City. 2014. “Overview of Climate Change and 
GCF.” Training material of Incheon Metropolitan City.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2014. Climate 
Change 2014 Synthesis Report: Summary for Policymakers. Geneva: 
IPCC Secretariat.
International Energy Agency. 2014. Energy Efficiency Market Report 
2014. Paris: IEA Publications.
Inter-ministerial consensus, Republic of Korea. 2014. “National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Roadmap.” (January 28).
Inter-ministerial consensus, Republic of Korea. 2015. “Korea’s 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Target 2030 to be 37% Relative to 
BAU(851 million ton).” (June 30).
KB Financial Research Institute. 2012. “Implications and Impact of 
Hosting GCF.” KB Daily Knowledge Vitamin. 2012-146.
81
Sungjin Kim
Kim, Ji-seob. 2012. “Annual economic benefit by hosting the UN GCF 
Secretariat is KRW 381.2 billion.” 『Chosunilbo』 (October 20th).
http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2012/10/20/2012102000619.
html?Dep0=twitter&d=2012102000619
Kim, Jeong-won and Sungjin Kim. 2015. “An Exploratory Study on 
Determinants of Allocation of the Adaptation Fund for Climate 
Change Adaptation.” The Korean Journal of International 
Relationship. 55(2).
Kim, Sungjin. 2014. “South Korea’s Climate Diplomacy: Analysis Based 
on the Perspective of ‘Middle Power Diplomacy.’” East Asia Institute 
Middle Power Diplomacy Initiative Working Paper No.5.
Korea Energy Economics Institute. 2014. Yearbook of Energy Statistics 
2014. Uiwang: Korea Energy Economics Institute.
Lee, Myung-bak, 2015. Time of President 2008-2013. Seoul: RH Korea.
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea. 2013. Green Climate 
Fund Hosting White Paper. Sejong: Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance.
O’Donnell, Jill Kosch. 2015. “South Korea’s Role as Host of the 
Green Climate Fund: Implications for ROK Contributions to 
Green Growth.” In Scott A. Snyder. (ed.). Middle-Power Korea: 
Contributions to the Global Agenda. New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press.
Park, Si-won. 2014. “Critical Issues of Finance under the UN Climate 
Change Regime and the Role of Green Climate Fund(GCF) - 
Enhanced support for adaptation “ Environmental Law and Policy. 
13.
Polycarp, Clifford, Louise Helen Brown, and Xing Fu-Bertaux. 2013. 
Mobilizing Climate Investment: The Role of International Climate 
Finance in Creating Readiness for Scales-up Low-carbon Energy. 
Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute.
82
Korea and the Green Climate Fund
Schalatek, Liane. 2013. Setting the Course: The Third Meeting of the 
Green Climate Fund Board Lays the Groundwork for Key Decisions 
later This Year. Washington D.C.: Heinrich Boll Stiftung.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
2011. “Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth 
Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 
2010.” FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2012. 
“Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventeenth Session, 
Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011.” FCCC/
CP/2011/9/Add.1.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2015a. 
“Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twentieth Session, 
Held in Lima from 1 to 14 December 2014.” FCCC/CP/2014/10/
Add.1.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2015b. 
“INDC Submission by the Republic of Korea on June 30.” 
 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/
submissions.aspx
Vandeweerd, Veerle, Yannlck Glemarec, and Simon Billett. 2012. 
Readiness for Climate Finance: A Framework for Understanding 
What It Means to be Ready to Use Climate Finance. New York: 
United Nations Development Programme.
83
Abstract
In 2011, the Republic of Korea, an energy and CO2-intensive OECD 
member state, initiated the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Reduction Roadmap 2020 in order to mitigate climate change. In 2015, 
South Korea implemented the first domestic emission trading scheme 
in East Asia in order to support this process. In an attempt to fulfill the 
allocated domestic emission reduction targets for each sector, the South 
Korean economy has increased investments into low carbon and green 
growth. However, to date greenhouse gas emissions remain on the rise 
and the sectors are failing to reach their emission reduction targets. 
This article assesses the question pertaining to how much additional 
investment is required in order to realize the government’s commitment 
to the 2020 roadmap. 
Central to this assessment, an econometric greenhouse gas emission 
model for South Korea was developed that was mainly driven by macro-
economic investments. Results obtained from this model indicate that 
the GDP-share of investments will need to increase by 9.1% p.a. in order 
to generate sufficient capital to realize the National Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Roadmap2020. Due to different marginal abatement 
costs, however, the induced greenhouse gas emission reductions are not 
evenly distributed among each sector of the South Korean economy. 
Prominently, power generation, oil and gas, and transport are likely 
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to over-fulfill their emission reduction targets, while manufacturing 
industries will come up short on their targeted emission reductions. By 
2020, the manufacturing industries and construction would be short 
about 70 Mt CO2-equivalents, while power generation, oil and gas would 
possess excess emission reductions in about the same amount. In this 
case, the proposed domestic emission trading scheme would be able 
to efficiently allocate the necessary capital for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions and support the sectoral emission reduction efforts. Sectors 
with high marginal abatement costs such as manufacturing industries 
could buy emission allowances from the power generation or transport 
sectors. Hence, additional investments and the trading scheme would 
work hand in hand together.
Ⅰ. Introduction
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Republic 
of Korea has the thirteenth-largest economy and is the seventh-largest 
exporter in the world. South Korea is an energy-intensive economy, at 
number eleven in the world in terms of energy consumption, and is the 
world’s fifth-largest oil importer (IEA, 2012). Between 1990 and 2013, 
its primary energy supply and CO2-emissions grew by 200% (BP, 2014), 
governed by the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework 
on Climate Change (UNFCC), its greenhouse gas emissions (i.e., CO2, 
CH4, N2O, PFCs, HFCs, and SF6) grew by 134% between 1990 and 2012 
(UNFCCC, 2015). 
South Korea does not have a quantitative obligation towards the Kyoto 
Protocol. However, in order to mitigate climate change, in 2008 the “Low 
carbon, Green growth” movement was proclaimed by the South Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak, as a national vision to guide the nation’s 
long-term development (YOO, 2012). In 2009, at the 15th Conference 
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of the Parties of UNFCCC (COP 15) in Copenhagen, the Republic of 
Korea announced its national GHG emission reduction goal of 30% 
below the business as usual (BAU) projection by 2020 (The Republic Of 
Korea, 2011). In 2011, the South Korean government also issued the 
National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, which 
included a national emissions reduction target and action plans for each 
sector. Disaggregated by sectors, the following greenhouse gas emission 
reductions were envisaged: transportation -34.3%, buildings -26.9%, 
power generation -26.7%, public sector -25.0%, industry -18.5%, waste 
-12.3%, and agriculture and fisheries -5.2%. According to the National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, the total emission 
reduction of 30% would be equivalent to a 233 million tons of CO2-
equivalent (CO2e) greenhouse gas emission reductions on a national 
level compared to the predicted business as usual emission of 776.1 
MtCO2e (Ministry for the Environment, 2011). On 1 January 2015, a 
national emissions trading scheme came into force to support the Korean 
government pledge for a 30% greenhouse gas emission reduction, down 
to 543 Mt CO2e (ICAP, 2015).
Between 2008 and 2012, South Korea’s economy grew by 20.5% (IMF, 
2014). According to existing data from the UNFCCC (2015), during that 
period, however, greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea increased 
by 15.6% instead of decreasing by 1.6% as scheduled in the National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020. To counterbalance 
this issue, in 2009, South Korea initiated a Five-Year Plan for Green 
Growth that contained a comprehensive set of projects worth KRW 
108.7 trillion (USD 96 billion) in total investments (Fekete et al., 2013). 
In 2013, investments accounted for 27.4% of the GDP (IMF, 2014). 
However, these investments seem to be not sufficient as greenhouse 
gas emissions are still on the rise. Against this background, this article 
assesses the question: how much additional investments have to be made 
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to realize sufficient greenhouse gas emission reductions in South Korea 
until 2020 in order to fulfil the government pledge. 
In the following, Section 2 describes the development of South 
Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions between 1990 and 2012, as well as the 
current greenhouse gas emission reduction policies. Section 3 provides 
an econometric estimation and forecast of greenhouse gas emissions in 
South Korea required to reach the targets of the National Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020 under different scenarios of the 
increase of investments relative to the GDP (increase of 8.1% p.a., 9.1%, 
p.a. and 10.1% p.a.). It also analyses to which extent the greenhouse 
gas emission reductions would be realized in the different sectors of the 
South Korean economy. The summary in Section 4 concludes the article.
Ⅱ.  Development of South Korea’s greenhouse gas emissions 
1990–2012 and current greenhouse gas emission reduction 
policies
South Korea is a member of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and is a fast growing economy in the G-20 
group. Between 1990 and 2013, its gross domestic product (GDP) 
increased by 13.3% p.a. With its low population growth (1.0% p.a.), the 
GDP per capita increased by 12.2% p.a. during the same period (Table 
1). In 2013, by purchasing power parities, South Korea was recognized 
as the 12th largest economy in the world; its GDP per capita was about 
USD 34,800, similar to that of Japan (USD 36,900) (IMF, 2014). Between 
1990 and 2013, investments increased by 5.8% p.a. from USD 127.6 bn. 
PPP to USD 464.1 bn. PPP. During the same period of time, the GDP-
share of investments, however, decreased by 1.4 % p.a. (Table 1).
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Table 1: Basic socio-economic and environmental indicators of South Korea (1990–2013)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 2013
1990–
2013, 
in % 
p.a.
Population (Mill.) 43.0 44.7 46.0 47.0 48.2 48.4 48.6 48.8 1.0
GDP (USD bn. PPP) 334.9 552.3 773.4 1094.8 1473.7 1559.4 1623.8 1697.0 13.3
Investments 
(bn. USD PPP) 127.6 204.0 236.4 325.0 435.1 459.3 449.1 464.1 5.8
Investments 
(% of GDP) 38.1 36.9 30.6 29.7 29.5 29.4 27.7 27.4 -1.4
Primary energy 
supply (Mtsce) 128.6 210.2 270.6 315.5 363.8 382.6 387.0 387.6 8.9
CO2-emissions (Mt) 252.8 386.1 442.3 494.8 594.0 623.4 625.7 NA 7.2
a
GDP per capita 
(USD PPP) 7,792 12,366 16,817 23,271 30,584 32,226 33,420 34,792 12.2
PES/GDP (t SKE / 
1000 USD PPP) 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.23 -3.9
CO2/PES 
(t CO2 / t PES) 1.97 1.84 1.63 1.57 1.63 1.63 1.62 NA -1.5
 a
CO2/GDP 
(t/ USD 1000 PPP) 0.75 0.70 0.57 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.39 NA -5.0 a
CO2 per capita (t) 5.88 8.65 9.62 10.52 12.33 12.88 12.88 NA 6.2
 a
Source: BP (2014), UNFCCC (2015), IMF (diff. issues). NA = Not available in UNFCCC data. 
a) Annual growth rate 1990-2012.
With a growing economy, and as one of the “four tigers” in Asia (South 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), the energy demand in South 
Korea has increased considerably since the mid 1960’s, at 8.1% per 
annum between 1965 and 2013. As South Korea’s economy is dominated 
by heavy industries such as iron and steel, the chemical industry, ship-
building and automotive manufacturing industry, etc. by large industry 
conglomerates (chaebols) (OECD, 2014), the country has long been very 
energy intensive. The main fuels used in the South Korean economy are 
oil and coal (Figure 1). 
Although South Korea was hit by the 1997 financial crisis and 
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had to be bailed out with IMF loans, the country succeeded to partly 
restructure its economy by promoting the information technology and 
communication (ITC) sector. In 2012, South Korea spent 4.4% of its GDP 
on research and development, the highest share among OECD countries 
(OECD, 2014). The restructuring also helped, together with efficiency 
gains in industry, to realize a decrease in the energy intensity on the GDP 
(only about 4% p.a. between 1990 and 2013), allowing the economic 
growth and primary energy demand to decouple. After this consolidation, 
South Korea managed to recover from the global financial crisis of 2008 
and the following years much better than neighboring countries such 
as Japan (IEA, 2012). The new South Korean growth strategy aims at 
fostering a “creative economy”, in which venture businesses play a vital 
role (OECD, 2014).
Figure 1: Primary energy supply in South Korea (1965-2013, in Mtsce)
Source: BP (2014).
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South Korea does not have significant domestic fossil energy 
resources: no oil resources, only very limited reserves of natural gas, and 
small amounts of indigenous anthracite (IEA, 2012). Hence, the country 
is largely dependent on imports of oil, gas, and coal. South Korea is the 
third-largest crude oil importer in Asia after China and Japan, and the 
Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) is the largest single buyer of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) in the world (IEA, 2012).
Nuclear energy was developed in the early 1980’s in attempts to 
improve energy security in the production of electricity for its fast 
growing economy. Although nuclear energy represents about 30% of 
power generation and 12% of the total primary energy supply, the CO2-
intensity of the primary energy supply only decreased by about 15% until 
1990, and has remained more or less constant ever since (Table 1). 
Compared to the situation until the mid 1990s, the structure of 
the primary energy supply in 2013 is more balanced, especially as the 
share of gas (LNG) in the total primary energy supply is continuously 
increasing. However, renewable energies (hydro, bio-fuels, and other 
renewables) still only count for 1% of the total primary energy supply 
in South Korea (Figure 2). As such, the promotion and increase of 
renewable energies is obviously a task that remains for the South Korean 
government, especially for the future implementation of the 2020 
National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap.
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Figure 2: Structure of primary energy supply in South Korea (1965–2013, in Mtsce)
Source: BP (2014).
The high energy intensity of the GDP, high CO2-intensity of the 
primary energy supply, and slow population growth rate in South Korea 
have led to a considerable increase in the CO2-emissions per capita of 
about 6% p.a. between 1990 and 2012. In 2012, the CO2-emissions per 
capita was already 12.9 tons (Table 1). 
Thus, South Korea has already surpassed Germany (2013: 10.9 t) and 
Japan (11.2 t) and is starting to catch up with the high per capita CO2-
emissions in the US (2013: 19.0 t) (BP, 2014). According to BP (2014), 
the per capita CO2-emissions in 2013 are already 16.0 t; however, the 
two data sets have differed since 1990. Therefore, in order to be able to 
compare the emissions of CO2 and the other five greenhouse gases in 
South Korea, in the following, the UNFCCC data is used.
Table 2 shows the development and structure of the six Kyoto 
greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide 
91
Andreas Oberheitmann
(N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6) between 1990 and 2012. In 2012, CO2 made up about 
90% of the six Kyoto greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea, followed 
by methane (4%), and nitrous oxide (2%). Hence, the main focus of the 
climate change mitigation strategy in South Korea is the reduction of 
CO2-emissions.
Table 2: Structure of greenhouse gas emissions in Korea (excl. LULUCF)(1990–2012, 
in Mill. t CO2e and %)
Greenhouse gas 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Annual growth 
(1990–2012, 
in % p.a.)
Total 294.6 436.5 503.0 559.9 657.2 685.7 688.4 7.3
CO2 252.8 386.1 442.3 494.8 594.0 623.4 625.7 7.8
CH4 32.0 29.6 29.3 28.7 29.3 29.6 29.8 -0.6
N2O 9.6 14.4 18.3 22.1 13.3 13.9 14.2 3.4
HFCs 0.9 5.0 8.5 6.6 8.1 7.9 8.7 20.5
PFCs NA NA 2.2 2.7 2.3 2.0 2.3 0.2a
SF6 0.2 1.4 2.4 5.0 10.3 8.8 7.6 33.5
in % 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Difference 
1990–2012. 
in %-points
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0
CO2 85.8 88.5 87.9 88.4 90.4 90.9 90.9 5.1
CH4 10.8 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.3 4.3 -6.5
N2O 3.2 3.3 3.6 3.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 -1.2
HFCs 0.3 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0
PFCs NA NA 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 -0.1 a
SF6 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.3 1.1 1.0
Source: UNFCCC Data Interface (2015).a) Annual growth rate resp. deviation 2000–2012.
In absolute figures, between 1990 and 2012, the total greenhouse 
gas emissions in South Korea (excluding land use and land use change 
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(LULUCF)1 grew by 7.3% p.a. from 295 Mt CO2e to 688 Mt CO2e (Table 
3). The main sectoral sources of greenhouse gases were energy industries 
(38.9%), manufacturing industries (26.2%), and transport (12.5%), 
together accounting for 77.6% of the total greenhouse gas emissions 
in South Korea (688.4 Mt CO2e). Including LULUCF, greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2012 were 637.5 Mt CO2e.
Although a member of the OECD, South Korea does not have a 
quantitative obligation for reducing greenhouse gas emissions with 
respect to the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate change (UNFCCC). When the UNFCCC was 
adopted in 1992, the Republic of Korea was still regarded as a developing 
country, and did not join the OECD until 1996 (OECD, 2015). 
Table 3: Development of total greenhouse gas emissions in Korea (1990–2012, in 
Mill. t CO2e)
in Mill. t CO2e 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012
Annual 
growth 
(1990–2013, 
in % p.a.)
Total emissions excl. 
LULUCF
294.6 436.5 503.0 559.9 657.2 685.7 688.4 7.3
Power generation, oil 
and gas
53.0 94.6 138.9 182.6 263.2 271.7 275.9 14.7
Energy industries 47.6 91.5 134.8 177.1 256.0 264.0 267.5 15.5
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels
5.4 3.1 4.1 5.4 7.2 7.7 8.3 3.7
Transport 35.5 64.7 69.9 81.8 85.3 85.0 86.4 7.7
Other sectors (buildings, 
public sector)
76.5 78.5 73.3 69.6 58.9 58.3 58.0 -2.3
Industry 96.0 159.4 179.3 188.7 213.6 234.3 231.4 7.6
1	 	Increasing the removal of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere (e.g., by afforestation 
or forest management), or by reducing emissions (e.g. by reducing deforestation) 
(UNFCCC, 2015a).
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Manufacturing 
industries and 
construction
76.5 116.9 129.8 134.9 161.2 182.6 180.0 7.4
Industrial processes 19.5 42.6 49.5 53.8 52.4 51.7 51.4 8.4
Waste 9.9 14.8 17.8 15.7 14.1 14.6 14.8 3.4
Agriculture 23.8 24.5 23.7 21.5 22.0 21.9 22.0 -0.6
Landuse change and 
forestry (LUCF)
-34.4 -35.4 -58.9 -56.6 -54.9 -51.3 -50.9 3.3
Total emissions incl. 
LULUCF
260.2 401.1 444.1 503.2 602.3 634.4 637.5 7.8
Source: UNFCCC (2015).
In 2008, the South Korean government introduced “Low carbon, 
Green growth” as the new goal of its long-term economic policy. A 
50 member Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG) was 
subsequently established in February 2009, to coordinate and evaluate 
the green growth policies of the different ministries and to undertake 
consultations with private-sector stakeholders. It is co-chaired by the 
Prime Minister and a chairman from the private sector (IEA, 2012). In 
2009, South Korea also initiated a Five-Year Plan for Green Growth that 
contained a comprehensive set of projects worth KRW 108.7 trillion 
(USD 96 billion) in total investments, and planned to increase the 
share of public investment in basic research to 35% in order to become 
competitive with other leading countries (Fekete et al., 2013). 
Implementing this strategy and contributing to climate change 
mitigation, the South Korean government in 2009 proclaimed its national 
GHG emission reduction goal of 30% below the 2020 business as usual 
projection of greenhouse gas emissions. The 30% emission reduction 
represents an ambitious pledge in the 15% to 30% range based on 
the IPCC’s recommendation for a substantial deviation below baseline 
for developing countries (Fekete et al., 2013; IPCC, 2007). Table 4 
shows the forecasted greenhouse gas emissions in the 2020 business 
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as usual projection. For 2015, the South Korean government assumes 
the total greenhouse gas emissions to be in the range of 707 Mt CO2e, 
and 776 Mt CO2e for 2020 (The Republic of Korea, 2011). As no other 
data is available and it is not clear which measures have already been 
implemented by the Korean government and taken into account in the 
BAU scenario (Fekete et al., 2013), the sectoral structure in Korea is 
assumed to be constant, and as such the average annual growth rate of 
total greenhouse gases was applied for each year between 2012 and 2015 
and between 2016 and 2020. For the GDP, an annual growth rate of 5.5% 
is assumed; South Korea’s economy grew by this rate during the past five 
years.
Table 4: Development of total greenhouse gas emissions in Korea-Business as usual 
(2013–2020, in Mill. t CO2e)
in Mill. t CO2e 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Total emissions excl. LULUCF 719 714 709 722 735 749 762 776
Power generation, oil and gas 288 286 284 289 295 300 306 311
Energy industries 280 278 276 281 286 291 296 302
Fugitive emissions from fuels 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Transport 90 90 89 91 92 94 96 97
Other sectors (buildings, public sector) 61 60 60 61 62 63 64 65
Industry 242 240 238 243 247 252 256 261
Manufacturing industries and construction 188 187 185 189 192 196 199 203
Industrial processes 54 53 53 54 55 56 57 58
Waste 15 15 15 15 16 16 16 16
Agriculture 23 23 23 23 23 24 24 25
Source: The Republic of Korea (2011), own calculations.
In 2011, the South Korean government issued the National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020. It included both 
the sectoral emissions reduction target as well as action plans for each 
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sector. Based on this roadmap, the following greenhouse gas emission 
reductions until 2020 are planned (Ministry for the Environment, 2011): 
• Transportation: -34.3%
• Buildings: -26.9%
• Public sector -25.0%, 
• Power generation, oil and gas: -26.7%
• Industry: -18.5%
• Waste: -12.3% 
• Agriculture and fisheries: -5.2%. 
The 30% target represents a total greenhouse gas emission reduction 
of 233 Mt CO2e from the current 776 Mt CO2e by 2020 in the business 
as usual scenario, down to 543 Mt CO2e in the same year, by having 
implemented these emission reduction measures. Yoo (2012) presents 
a disaggregation of the emission reduction paths for each sector. Table 
5 shows the planned greenhouse gas emission reductions of each sector 
according to the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 
2020 and the disaggregation shown in Yoo (2012). 
UNFCCC does not provide disaggregated South Korean GHG 
emission data for buildings and the public sector, only its sum under 
the item “1.A.5 Energy-Other”. As the public sector only has a share 
of less than 1% of the total greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea 
(2007 data, Oh, 2011), its emission reduction impact is very small. As 
for power generation, oil and gas disaggregated data is available as “1.A.1 
Energy industries” and “1.B. Fugitive emissions from fuels”. The same is 
true for industry, which can be disaggregated into “1.A.2 Manufacturing 
industries and construction” and “2. Industrial processes”. Note that as 
waste (2012: 2.2% of total GHG-emissions) and agriculture (2012: 3.2% 
of total GHG-emissions) are very small sectors, for reasons of simplicity 
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no disaggregation of their sub-sectors is made here, even though data is 
available.
Table 5: Development of total greenhouse gas emissions in Korea-Planned reduction 
according to the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020 
(2013–2020, in Mill. t CO2e)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Emission 
reduction 
vs BAU 
(2020)
Total emissions excl. 
LULUCF
695 667 638 618 598 579 561 543 -30,0
Power generation, oil 
and gas
280 273 267 258 250 243 235 228 -26,8
Energy industries 271 265 259 251 243 236 228 221 -26,7
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels
8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 -30,0
Transport 86 83 80 77 73 70 67 64 -34,3
Other sectors 
(buildings, public 
sector)
58 56 54 53 52 50 49 48 -26,8
Industry 234 217 201 193 185 178 172 166 -36,5
Manufacturing industries 
and construction
180 164 148 139 131 124 116 110 -46,0
Industrial processes 54 53 53 53 54 55 55 56 -3,2
Waste 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 -12,3
Agriculture 23 23 22 23 23 23 23 24 -5,2
Source: The Republic of Korea (2011), Yoo (2012), own calculations.
South Korea has developed a comprehensive set of strategies, broken 
down into policies and measures for all sectors to fulfil their pledge. The 
government developed 14 different strategies to support its overarching 
Low Carbon, Green Growth vision, including the reduction of industrial 
energy demand, promotion of renewable energies, energy efficiency 
improvements in buildings, public transport, policies of land use change 
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and forestry as well as waste reduction. Most importantly, South Korea is 
implementing an emissions trading system which has started operation in 
January 2015 (Fekete et al., 2013). 
The South Korean national emission trading scheme is the first 
nationwide cap-and-trade program in operation in Asia. With a cap of 
573 Mt CO2e in 2015, it is the second largest emission trading scheme 
(ETS) worldwide, after the EU ETS. This system covers about two-thirds 
of the country’s total emissions and has three implementation phases 
(ICAP (2015)):
• Phase I (2015–2017) has a cap of 1687 Mt CO2e including a 
reserve of 89 million t CO2e in order to ensure market stabilization 
measures, early action, and new entrants. In this phase, 100% 
of the certificates will be issued for free. In Phase I, 23 sub-
sectors including steel, cement, petro-chemistry, refinery, power, 
buildings, waste sectors, and aviation will participate in the trading 
scheme. In total, 525 companies that emit more than 125,000 t 
CO2/year are included. 
• In Phase II (2018–2020), there will be 97% free allowances and 3% 
auctioning. 
• In Phase III (2021–2025), less than 90% of the certificates will be 
freely allocated and more than 10% auctioned. 
Energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors such as iron and steel will 
receive 100% of their allowances for free in all three phases. Banking, 
i.e., saving of emissions rights for later, is allowed without any restriction. 
Borrowing, i.e., using future emission rights, is allowed only within a 
single trading phase. Annual reporting of emissions per year (t) must be 
submitted by the end of March of the following year (t+1). Emissions 
must be verified by a third-party verifier. Penalties for non-compliance 
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shall not exceed three times the average market price of allowances of the 
given compliance year or KRW 100,000/ton (EUR 70) (ICAP, 2015).
Ⅲ.  Econometric estimations and forecasts of greenhouse gas 
emissions to reach the targets of the National Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020
In order to estimate the impact of additional investments to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and to reach the targets of the National 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020, an econometric 
greenhouse gas emissions model for South Korea is applied to cover the 
sectors mentioned in the Roadmap. In detail, the model equations are as 
follows:
Energy industries: (1) GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt = C + α·GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt-1 + β·CO2_KSt + εt
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels:
(2) GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt = C + α· GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt-1 + β CO2_KSt + εt
Transport: (3) GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt = α·GDP_KSt/POP_KSt + β CO2_KSt + γ D112t + εt
Other sectors  
(buildings, public 
sector):
(4) GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt = α·CO2PES_KSt + β GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt-1 + εt
Manufacturing 
industries and 
construction:
(5) G H G _ E N M A N U F _ K S t  =  C  +  α · G H G _ E N M A N U F _ K S t - 1 
+ β CO2_KSt/GDP_KSt + γ Tt + ζ·D111t + εt
Industrial 
processes:
(6) GHG_INDPROC_KSt = α·GHG_INDPROC_KSt-1 + β CO2_KSt + γ D97t + 
ζ·D99t + εt
Waste: (7) GHG_WASTE_KSt = α· GHG_WASTE_KSt-1+ β INV_KSt / POP_KSt + γ 
D98t+ ζ·D101t + η·D107 + εt
Agriculture: (8) GHG_AGRIC_KSt = C + α·GDP_KSt / POP_KSt + β Tt + γ INVSH_KS 
+ ζ ·CO2_KS + εt
With: GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from energy industries in year t (Mt CO2e)
 GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt = Fugitive greenhouse gas emissions from fuels in year t (Mt CO2e)
 GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from energy for transport in year t (Mt CO2e)
 GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from energy for other sectors in year t (Mt CO2e)
  GHG_ENMANUF_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from energy for manufacturing industries and 
construction in  year t (Mt CO2e) 
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 GHG_INDPROC_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from industrial processes in year t (Mt CO2e)
 GHG_WASTE_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from waste in year t (Mt CO2e)
 GHG_AGRIC_KSt = Greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture in year t (Mt CO2e)
 CO2_KSt = CO2-emissions in South Korea in year t (Mt CO2e)
 CO2PES_KSt = CO2-intensity of primary energy supply in year t (t CO2/t sce PES)
 INVSH_KSt = GDP-share of investments in year t (%)
 GDP_KSt = GDP in year t (bn. USD PPP)
 POP_KSt = Population in year t (million)
 Tt = Linear technological trend
 D109t = Dummy variable for the year 2009 (1 for 2009, 0 otherwise)
 D112t = Dummy variable for the year 2012 (1 for 2012, 0 otherwise)
 εt = Error term
The emissions from power generation, oil and gas (GHG_
ENPOWERGEN_KSt), and from industry (GHG_INDUSTRY_KSt) in Mt 
CO2e in year t are defined as:
(9)  GHG_ENPOWERGEN_KSt = GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt + GHG_
FUGITIVE_KSt
(10)  GHG_INDUSTRY_KSt = GHG_ENMANUF_KSt + GHG_
INDPROC_KSt
In year t, the total greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea (GHG_
TOTAL_KSt) in Mt CO2e are defined as:
(11)  GHG_TOTAL_KSt = GHG_AGRIC_KSt + GHG_ENPOWERGEN_
KSt + GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt + GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt + GHG_
INDUSTRY_KSt + GHG_WASTE_KSt
Before being able to run the models, the question of stationarity of the 
time series has to be addressed. Estimating the OLS, including variables 
that follow a random walk, may yield spurious results, i.e., the regressions 
present a relationship between these variables which in reality do not 
exist (Granger and Newbold, 1974). In order to assess the existence 
of a random walk of the variables in the single models, a unit root test 
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introduced by Dickey and Fuller (1979) was applied. The augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test results indicate that all variables applied above 
are non-stationary. Therefore, all variables could be converted into a 
stationary time series by taking their first differences (Table 6), i.e., they 
are integrated at order 1 [I(1)].
Table 6: Stationarity of the model variables
Variable Specification Order of 
integration
GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from energy industries I(1)
GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt Fugitive greenhouse gas emissions from fuels I(1)
GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from energy for transport I(1)
GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from energy for other sectors I(1)
GHG_ENMANUF_KSt Greenhouse  gas  emiss ions  f rom energy  for 
manufacturing industries and construction
I(1)
GHG_INDPROC_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from industrial processes I(1)
GHG_WASTE_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from waste I(1)
GHG_AGRIC_KSt Greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture I(2)
CO2_KSt CO2-emissions I(1)
CO2PES_KSt CO2-intensity of primary energy supply I(1)
INVSH_KSt GDP-share of investments I(1)
GDP_KSt GDP I(1)
POP_KSt Population I(1)
Source: Own calculations.
No spurious regressions will occur if there is a stable-long-term 
economic relationship between the variables in the single models, i.e., 
if the linear combination of the variables are co-integrated (Engle and 
Granger, 1987; Granger, 1986). Applying ADF-tests to the OLS-residuals 
shows that the residuals of Equations (1)–(8) are stationary (Table 7). 
This then means that the linear combination of the variables in the single 
model equations appear to be co-integrated.
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Table 7: Co-integration of the model variables
Nr. Model equation Stationarity 
of residuals, 
significance 
level (%)
(1) GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt = C + α·GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt-1 + β·CO2_KSt + εt I(0), 5%
(2) GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt = C + α· GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt-1 + β CO2_KSt + εt I(0), 1%
(3) GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt = α·GDP_KSt/POP_KSt + β CO2_KSt + γ D112t + εt I(1), 1%
(4) GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt = α·CO2PES_KSt + β GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt-1 + εt I(0), 1%
(5) GHG_ENMANUF_KSt = C + α·GHG_ENMANUF_KSt-1 + β CO2_KSt/GDP_
KSt + γ Tt + ζ·D111t + εt
I(0), 1%
(6) GHG_INDPROC_KSt = α·GHG_INDPROC_KSt-1 + β CO2_KSt + γ D97t + 
ζ·D99t + εt
I(0), 5%
(7) GHG_WASTE_KSt = α· GHG_WASTE_KSt-1+ β INV_KSt / POP_KSt + γ D98t+ 
ζ·D101t + η·D107 + εt
I(0), 1%
(8) GHG_AGRIC_KSt = C + α·GDP_KSt / POP_KSt + β GHG_AGRIC_KSt-1 + γ 
D102t + ζ D103t + εt
I(1), 5%
Source: Own calculations.
Table 8 shows the estimated coefficients and t-values of the model 
equations. The coefficients of the variables are all significant on the 
1% and 5% levels, with one on the 10% level. In many cases, the 
dependent variable, e.g., for the energy industry in South Korea 
(GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt), is estimated using its lagged value (GHG_
ENERGYIND_KSt-1). The lagged value represents the inertia in the 
development of the greenhouse gas emissions in the energy industry in 
South Korea. Based on long-term investment cycles, e.g., of power plants, 
the energy industry capital stock only slightly changes from year to year 
(Oberheitmann and Frondel, 2006).
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Table 8: Estimated coefficients and t-values of the single model equations
(1) GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C -46.61990*** -2.722994
GHG_ENERGYIND_KSt-1 0.698244*** 6.903920
CO2_KSt 0.217275*** 3.233993
adj. R2: 0.99; DW: 1.21 ** denotes significance on the 1% level.
(2) GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C -1.432551*** -4.842208
GHG_FUGITIVE_KSt-1 0.843527*** 13.13292
CO2_KSt 0.005053*** 5.901041
adj. R2: 0.97; DW: 2.51 *** denotes significance on the 1% level.
(3) GHG_ENTRANSP_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
GDP_KSt/POP_KSt -0.403116* -1.573401
CO2_KSt 0.174324*** 15.42488
D112t -9.245889* -1.896528
adj. R2: 0.93; DW: 0.75 *** denotes significance on the 1% level, * on the 10% level, 
respectively.
(4) GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
CO2PES_KSt 14.72552** 2.324540
GHG_ENERGYOS_KSt-1 0.634950*** 4.185995
adj. R2: 0.65; DW: 2.33 *** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, 
respectively.
(5) GHG_ENMANUF_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C -11920.41*** -4.672114
GHG_ENMANUF_KSt-1 0.263566** 2.037152
CO2_KSt/GDP_KSt 188.0280*** 3.940516
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Tt 5.953036*** 4.693031
D111t ***13.81251 2.619214
adj. R2: 0.99; DW: 2.31*** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, 
respectively.
(6) GHG_INDPROC_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
GHG_INDPROC_KSt-1 0.696398*** 5.600262
CO2_KSt 0.031102*** 2.542187
D97t 4.685690* 1.342788
D99t 6.767519** 1.945576
adj. R2: 0.99; DW: 2.31*** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, * on the 
10% level, respectively.
(7) GHG_WASTE_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C 3.683228*** 3.602659
GHG_WASTE_KSt-1 0.827210*** 11.14885
INV_KSt/POP_KSt -0.130989* -1.602772
D98t
t
-1.684783** -2.321687
D101t 0.947806* 1.320349
D107t -1.211179* -1.773914
adj. R2: 0.91; DW: 1.62*** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, * on the 
10% level, respectively.
(8) GHG_AGRIC_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C 3.651516** 2.045979
CO2_KSt/ GDP_KSt 1.910334** 2.051441
GHG_AGRIC_KSt 0.794318*** 8.400914
D103t -0.563931* -1.695974
D103_KSt -0.535149* -1.591395
adj. R2: 0.81 DW: 0.80*** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, * on the 
10% level, respectively.
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Every model equation directly or indirectly (CO2PES_KSt = CO2_
KSt / PES_KSt) contains the variable CO2_KSt, i.e., the amount of 
CO2-emissions in South Korea. As CO2 by far is the most important 
greenhouse gas in South Korea (2012: 90.9%, Table 2), the reduction 
of CO2-emissions in South Korea is the main driver of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions required to realize the National Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020. The CO2-emissions in South Korea 
(CO2_KSt) can be estimated using the following model equation:
(12) CO2_KSt = C + α·INV_KSt/GDP_KSt + εt
INV_KSt are the investments in Korea (in bn. USD PPP), GDP_KSt is 
the South Korean GDP (in bn. USD PPP), and εt is the error term. Table 9 
shows the estimated coefficients and t-values of the CO2-emission model. 
Table 9: Estimated coefficients and t-values of the CO2-emission model
(12) CO2_KSt
Variable Coefficient estimates t-Values
C 1097.531*** 11.15841
INV_KSt/GDP_KSt -2016.798*** -6.684553
D98t -214.4554*** -3.481461
D111t 119.8539** 2.060217
adj. R2: 0.76; DW: 1.22*** denotes significance on the 1% level, ** on the 5% level, 
respectively.
The time series of CO2 and the GDP-share of investments are both 
non-stationary, but are integrated at order 1 (I(1)). As the residuals are 
stationary, these variables can be co-integrated and hence do not yield 
spurious results when using the OLS estimator.
In order to assess the validity of the model, the business as usual 
(BAU) path until 2020 was estimated (Table 10) and compared to the 
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assumed business as usual development of greenhouse gas emissions 
provided by the South Korean government as a benchmark for the 
planned greenhouse gas emission reductions in the National Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020 (Table 4). As Table 10 shows, 
the deviations of the estimated development of greenhouse gas emissions 
are acceptable. The total emissions excluding LULUCF only differ from 
the official BAU-scenario by -0.5%. The deviation of power generation, 
oil and gas is even less (-0.2%). Minor emission sources such as waste 
or agriculture are more difficult to estimate. However, the absolute 
deviations (-2.7 Mt CO2e resp. -4.1 Mt CO2e) are small compared to the 
total emissions of 776 Mt CO2e in the official BAU scenario (Table 10).
Table 10: Econometrically estimated BAU-scenario of greenhouse gas emissions in 
South Korea (1990–2012, in Mill. t CO2e)
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
BAU 
official 
2020
Total emissions excl. LULUCF 667 672 684 699 716 734 753 772 776
Power generation, oil and gas 267 265 268 274 281 290 300 311 311
Energy industries 259 257 259 265 272 281 290 300 302
Fugitive emissions from fuels 8 8 9 9 9 10 10 10 9
Transport 81 84 86 88 90 92 94 95 97
Other sectors (buildings, 
public sector)
59 59 60 60 60 60 59 59 65
Industry 224 228 234 242 250 258 265 273 261
Manufacturing industries 
and construction
171 173 179 184 191 197 203 208 203
Industrial processes 53 54 56 58 59 61 63 64 58
Waste 15 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 16
Agriculture 22 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 25
Source: Own calculations.
In 2009, the South Korean government initiated a Five-Year Plan 
for Green Growth with green investments in the amount of KRW 
108.7 trillion (USD 96 billion) (Fekete et al., 2013). In 2013, the total 
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investments accounted for USD 464 bn. (PPP), or 27.4% of the GDP (IMF, 
2014). In order to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions in South Korea 
according to the 2020 roadmap, investments in low-carbon green growth 
have to be increased. Table 11 shows the development of greenhouse gas 
emission reductions due to three scenarios of annual growth relative to 
the total investment share of the GDP in the South Korean economy.
From Table 11, it is clear that the 2020 government pledge can only 
be fulfilled with a 9.1% annual growth of the GDP-share of investments. 
An 8.1% p.a. growth rate would only reduce the total greenhouse 
gas emissions by 25.2% in 2020 compared to the business as usual 
development assumed by the South Korean government. A 10.1% annual 
growth would lead to a 35% reduction of greenhouse gases in South 
Korea. Correspondingly, the total investments in South Korea would have 
to increase up to USD 798 bn. PPP (8.1% p.a. growth), USD 851 bn. PPP 
(9.1% p.a. growth), and USD 907 bn. PPP (10.1% p.a. growth) in 2020. 
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Table 11: Estimated greenhouse gas emission reduction scenarios in South Korea for 
different annual growth rates of GHP-share of investments (2013–20202, in Mill. t CO2e) 
+8.1% p.a.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Emission 
reduction 
vs official 
BAU 
(2020)
Target 
Emission 
reduction 
vs BAU 
(2020)
Emission 
reduction 
vs govt. 
planned 
scenario 
(2020)
Total emissions excl. 
LULUCF
667 655 643 631 619 607 594 581 -25.2 -30.0 6.9
Power generation, oil 
and gas
267 258 249 239 230 220 209 199 -36.1 -26.8 -12.7
Energy industries 259 250 241 231 222 212 202 192 -36.5 -26.7 -13.3
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels
8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 -25.5 -30.0 6.4
Transport 81 78 75 72 68 65 61 58 -40.9 -34.3 -10.0
Other sectors 
(buildings, public 
sector)
59 59 59 59 58 58 57 57 -13.2 -26.8 18.6
Industry 224 223 225 227 229 231 233 236 -9.7 -36.5 42.2
Manufacturing 
industries and 
construction
171 170 171 174 177 180 183 187 -7.9 -46.0 70.5
Industrial processes 53 53 53 53 52 51 50 49 -15.8 -3.2 -13.1
Waste 15 14 14 14 13 13 12 12 -27.9 -12.3 -17.8
Agriculture 22 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 -18.7 -5.2 -14.2
+9.1% p.a.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Emission 
reduction 
vs official 
BAU 
(2020)
Target 
Emission 
reduction 
vs BAU 
(2020)
Emission 
reduction 
vs govt. 
planned 
scenario 
(2020)
Total emissions excl. 
LULUCF
667 652 636 620 602 583 564 543 -30.0 -30.0 0.0
Power generation, oil 
and gas
267 257 246 233 220 207 192 177 -43.1 -26.8 -22.2
Energy industries 259 249 238 226 213 199 185 171 -43.4 -26.7 -22.8
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels
8 8 8 8 8 7 7 6 -32.1 -30.0 -3.0
Transport 81 77 73 69 64 60 55 50 -48.6 -34.3 -21.8
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Other sectors 
(buildings, public 
sector)
59 59 59 59 58 58 57 56 -13.9 -26.8 17.7
Industry 224 223 223 224 225 226 227 228 -12.4 -36.5 37.8
Manufacturing 
industries and 
construction
171 169 170 172 174 177 180 183 -10.0 -46.0 66.6
Industrial processes 53 53 53 52 51 49 48 46 -21.0 -3.2 -18.5
Waste 15 14 14 14 13 13 12 11 -30.1 -12.3 -20.3
Agriculture 22 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 -19.0 -5.2 -14.6
+10.1 % p.a.
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Emission 
reduction 
vs official 
BAU 
(2020)
Target 
Emission 
reduction 
vs BAU 
(2020)
Emission 
reduction 
vs govt. 
planned 
scenario 
(2020)
Total emissions excl. 
LULUCF
667 649 629 608 584 559 532 504 -35.0 -30.0 -7.2
Power generation, oil 
and gas
267 256 242 227 211 193 174 154 -50.4 -26.8 -32.2
Energy industries 259 248 234 220 204 186 168 149 -50.7 -26.7 -32.8
Fugitive emissions 
from fuels
8 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 -39.0 -30.0 -12.9
Transport 81 76 71 66 60 54 48 42 -56.8 -34.3 -34.2
Other sectors 
(buildings, public 
sector)
59 59 59 58 58 57 57 56 -14.6 -26.8 16.7
Industry 224 222 221 221 221 221 221 221 -15.4 -36.5 33.2
Manufacturing 
industries and 
construction
171 169 169 170 171 173 176 178 -12.2 -46.0 62.5
Industrial processes 53 53 52 51 50 47 45 43 -26.4 -3.2 -24.1
Waste 15 14 14 14 13 13 12 11 -32.4 -12.3 -23.0
Agriculture 22 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 -19.4 -5.2 -15.0
Source: Own calculations.
The required greenhouse gas emission reductions in South Korea, 
however, would not be among single sectors of the economy. In the 
scenario of a 9.1% p.a. growth of investment share of the GDP, Table 
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11 shows that the increase of investments into low carbon green growth 
would especially trigger greenhouse gas emission reductions in power 
generation and transport (-43.1% resp. -48.6% in 2020), but only a 
reduction of 10% in manufacturing industries and construction, and 
13.9% in buildings and the public sector. By 2020, in absolute terms, this 
means that manufacturing industries and construction would be short 
about 70 Mt CO2-equivalents, with power generation, oil and gas having 
emission reductions in about the same amount. Greenhouse gas emission 
reductions from waste and the agricultural sector would decrease by 
27.9% resp. 18.7%, but on a very low absolute value level. This means 
that power generation, oil and gas sector, especially, as well as the 
transport sector is likely to over-fulfill their pledges while manufacturing 
industries and construction as well as buildings and the public sector will 
not reach their greenhouse gas emission reduction targets in 2020.
The different speeds of greenhouse gas emission reductions across 
the sectors of the economy reflect the different marginal abatement costs 
in these branches. For example, the marginal abatement costs in power 
generation sector or the oil and gas sector seem to be lower than in other 
industry sectors. Hence, the same amount of investment leads to smaller 
greenhouse gas emission reductions in other industries compared to 
the power generation sector. Against this background, in the installed 
domestic cap-and-trade emission trading scheme, especially power 
generation, oil and gas, are in a seller position of greenhouse gas emission 
allowances, other South Korean industry sector are very likely to be in a 
buyer position. However, as the emission trading scheme has only been 
in place for a few months, the success of this system is still undetermined 
and is indeed subject to further research. Importantly, the considerable 
spread of marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs between the sectors, 
however, is a positive framework condition for creating a significant 
greenhouse gas emission allowance for trading turnover in South Korea.
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Ⅳ. Summary
The Republic of Korea is a developed OECD member state with a per-
capita income comparable to Japan. Over the past decades, after the 
Korean War, the South Korean economy has grown quickly. Inter alia, 
by largely investing into research and development and promoting 
the information and telecommunication sector since the 1990s, it has 
succeeded in diversifying its economic structure, allowing it to overcome 
the international financial crisis in 2008 and the following years much 
better than many of its neighboring countries, especially Japan. 
On average, South Korea is still an energy intensive economy that 
is dominated by large industry conglomerates. With 12.9 t CO2 per 
capita, the country is one of the most carbon intensive economies in the 
OECD, being more carbon intensive than either Germany (2013: 10.9 
t CO2) or Japan (11.2 t CO2). Between 1990 and 2012, greenhouse gas 
emissions in South Korea grew by 7.3% p.a., with 90% of these emissions 
being CO2. However, although it is a member state of the OECD, South 
Korea does not have a quantitative greenhouse gas emission reduction 
obligation towards the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. When the UNFCCC was 
signed, the Republic of Korea was still regarded as a developing country. 
Nevertheless, in 2009, the South Korean government committed itself to 
reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 30% in 2020, compared to 
its current business as usual path. 
In 2011, the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 
2020 was issued, including quantitative emissions reduction targets for 
transportation (-34.3%), buildings (-26.9%), the public sector (-25.0%), 
power generation, oil and gas (-26.7%), industry (-18.5%), waste 
(-12.3%), and agriculture and fisheries (-5.2%). In order to support the 
sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction efforts, in January 2015, a 
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domestic cap-and-trade emission trading scheme was installed, being 
the first of its kind in East Asia. However, even though South Korea 
has invested into low carbon green growth, to date its greenhouse gas 
emissions are still growing. Obviously, the capital that has been invested 
was insufficient. Hence, the question that now arises pertains to how 
much investment would be necessary to fulfil the National Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020 in the remaining years. 
In this report, by applying an econometric greenhouse gas emission 
model, the National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Roadmap 
2020 was estimated and the related emission reductions forecasted. 
The main driver of the greenhouse gas emission reduction is the GDP 
share of macro-economic investments and the underlying investments 
in South Korea. Results from this model indicate that the GDP-share of 
investments would have to be increased by 9.1% p.a. until 2020 in order 
to fulfill the greenhouse gas emission reduction pledges of the South 
Korean government. Overall, annual investments would have to almost 
double from USD 465 bn. PPP in 2013 to about USD 850 bn. PPP in 
2020 in order to achieve these goals. 
The induced greenhouse gas emission reduction paths, however, 
are different across the South Korean economy due to different sectoral 
marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs. By 2020, the largest impact 
of the increased investment will be seen in power generation, oil and 
gas as well as in the transport sector (-43.1% resp. -48.6%), over-
fulfilling their national targets (-26.7%, rep. -34.3%). In other sectors, 
most prominently in the manufacturing industry (-10.0%), greenhouse 
gas emission reductions are rather small compared to their emission 
reduction target (-46.0%). Here, however, the installed domestic emission 
trading scheme would be able to support the emission reduction efforts, 
as the manufacturing industry could buy emission allowances and thus 
be able to fulfill its emission reduction targets at a lower cost than its 
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marginal abatement costs. In particular, the low carbon investments in 
the power generation and transport sectors could be rewarded with back-
flowing capital from the sales of their excess allowances.
113
Andreas Oberheitmann
<References>
BP (2014): BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014. http://www.
bp.com/statisticalreview. (Accessed 20 October 2015).
Dickey, D.A. / Fuller, W.A. (1979): Distribution of the estimators for 
autoregressive time series with a unit root, in: Journal of the 
American Statistical Association, Volume 74, pp. 427-431.
Engle, R.F. / Granger, C.W.J. (1987): Cointegration and error correction: 
Representation, estimation and testing, in: Econometrica, Volume 
55, pp. 251-276.
Granger, C.W.J. (1986): Developments in the study of co-integrated 
economic variables, in: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 
Volume 37, pp. 213-228.
Granger, C.W.J. / Newbold, P. (1974): Spurious regressions in 
econometrics, in: Journal of Econometrics, Volume 2, pp. 111-120.
Fekete, H.; Höhne, N.; Hagemann, M.; Wehnert, T.; Mersmann, F.; 
Vieweg, M.; Rocha, M.; Schaeffer, M. and Hare, W. (2013): 
Emerging economies – potentials, pledges and fair shares of 
greenhouse gas reduction. In: German Federal Environment Agency 
(ed.): Climate Change 06/2003. Environmental Research of the 
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety, Project-no. (FKZ) 3711 41 120.
ICAP (2015): Korea Emissions Trading Scheme. International Carbon 
Action Partnership ETS Detailed Information. 5 February 
2015.https://icapcarbonaction.com/index.php?option=com_
etsmap&task= export&format=pdf&layout=list&systems%5B%
5D=47. (Accessed 20 October 2015).
IEA (2012): Energy Policies of IEA Countries. The Republic of Korea - 
2012 Review. Paris.
IMF (diff. years): World Economic Outlook. Washington.
114
Low Carbon and Green Growth in South Korea 
IPCC (2007): Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2007: 
Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer 
(eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom 
and New York, NY, USA.
Ministry for the Environment (2011): National Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reduction Roadmap 2020. http://eng.me.go.kr/eng/
web/board/read.do?menuId=21&boardMasterId=522&board
Id=339283. (Accessed 20 October 2015).
Oberheitmann, A. and Frondel, M. (2006): The Dark Side of China’s 
Increasing Economic Prosperity: Will Energy Consumption and 
Global Emissions Rise Drastically? Reinhard Bleischwitz and 
Oliver Budzinski (eds.): Environmental Economics – Institutions, 
Competition, Rationality. INFER Annual Conference 2004, 
Wuppertal, Germany. Berlin 2006, pp. 207-224.
OECD (2014): OECD Economic Surveys: Korea 2014. Paris.
OECD (2015): List of OECD Member countries - Ratification 
of the Convention on the OECD. http://oecd.org/about/
membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm. (Accessed 
27 October 2015).
Oh, D. (2011): GHG target Management Program. Presentation at IEA 
DSM. Korea Energy Management Corporation. Mimeo.
The Republic of Korea (2011): Korea’s Third National Communication 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. Seoul. Mimeo.
UNFCCC (2015): Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data. Data Interface. http://
unfccc.int/ghg_data/items/3800.php. (Accessed 20 October 2015).
UNFCCC (2015a): Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF). 
https://unfccc.int/land_use_and_climate_change/lulucf/items/3060.
115
Andreas Oberheitmann
php. (Accessed 27 October 2015).
Yoo, Changmin (2012): Emissions trading – South Korea steams ahead. 
In: Global Carbon. Autumn 2012. https://www.pwc.com/en_GX/
gx/sustainability/publications/assets/pwc-emmisions-trading-south-
korea.pdf. (Accessed 20 October 2015).

117
I. Introduction 
This year marks the 70th anniversary of Korea's independence from 
Japanese colonial rule. Ever since its liberation, Korea has experienced 
many changes on political, economic, social and cultural fronts. Korea’s 
energy production and consumption have also transitioned greatly 
with economic growth and people’s evolving lifestyles in the process of 
industrialization. Rather, inversely, it was transition in energy production 
and consumption which led to the economic growth and transformation 
of life styles. Electricity, as a secondary energy, especially became 
increasingly relevant as high-level energy, driving economic development 
while adding convenience and comfort to our daily lives. In the wake 
of Korea’s liberation in September 1946, the nuclear power installed 
capacity of South Korea was only 199 MW (Kang Myungng-jang, 1990). 
However as of 2013, it increased more than 437times to 86,969 MW. 
In 1945, the electricity generation output was 711,327 MWh, which 
increased 727 times to 517,148 GWh in 2013. Such change in South 
Korea is extremely remarkable when compared to its North counterpart. 
The power installed capacity of North Korea in 1945 was 1,524 MW, 
which increased 4.8 fold to only 7,243 MW (Statistics Korea, 2015), and 
this is in stark contrast of South Korea whose power installed capacity is 
12 times greater than North Korea as of 2013. 
Many changes also occurred in terms of the final consumption 
Korea’s Nuclear Policy - 
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energy sources in Korea in the course of industrialization. In Korea, oil 
accounts for the largest share (almost half) of final energy with 48.4%. 
Even until the beginning of the 1960s, wood and coal represented 50% 
of energy sources in Korea (Ryu Ji-cheol, 2013). As for households, fuel 
used for heating is extremely important, however, in the past firewood 
was generally used as fuel. In 1950s coal briquettes were deployed to 
become the most widely used domestic fuel for heating and cooking until 
the 1980s. In the 1990s, kerosene became prevalently by installing oil 
boilers. In 1998, affordable kerosene for boilers emerged for everyday 
use, however, as it began to be used as the primary ingredient for fake 
petrol, boiler kerosene has been completely banned from sale since 
July 2011 (SK Energy. 2015). Today, the most commonly used fuel for 
heating and cooking in Korea is urban gas but electricity is increasingly 
gaining relevance as well. Such transition in final energy sources could 
be profoundly felt by average citizens in their daily lives. However, it 
was not the domestic sector but the industrial sector that has driven the 
consumption of energy in our society. As of 2013, the industrial sector 
consumed 62.3% of the overall final energy and 54.1% of power. 
The fuels used for power generation have also evolved. A large scale 
of bituminous coal and nuclear energy has become the major source of 
fuel for power generation going from hydro-electricity to coal and to 
petrol. Recently new and renewable energy has emerged as a sustainable 
alternative; however, it still remains at a standstill. The most controversial 
energy in Korea nowadays is nuclear energy, representing 23.5% of the 
generation installed capacity and 31.1% of all power generation output. 
Nuclear power which did not exist in Korea at the time of independence, 
has now become the major power source together with bituminous 
coal, and unlike the bituminous coal which is declining, nuclear energy 
is being expanded regarded as the “economic and ecological energy” to 
adapt to climate change. 
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Korea is the major world nuclear energy country. After constructing 
the first nuclear reactor Kori 1 in 1972 which began commercial 
operation in 1978, as of today 2015, Korea has become the 6th largest 
powerhouse in terms of nuclear capacity and the number of reactors. A 
total of 24 reactors with 21.6GWe capacity are currently operating, 4 
reactors (1.4GWe each) are under construction and additional 8 reactors 
are scheduled for construction. Moreover, Korea has gone beyond its 
borders to export nuclear generation abroad. In 2009, Korea signed a $20 
billion contract with the UAE and is currently building 4 reactors. Korea 
has continued to achieve economic development by supplying abundant, 
stable and affordable power by consistently expanding nuclear reactors. 
Then, to where is Korea’s nuclear development policy headed? and is it 
sustainable? 
Korea liberated itself from the Japanese imperialism with the 
atomic bombings of America and achieved modernization, however its 
nuclear energy which had been adopted and expanded in the course 
of modernizing the country has led to numerous problems, reinforcing 
risks inherent in society. Korea is currently standing at the crossroads 
of having to decide whether to continue relying on nuclear energy or 
opt for denuclearization. Based on this historical background, this paper 
aims to examine the past, present and future of Korea’s nuclear policies. 
It also aims to study how nuclear power plants have expanded in Korea 
according to the evolution of nuclear policies and the social response 
thereof. Korea’s nuclear policies are not merely an issue regarding 
Korea. Chances are high that Korea, as the world’s major nuclear energy 
country, will have a great impact on other countries such as developing 
ones seeking to achieve substantial economic growth. Moreover, as seen 
from the 1986 Chernobyl incident of the Soviet and the 2011 Fukushima 
nuclear accident in Japan, since the consequences of a nuclear accident 
go beyond the boundaries of the affected country, nuclear safety of Korea 
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is not just confined to Korea but goes beyond its borders, therefore it is 
quite relevant to examine the present and future of Korea’s nuclear energy 
policy focusing on continuous expansion. 
II. Situation of Nuclear Power Generation in Korea
Nuclear energy is the major source for power generation in Korea. Ever 
since the commercial operation of Korea’s first 587MW nuclear reactor 
in 1978, nuclear generation facilities and total output in Korea have 
achieved a constant growth. Nuclear energy with a total output of 3.5GWh 
in 1978, representing 8.5% of all installed capacity and 9.4% all power 
output increased to 20,716MW and 156,407GWh respectively in 2014, 
each representing 22.2% of the total installed capacity and 30.0% of the 
total power output. There are currently a total of 24 nuclear reactors in 
operation as of September 2015, with 4 under construction and planned 
for construction. Among the operating reactors, 20 are pressurized light 
water reactors with Wolsong 1& 4 being the only pressurized heavy 
water reactors. Nuclear power plants and reactors in Korea are located as 
seen in Image 1. 
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Image 1: Existing and Planned Nuclear Power Plant Sites in Korea 
Note: Site indicated in parenthesis is where each reactor is located. 
Nuclear reactors indicated in light yellow circle are currently operating, and dark yellow 
represents pressurized heavy water reactors. And the circles with red borders indicate reactors 
whose design life will expire in 15 years in 2015. 
Reactors in dark grey are those under construction and in light grey are planned for 
construction. 
Shin Kori 7 & 8 are planned for construction as Cheonji 1, 2 in Youngdeok, yet it is difficult 
to ascertain that the site has been confirmed as Youngdeok. 
Reactors in light grey without borders are whose site has not been yet confirmed. Additional 2 
reactors planned for construction will be either built in Youngdeok or Samcheok 
Korea consists of 17 metropolitan local autonomous groups, and 
nuclear plants are located in the Busan Metropolitan City Kijang-gun, 
Ulsan Metropolitan City Ulju-gun, Gyeongsangbuk-do Gyeongju-
si, Gyeongsangbuk-do Ulchin-gun, and Cholla-namdo Youngkwang-
gun. The Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant and Shin Wolsong Nuclear 
Power Plant border Yangnam-myeon and Yangbuk-myeon respectively, 
therefore together are referred to as the “Wolsong Nuclear Power Plants.” 
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Hanul Nuclear Power Plant and Shin Hanul Nuclear Power Plants are 
both located in Gyeongbuk Ulchin-gun, both referred to as “Hanul 
Nuclear Power Plants.” Kori Nuclear Power Plant located in Busan-si 
Kijang-gun and Shin Kori Nuclear Power Plant located in Ulsan City 
Ulju-gun do not belong to the same administrative district, however, 
since they share administrative borders are referred to as “Kori Nuclear 
Power Plants.” The “Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant” is located in Chonnam 
Youngkwang-gun. Hanul Nuclear Power Plant and Hanbit Nuclear Power 
Plant were referred to as “Ulchin Nuclear Power Plant” and “Youngkwang 
Nuclear Power Plant” based on their geographical location, however, with 
the general perception that nuclear power plants revealing the same name 
as the administrative district they belong to would have a negative impact 
on the local economy and image, local residents demanded that the name 
of the nuclear plants be changed, thus was adopted the current name in 
May 2013. Four reactors were planned for construction in Shin Kori and 
2 in Shin Ulchin, however, 2 units (no. 7 & 8) out of 4 planned for the 
Shin Kori site were decided to be built in Youngdeok as Cheonji 1 & 2. 
By 2022, when construction of the currently planned nuclear reactors 
will be completed, there will be 10 units operating in Kori (4 in Kori + 6 
in Shin Kori), 6 in Wolsong (4 in Wolsong +2 in Shin Wolsong), and 10 
in Hanul (6 in Hanul) + 4 in Shin Hanul, 6 in Hanbit, and 2 in Cheonji, 
Youngdeok. Moreover, 2 additional units will be constructed either in 
Youngdeok or Samcheok, however, the site is yet to be confirmed due to 
resistance from local residents. 
With 24 nuclear reactors under operation, Korea holds a significant 
position in terms of nuclear development. Table 1 ranks Korea as the 
world’s 6th in terms of nuclear installed capacity and the number of 
reactors and 4th in terms of the installed capacity and nuclear power 
generation of the reactors under construction. Above all, Korea ranks 
no.1 in terms of nuclear generation density which is derived by dividing 
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the total nuclear installed capacity with the land surface area. This 
indicates that many nuclear power plants are concentrated in such a small 
territorial space. Since Belgium, Taiwan, Japan, France and Switzerland 
ranking from 2nd to 5th place in nuclear density have either abandoned 
their pro-nuclear policies or will not expand their nuclear policy, Korea 
is expected to continue to top the list. High nuclear density means that 
the nuclear reactors are concentrated in a small area of land, thus in case 
of a nuclear accident, the entire territory is subject to contamination. 
Korea also ranks high in the number and capacity of reactors under 
construction, which probably will increase the nuclear density. As of 
August 2015, a total of 72 nuclear reactors with 76.3 GWe capacity are 
under construction globally, and Korea ranks 5th (4 under construction) 
following China (24), Russia (8), India (6), and US (5) whereas in terms 
of installed capacity it ranks 4th (5.6GWe) following China (27.4GWe), 
Russia (8.0GWe), and the US (6.3GWe). Going forward, Korea is 
expected to continue to rank high globally in nuclear energy generation.
Table 1: The World Major Nuclear Power Countries
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th World
Installation capacity
(GWe (#))*
US France Japan Russia China S. Korea 380.8 
(437)98.8 (99) 63.1 (58) 40.5 (43) 25.3 (34) 23.1 (26) 21.7 (24)
Reactors under 
construction
(GWe (#))*
China Russia US S. Korea India UAE
76.3 
(72)27.4 (25) 8.0 (9) 6.0 (5) 5.6 (4) 4.3 (6) 4.2 (3)
Nuclear generation
(TWh)**
US France Russia S. Korea China Canada
2,461
798.6 418 169.1 149.2 123.8 98.6
Nuclear density
(kW/km2)**
S. Korea Belgium Taiwan Japan France Swiss
-
216.5 194.3 139.8 117.0 115.3 78.8
Note: * As of August, 2015; ** 2014 statistics
Source: World Nuclear Association Homepage.
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Not only are nuclear power plants in Korea quite densely located 
compared to the national land surface, they are concentrated in specific 
areas of the country, primarily in a limited number of regions. As of April 
2015, a total of 443 nuclear reactors are located in 187 nuclear power 
plant sites around the world. Among them, there are only 11 sites which 
have more than 6 reactors, accounting for only 6% of all cases. As for 
Korea, all 4 nuclear power plant sites fall under this category. Overall, the 
nationwide density is not only high but also site-specific density is very 
high in the world. Ulchin ranks number 2 in the number of reactors it 
accommodates and installed capacity per site with six 6216MW Hanul 
reactors, and Youngkwang the third place with six 6193MW reactors 
in the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant, and Kori (six, 5107MW) ranking 
6th and Wolsong (six, 4809MW) the world’s 7th. Moreover, since Shin 
Kori 3 & 4, Hanul 1&2 are under construction, and Shin Kori 5&6, 
Shin Hanul 3 & 4 are planned for construction, Korea’s density per site 
ranking will soon go up again. (See Table 2). The high population density 
surrounding the sites is another issue. There are 3.4 million residents 
living in the vicinity of the Kori Nuclear Power Plant, which makes it one 
of the most densely populated regions in the world. A total of 10 nuclear 
reactors are planned for construction, which will eventually operate in 
these densely populated regions. Then nuclear centralization of multiple 
nuclear reactors being concentrated in one site will incur risks for the 
surrounding environment, and in case of accidents due to human error 
or terror, it will be difficult for these reactors to ensure power supply, 
triggering serious problem by disrupting stable supply of electricity 
throughout the country. 
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Table 2: Global Nuclear Reactors by Nuclear Power Plant Site
(As of April 2015)
1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units 5 units
6 units 
or more
Total
(443 units)
No. of sites 53 77 18 28 0 11 187 sites
Share (%) 28 14 10 15 0 6 100%
Source: See IAEA and WNA websites; compilation of Green Peace website data
The total installed capacity of nuclear power plants operating in 
Korea is 20.7GW as shown in <Table 3>. The total power output from 
nuclear energy increased 11,200 times from 2,324GWh in 1978 to 
138,784GWh in 2013. As for the lifespan of Korean nuclear reactors, 
the first reactor Kori 1 and 4 pressurized heavy water type units in 
Wolsong Nuclear Power Plant are 30 years, and the rest are all 40 years. 
Kori 1 and Wolsong 1 have extended their licenses after going through 
a safety inspection and are currently in operation. Kori 1 which reached 
mass criticality in 1977 and went into commercial operation from 
1978 reached the end of its 30 year license in June 2007, however after 
undergoing a safety inspection, it was authorized for extension by 10 
more years until June 2017, and is currently operating. 
In Korea, to extend the license of nuclear reactors whose design life 
has expired, it is required to file an application 2 years before the license 
ends. As for Kori 1, with the deadline for license extension drawing near 
in June 2017, the application for extension should have been submitted 
by June 2015. However, despite growing social concerns over the safety 
of outdated nuclear power plants following Japan’s Fukushima nuclear 
accident and controversies and social protests thereof, the Nuclear 
Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) decided to extend the license of 
Wolsong 1 for another 10 years in February 2012. However, due to the 
aggravated public opinion, the operator KHNP gave up on applying to 
extend license, accepting the recommendation of the Energy Committee 
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under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. As a result, in June 
2017, Korea’s first nuclear reactor will be shut down due to the expiration 
of design life. The 30 year life of Wolsong Nuclear Reactor Unit 1 expired 
in November 2012, and an application was made to extend its license in 
November 2010. However, with the stress test following the Fukushima 
accident, the deliberation for extension was delayed. Despite the social 
controversies that will be addressed later on in this paper, the NSSC 
approved extending the license of Wolsong 1 in February 27, 2015, 
which went into extended operation since June 23, 2015. In Korea, 
nuclear power plant construction in the 1980s took place at a rapid pace, 
thus added to the Kori 1 and Wolsong 1, there are 10 other units, thus 12 
in total which will have their license expire before 2030. These reactors 
are indicated in red borders in Image 1. The details of reactors by site are 
as seen in Table 3. 
Table 3: Current Status of Nuclear Power Plants and Characteristic of Reactors by 
Site in Korea 
Category
Installed 
capacity 
(MW)
Reactor 
Type
Design 
Life
Site
Date of 
Commercial 
Operation
Expiry of 
Design Life
Accumulated 
Generation since 
Commercial 
Operation(MWh)
Kori
#1  587
PWR
30+10
Busan-si, 
Kijang-gun, 
Jangan-eup
’78. 04. 29
’07. 06. 18
(’17. 06. 18)
139,100,959 
#2  650
40
’83. 07. 25 ’23. 04. 08 152,662,105 
#3  950 ’85. 09. 30 ’24. 09. 28 211,557,529 
#4  950 ’86. 04. 29 ’25. 08. 06 210,994,714 
Shin 
Kori
#1 1,000 PWR
(OPR 1000)
40
Ulsan-si, 
Ulju-gun, 
Seosaeng-
myeon
’11. 02. 28 ’50. 05. 18 17,547,481 
#2 1,000 ’12. 07. 20 ’52. 07. 00 7,810,602 
#3 1,400
PWR
(APR 1400)
Under construction(began installing reactors: 
’10.7.15/’11.7.18)#4 1,400
#5 1,400 Planned for construction (completion 
expected in ’19.12/’20.12)#6 1,400
#7 1,500
APR 1500
Will be changed to Youngdeok 1 & 2 for construction 
(completion expected in ’23.12/’24.12)#8 1,500
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Wolsong
#1  679
PHWR
30+10
Gyeongbuk 
Gyeongju-
si Yangnam-
myeon
’83. 04. 22
’12. 11. 20
(’22. 11. 20)
139,044,905 
#2  700
30
’97. 07. 01 ’26. 11. 01 95,944,468 
#3  700 ’98. 07. 01 ’27. 12. 29 91,999,136 
#4  700 ’99. 10. 01 ’29. 02. 07 85,378,185 
Shin 
Wolsong
#1 1,000
PWR
(OPR 1000)
40
Gyeongju-
si Yangbuk-
myeon
’12. 07. 31 ’52. 01. 26 7,175,956 
#2 1,000 ’15. 07. 24 ’55. 02. 08  -
Hanbit
#1  950
PWR 40
Chonnam 
Youngkwang-
gun 
Hongnong-
eup
’86. 08. 25 ’25. 12. 22 206,208,737 
#2  950 ’87. 06. 10 ’26. 09. 11 195,768,235 
#3 1,000 ’95. 03. 31 ’34. 09. 08 149,470,395 
#4 1,000 ’96. 01. 01 ’35. 06. 01 147,372,010 
#5 1,000 ’02. 05. 21 ’41. 10. 23 93,569,055 
#6 1,000 ’02. 12. 24 ’42. 07. 30 91,150,817 
Hanul
#1  950
PWR 40
Gyeongbuk 
Ulchin-gun, 
Buk-myeon
’88. 09. 10 ’27. 12. 22 186,904,472 
#2  950 ’89. 09. 30 ’28. 12. 28 182,779,731 
#3 1,000 ’98. 08. 11 ’37. 11. 07 128,103,642 
#4 1,000 ’99. 12. 31 ’38. 10. 28 101,810,665 
#5 1,000 ’04. 07. 29 ’43. 10. 19 80,141,450 
#6 1,000 ’05. 04. 22 ’44. 11. 11 74,483,497 
Shin 
Hanul
#1 1,400
PWR
(APR 1400)
40
Under construction(groundbreaking: 
’10.4.30; began installing reactor in: ’14.7.20)#2 1,400
#3 1,400 Planned for construction
(completion expected in ’20.6/’21.6 )#4 1,400
Total 20,716 2,796,645,746
Note: Reactors whose license will expire by 2030 are indicated in gothic, those under 
construction or planned for construction in shade.
III. History and Policy of Nuclear Development in Korea 
Then, how did Korea come to expand its nuclear development? This 
chapter aims to examine the policies and social context of nuclear 
development in Korea.
1) Beginning and Expansion of Nuclear Development 
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Nuclear development in Korea first began at the request of the US 
government. In 1953, then US President Eisenhower advocated for “Atoms 
for Peace” and proposed to stop the competition for developing nuclear 
weapons and to use nuclear weapons technology for peaceful ends to 
generate nuclear energy. Then in 1954, the US government requested 
the Korean government to send Korean scientists to the Atomic Research 
Institute in the US. (Yun Sun-Jin·Oh Eun-jeong, 2006). As such, nuclear 
energy was generated in Korea with the support of the US government, 
and in 1955 both countries signed the bilateral atomic energy agreement. 
In 1958, the Atomic Energy Act was enacted in Korea and in 1959 the 
Atomic Energy Institute, an independent agency under the Presidential 
Office was established (Yun Sun-Jin·Oh Eun-jeong, 2006). In the 
beginning in Korea, nuclear energy was evaluated as not viable, because 
it was deemed too costly to be used for commercial purposes (Yun Sun-
Jin·Oh Eun-jeong, 2006). However, in the 1960s, with the establishment 
of the five-year economic development plan and with Korea’s economic 
development, power demand increased by 15% every year. As a result, 
from the mid-1960s, discussions on building nuclear power plants 
began to emerge and the policy direction was set to adopt nuclear 
energy. (Nuclear Energy Agency, 1969; Jin Sang-hyeon, 2009).1 In the 
1	 	The Korean government pursued nuclear energy development not just for economic 
reasons. There were also political and military reasons involved as the country wanted 
to possess nuclear weapons manufacturing technology by acquiring and accumulating 
nuclear development technologies (Yun Sun-Jin·Oh Eun-jung 2006; Yun Sun-Jin 
2015). Moreover, many developing countries tend to consider nuclear technologies 
as cutting edge technologies and that having nuclear capacity is the barometer for 
national power. Moreover, since Korea as a divided nation is faced with ideological 
and military confrontations, holding cutting edge technology like nuclear energy 
was a means to flaunt its national power. There were also US interests involved. 
At the same time the US felt the tension from the Soviet which was its competitor 
developing nuclear weapons (1949), therefore it wanted to manage and control the 
nuclear industry by providing nuclear development technologies and have its liberal 
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1960s, Korea came to consider nuclear energy as an important source 
of energy for the economic development through its long-term nuclear 
development plan and established plans to build nuclear power plants. 
As a result, in 1972, Kori 1 began its construction, which became 
commercially operational in April 1978, making Korea the 21st nuclear 
power country in the world. Following the two oil crises in the 1970s, 
nuclear energy began to be considered as an alternative option to oil and 
coal, which led to the rapid expansion of nuclear power plants. There was 
only one reactor operating up until 1980, however the number increased 
to 9 units in 1989. In 1983, 8 units were under construction at the same 
time. With the expansion of nuclear energy, the Korean government 
also planned to introduce a nuclear fuel cycle program. According to the 
Korea-US Atomic Agreement, Korea needs approval or consent from the 
US to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel. However, with the signing of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NNPT) in 1970 and strengthening 
of the NNPT following India’s atomic bomb in 1974, it had become 
challenging to seek America’s consent. With the reinforced NNPT, efforts 
to complete the nuclear fuel cycle by reprocessing spent fuel were foiled. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the nuclear development saw a slowdown 
due to the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 and the Soviet’s Chernobyl 
accident in 1986. Most developed countries failed to go ahead with 
their new nuclear plant construction plans. However, at this time Korea 
continued to expand its nuclear power generation. In fact, Korea used the 
global nuclear slowdown as the means to take another leap forward in 
the nuclear sector. As the global nuclear energy market declined, nuclear 
technology firms that dominated the market came to face management 
democratic allies under its nuclear umbrella (Lee Pil-ryul 1999). Moreover, the 
sales strategy of large multinational companies trying to gain profit by selling largely 
invested nuclear generation facilities came into play (Yun Sun-Jin․Oh Eun-jung 2006; 
Lee See-jae 2005). 
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issues, which served as the chance to further develop Korean-type 
reactors built on our proprietary technology. By signing a contract 
with America’s Combustion Engineering (CE, present Westinghouse), 
Korea was transferred the right to improve and produce technologies 
independently. As for the nuclear power plants commissioned for 
construction before the Chernobyl accident, all the rights and obligations 
from design, planning, and construction to pilot operation were 
delegated to foreign companies as a turnkey project. However, as for the 
construction of Youngkwang 3 & 4 commissioned in 1987, a Korean 
company was selected as the main contractor with the goal of achieving 
95% technological autonomy pursuant to the “Plan for Achieving Nuclear 
Technological Autonomy”, and relevant technologies were introduced 
from abroad. The Korea Heavy Industries and America’s ABB-CE jointly 
constructed the Hanbit Nuclear Reactor 3 & 4, which eventually became 
the Hanul 3& 4, the first Korean standard reactor (Optimized Power 
Reactor 1000, OPR-1000), which began commercial operations in August 
1998 and December 1999 respectively. And based on the transferred 
technology, Hanbit 5 & 6 and Ulchin 5 & 6 based on the OPR-1000 
model were constructed in the beginning of and mid-year 2000. 
Moreover, Shin Kori 3 & 4 and Shin Hanul 1& 2 which are currently 
under construction through technological innovation are the Advanced 
Power Reactor 1400 (APR-1400) type. 
With growing global interest in climate change in 2000, pro-
nuclear camps including the IAEA and the WNA advocated the nuclear 
renaissance, presenting nuclear energy development as a means to cope 
with climate change (Yun, 2012). In Korea, the former president Lee 
Myung-bak advocated low-carbon green growth as the new development 
paradigm in August 2008, defining nuclear energy as low-carbon green 
energy and actively seeking its expansion. Deeming that the nuclear 
energy as a green energy or environment-friendly energy producing low 
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carbon, the Lee administration announced that it would increase the 
nuclear energy’s share in the energy mix to 59% by 2030 through the 
first National Energy Basic Plan published in 2008. Moreover, it was 
active in exporting nuclear energy technologies to the overseas market. 
In December 27, 2009, the Korea Electric Power Corp. (KEPCO) signed 
the main contract to build four APR1400 reactors with the Emirates 
Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC). The UAE 1 &2 are currently 
under construction scheduled for completion in May 2017. As such, the 
ambitions to expand Korea’s nuclear energy are not limited to Korea but 
reaching out to the world. 
2)  Developments and Characteristics of Energy Policy and 
Nuclear Development Policy in Korea 
Energy and power consumption of a country are greatly impacted by 
the government policies. Not only are energy and power closely linked 
with economic growth, but also diverse needed facilities are generally 
massive in scale and require high investment costs. From generation, 
transmission, distribution to the downstream process, power generation 
and consumption are closely linked with diverse environmental and 
health issues, therefore it is highly likely that diverse social conflicts 
will occur surrounding the sites of the relevant facilities. Therefore, at 
times, government intervention is inevitable to address these issue or 
policies are established and implemented to move things towards the 
government-desired direction. This chapter aims to have an overall look 
at the past journey of nuclear energy policies in Korea and examine the 
meaning and the details of the National Energy Basic Plan and the Basic 
Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply which are closely connected to 
the nuclear development policy covered in this paper. 
The first and foremost priority of Korea’s energy policy has been the 
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stable supply of energy to achieve country’s economic growth. “The role 
of energy and the energy sector was to support economic growth by 
ensuring its sustainability.” (Korea Energy Economics Institute, 2000). 
However, the direction of such energy policy is understandable to some 
extent when overcoming poverty was the biggest social goal after the 
liberation. However, even today – even though it has been already 20 
years since Korea joined the OECD nations coming out of poverty – such 
policy direction has still been maintained. This can be also seen in the 7th 
Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply announced in July 2015, 
which provides that “stable supply and demand of power is the first 
and foremost priority”. In Korea, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry 
and Energy establishes and implements the energy-related policies and 
governs relevant administrative matters. However, the fact energy affairs 
are governed by the ministry in charge of industry-related affairs implies 
that energy is considered as an element for economic growth and as a 
subordinate means to economic or industrial policies. 
The trends and characteristics of Korea’s energy policy can be 
categorized in the following periods. From the establishment of the 
first 5 year economic development plan in 1962 until the oil crisis in 
1973, with the rapid development of mining and the light industry 
sector, economy expanded significantly in size, achieving an annual 
growth rate of 8.9%. From 1962 to 1973, energy consumption increased 
8.4% annually, and as a result energy consumption in 1973 was 2.4 
times higher than 1962 (Korea Energy Economics Institute,2000). 
With accelerated industrialization, oil became the mainstream energy, 
leading oil dependency to grow from 9.8% in 1962 to 53.8% in 1973, 
whereas the share of firewood and anthracite was halved, dropping 
from 88.5% to 44.9%. Moreover, believing that the sufficient supply of 
power is a must to run factories and that energy demand will continue 
to grow in the future, the government established and implemented the 
133
Sun-Jin Yun
Generation Expansion Plan. In 1961, the government grouped together 
the three existing power generators, Namsun, and Chosun, to form a 
single entity KEPCO and expanded investments in power generation 
development. In the beginning, the investments were primarily focused 
on coal-fired power plants with relatively shorter construction period at 
lesser construction costs. However, with the increasing power demand, 
ever since 1974, the number of oil-fired power plants expanded, and 
thus the decision to build nuclear power plants, which explains the 
excessive supply of power in the 1970s. In 1971, the electricity power 
reserve reached 34.6%, which further grew to 55.6% in 1972, triggering 
campaigns on promoting the power sales (Korea Energy and Economics 
Institute, 2000). 
After the main energy source is changed to oil, Korea undergoes 
the first oil crisis and comes to grasp the importance of energy saving. 
However, this did not translate into systematic and structural changes. 
With increasing need to take long-term and proactive measures regarding 
energy issues at the national level, the Ministry of Energy and Resources 
was newly established in 1978. However, Korea suffered relatively less 
compared to other countries during the first oil crisis due to the special 
procurement boom in the Middle East, therefore it promoted growth-
oriented policy by rather expanding investments in the energy-intensive 
heavy chemical sector. And in this situation, the unit price of imported 
crude oil due to the second oil crisis more than doubled, leading to 
twice more oil import payments, which in turn resulted in accumulated 
external debt and high inflation between 1979 and 1981. As a result, in 
1980, Korea recorded a negative economic growth for the first time in its 
history. 
Leveraging such experience, from the 1980s, a plan to diversify 
channels for oil imports going beyond the Middle East and stockpiling 
oil were added to Korea’s energy policy. Moreover, as part of the 
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policy to reduce oil use, projects to construct bituminous coal-fired 
power plants, introduce natural gas, and build nuclear power plants 
were carried out. In 1986, the Pyeongtaek LNG Tank was completed 
to deploy LNG in earnest. As for the coal, which is the only fossil fuel 
produced in Korea, small mines were shut down because they had 
lost competitiveness due to the declining demand since consumers 
with higher income preferred high-end energy, and the coal mines 
became larger in size and mechanized. However, in the 1980s, non-
OPEC countries that experienced oil crisis began to develop and sell 
crude oil, which led to fierce price competition, making oil prices to 
plummet or to be maintained at very low level. Due to falling global oil 
prices, Korea’s energy consumption picked up constantly, making the 
economy to grow all the more rapidly. The two oil crises taught Korea 
the importance of energy demand management and development of new 
and renewable energies. As a result, the Energy Use Rationalization Act 
was enacted and the Korea Energy Agency was launched. Moreover, for 
the development and use of new and renewable energy, the Alternative 
Energy Development Promotion Act was enacted in 1987. However, such 
policy failed to gain momentum due to constant low oil prices. 
In the 1990s, energy prices including oil were stabilized, and with 
economic development and increasing income accordingly, energy 
consumption also recorded high growth. Moreover, during this period, 
power consumption growth rate exceeded that of the GDP, such 
trend continued to persist. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the 
GDP decreased by 3.5%, energy consumption by 0.2%, and power 
consumption by 8.1%. This period was quite an exception in Korean 
history, since in the 1990s, energy consumption grew almost two fold 
and power consumption 2.3 times more. However, it was also in the 
1990s that the international community began to take interest in climate 
change, giving rise to relevant negotiations. In 1992, the UN Framework 
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Convention on Climate Change was adopted, and the Kyoto Protocol 
with the detailed action plan was adopted in 1997. Korea having joined 
the OECD in 1996, was classified as the Non-Annex I country of 
developing countries, and not the Annex I countries with the mandatory 
obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, energy 
policies mitigating climate change failed to become the mainstream 
in Korea. In the 1990s, the hottest issue in Korea’s energy policy was 
the introduction of a competitive scheme in the energy sector. With 
the wind of neo-liberalism blowing around the world at the time, the 
political agenda in the energy sector also included deregulation, efficiency 
improvement and privatization of public companies and introduction 
of competitive scheme. Consequently, deregulation measures regarding 
the export and import, distribution, and pricing of oil businesses were 
implemented, and KECPO divided its generation division into 6 affiliates. 
It was then that the mandate on nuclear power generation was transferred 
to the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Corporation (KHNP). 
In 2000s, with climate change causing many disasters gaining more 
and more global attention, there also were growing interests in the low 
carbon energy sources. Many developed countries including Germany 
implemented measures to save energy to adapt to climate change, 
improve energy efficiency, foster demand management, and expand 
renewable energies, and Korea while deeming nuclear energy as low-
carbon producing ecological energy source redoubled its efforts to seek 
further development. In particular, as aforementioned, the Lee Myung-
bak government, while presenting low-carbon green growth as the new 
national paradigm, expanded nuclear power plant constructions and 
exported nuclear technologies abroad to seek economic growth. As a 
result, policy to expand nuclear energy gained more momentum, and 
despite the 2011 Fukushima accident, not many changes have occurred 
in Korea’s overall nuclear policy. 
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The nuclear energy sector in Korea has grown over the years as seen 
in Image 2. In the 1980s, with Korea constructing 8 nuclear reactors 
simultaneously at one point, the number of operating reactors increased 
from 1 unit in 1980 to 9 units in 1989. As a result, due to the over-supply 
of power, the electricity tariff was cut by 9 times. Moreover, with stable 
supply of affordable electricity, it was possible to develop the energy-
intensive heavy chemical sector. Since the mid-1990s, 4 nuclear reactors 
were built every year on average with increasing installed capacity and 
total power output. However, in the late 1980s, nuclear generation share 
was quite high, representing 36.3% of generation installed capacity (1989) 
and 53.1% of total power output (1987), whereas nowadays there is a 
slight declining trend of nuclear power generation.
 
Image 2: Annual Installed capacity and the Number of Nuclear Reactors under 
Operation and Construction 
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Image 3: Share of Annual Nuclear Installed capacity and Generation 
3)  Introduction to Energy Policy and Nuclear Policy in Ko-
rea: the National Basic Energy Plan and the Basic Plan on 
Electricity Demand and Supply 
The basic direction of energy policy, power policy, furthermore the 
nuclear policy in Korea is well defined in the National Basic Energy Plan 
(NBEP) and the Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply (BPEDS). 
The NBEP is the most superior national plan on energy policy which 
covers all areas related to energy and defines the basic direction of mid 
to long term energy policy while providing principles and direction 
on other energy plans. Furthermore, it aims to adjust the direction 
of individual energy plans based on macro-perspectives by seeking 
systematic integration of other energy plans. As of today, as part of the 20 
year plan based on the Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth, 
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the NBEP is renewed every 5 years whose draft is prepared the Ministry 
of Trade, Industry and Energy, which then goes through consultation 
with the heads of competent central administrative body and a public 
hearing before being finally confirmed through the deliberation of the 
Commission for National Energy, Committee on Green Growth and the 
Cabinet Council. The NBEP shall include the following items as indicated 
in Table 4: the trends and outlook in energy demand and supply in Korea 
and abroad, measures for stable deployment and supply, and energy 
management, etc. The first NBEP was established in 1997 (1997~2006) 
based on the Energy Use Rationalization Act (Article 4) to last for 10 
years and renewed every 5 years. In 2002, the second National Basic 
Energy Plan (2002~2011) was established pursuant to the Energy Use 
Rationalization Act (Article 4). The changed applicable act in 2008, the 
Energy Act provided that the Plan be established every five years over 
a period of 20 years, and during the Lee Myung-bak administration, 
due to the change in the applicable law, it was renamed as first the 
National Basic Energy Plan (2008~2030), and the current Park Geun-hye 
government established and announced the second National Basic Energy 
Plan (2013~2035) in January 2014 pursuant to the Framework Act on 
Low Carbon, Green Growth. 
Table 4: National Basic Energy Plan and Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply 
National Basic Energy Plan
Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and 
Supply
Applicable Act
Framework Act on Low Carbon, 
Green Growth (Article 41)
Electric Utility Act (Article 25)  
Governing 
Entity
Government 
Minister of Trade, Industry and 
Energy 
Duration
Established every five years over a 
span of 20 years
Established and implemented every 2 
years
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Procedure
Deliberation by Commission for 
National Energy → Committee on 
Green Growth → Cabinet Council 
Consultation with competent central 
administrative body, public hearing 
→ electric power policy council 
deliberation
Description
•  Trends and outlook on energy 
demand and supply in Korea and 
abroad 
•  Matters on stable introduction, 
supply and management of energy 
•  Goals on energy demand, energy 
mix, energy saving and energy 
efficiency improvement 
•  Measures on supply and use of eco-
friendly energy including new and 
renewable energy 
•  Measures on energy safety management 
•  Energy-related technology development 
and deployment, development of 
professional human resources, 
international cooperation, natural 
energy resource development and use, 
energy welfare etc. 
•  Basic direction of electricity demand 
& supply 
•  Long-term outlook on electricity 
demand & supply
•  P lan on power fac i l i t ies  and 
equipment
•  Power demand management 
•  Other matters required for power 
demand & supply 
Park Geun-hye 
administration
•  Officially announced the Second 
Nat i ona l  B a s i c  Ene rgy  P l an 
(2013~2035) in January 2014 
•  Officially announced the seventh 
Basic Plan on Electricity Demand 
and Supply (2015~2029) in July 
2015
The Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply (BPEDS) to be 
established by the Minister of Industry, Commerce and Energy every 
two years pursuant to Article 25 of the Electric Utility Act shall include 
the basic direction of power supply & demand, long-term outlook of 
power supply & demand, plan for power installations, management 
of power supply & demand, and other matters related to the supply 
& demand of power. (See Table 4). According to Article 25.1 of the 
Electric Utility Act, the BPEDS aims to ensure the “stable supply of 
electricity.” The Korean government, ever since it published the first 
BPEDS in 2002, has established a 15 year plan every two years. Similar 
plans to BPEDS had existed before, that is, 1985~1989 prior to 1991, 
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the exclusive utility KEPCO had established and implemented the “long-
term power development plan.” However with the complete amendment 
of the Electric Utility Act in 1991 and until 2000, it was the government 
which established the long-term power supply plan every two years with 
KECPO as the implementation body. However, up until then, KEPCO, 
the exclusive utility in generation, transmission and distribution had 
been in charge of establishing the plan itself, which was subsequently 
approved by the government. But after implementing the utility sector 
reform in 2001 which divided KEPCO into six generation companies 
with an attempt to introduce competition into the power sector, the 
Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply has been established by 
surveying KEPCO subsidiaries and private companies on their intent to 
build power generation facilities and incorporating the feedback in the 
business plan of the utility providers. The most recent BPEDS was the 7th 
edition confirmed and published in July 2015. 
In the 2nd NBEP, the government defined the top 5 priorities which 
include transitioning into policy centered on demand management, 
building decentralized power generation system, improving sustainability 
in terms of safety and environment, strengthening energy security and 
implementing policies together with the people. To meet such policy 
objectives, the government planned to expand the share of nuclear 
energy to 29% and new and renewable energies to 11% until 2035.2 The 
2	 	In Korea, we do not use the term “renewable energy” but “new and renewable energy” 
a combination word for “new energy” which is different from the term “renewable 
energy” used by the IEA. The new and renewable energy in Korea refers to energies 
that are neither coal nor oil, nuclear energy nor natural gas, and new energies 
include hydrogen, fuel cell, coal liquefied/gasified energy and heavy oil residue, and 
renewable energy include solar, photovoltaic, biomass, wind, small hydro power, 
geothermal, ocean energy, waste energy. The definition of the IEA’s renewable energy 
does not include the new energies included in the categories of Korea’s “new and 
renewable energies”, and unlike Korea, the IEA’s definition includes inflammable and 
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second NBEP was quite a progress compared to its previous approach, 
as in shifted towards demand-centered policy or building decentralized 
generation system. Yet, it did not differ much in that it still projected 
a consistent and sharp increase in energy demand, especially in power 
demand, and plans to constitute energy to meet such demand. The 
plan should have been made after considering the peak of the energy 
demand in order to reduce energy demand in times of different energy 
crises including climate change, however, this was not the case. The 
total energy demand will increase 1.32% annually until 2035 to become 
37.1% higher compared to the 2012 level, the electricity would increase 
by 79.5%, that is, 2.47% every year. As a result, it was projected that the 
share of electricity out of all energies would increase from 19.0% in 2012 
to 27.6% in 2035, and the goal in terms of demand management was set 
to reduce the electricity demand by 15%. Despite demand management, 
the electricity demand will continue to grow, therefore, nuclear energy 
was chosen as an alternative to deal with climate change as it emitted 
lesser greenhouse gases. Such approach still remains very much supply-
oriented. Compared to the first NBEP, even though the nuclear energy 
share was reduced from 41% to 29%, this means expanding the nuclear 
installed capacity (20,716MW) which represented 26.4% all installed 
capacity in 2020 to 29% in 2035 (42,705MW), whose goal can only be 
achieve through an additional construction of 5 ~ 7 nuclear reactors, 
excluding those planned for and construction. And the installed capacity 
needs to be more than doubled. 
The core of the seventh BPEDS which was confirmed and published in 
July 2015 is to build additional two new nuclear reactors. After projecting 
biodegradable wastes as waste energy, which is a different scope from Korea which 
does include industrial waste gas. Korea uses new a broader term of renewable energy 
compared to the IEA, which explains the gap between Korean and global statistics. 
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that the electricity demand will increase by 2.1% ever year for 15 years 
from 2015 to 2029, the government established the following basic 
direction for power generation facilities: expansion of generation facilities 
for stable supply of electricity (securing proper reserve rate of 22%), 
low carbon energy mix to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, balanced 
consideration of economic and environmental viability and acceptance in 
defining energy mix, and expanded deployment of decentralized energy 
(12.5% in 2029). In order to achieve these goals, the plan to build 4 
coal-fired power plants was removed from the 6th BPEDS and replaced 
by building 2 additional nuclear reactors. The hottest issue today 
surrounding energy consumption is the government’s intention to expand 
nuclear power generation following the Fukushima nuclear accident. 
IV. Future of Nuclear Energy in Korea
What will be the future of nuclear energy in Korea? It depends on what 
principles the government serves to establish its policies, and the latter 
depends on how the diverse issues faced by nuclear energy are resolved 
and how they are embraced by the civil society. The most important 
issue in the wake of the Fukushima accident was not just about ensuring 
nuclear safety but about whether nuclear was economically viable or 
whether nuclear energy could be considered low-carbon across all 
cycles. More specifically in Korea, there were a pile of pending issues 
that involved construction of new nuclear plants, extension of the 
design life of outdated nuclear power plants, installation of high-voltage 
transmission lines to transport nuclear energy, and treatment of spent 
fuel, etc. The way we address these issues and how proactive post-
nuclear movements are in providing alternatives while voicing against 
Korea’s pro-nuclear development policies will determine the future 
path of nuclear development in Korea. This chapter aims to provide an 
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outlook for the future of nuclear energy in Korea by briefly examining the 
major issues that fuel social controversies and studying the post-nuclear 
movements’ struggle against nuclear development policies. 
1) Life Extension of Outdated Nuclear Power Plants
As aforementioned, 12 out of the 24 existing operating reactors, will see 
their design life expire in 15 years in 2030 (See Image 1 and Table 3). 
Kori 1 operation will be permanently halted for the first time in Korea 
history in 2017, however, 11 reactors including Wolsong 1 whose one-
time life extension will expire in 2022 will need to undergo an inspection 
to extend its life in 2020. 
To extend the life of an outdated nuclear power plant (in Korean legal 
terms “continuous operation”) in Korea, the Nuclear Safety and Security 
Commission (hereinafter “NSSC”) determines, based on a set of safety 
criteria, whether the reactor in question can be operational until 10 years 
after the end of the design life. The requirements include periodic safety 
test on equipment, life test for equipment whose safety performance vary 
with time, and evaluation on the radiation impact on the environment 
following continuous operation, etc. All in all, 134 items need to meet the 
evaluation criteria. In 2013, in addition to the existing requirements for 
continuous operation, requirement for “stress test”, which was President 
Park Geun-hye’s electoral promise, was newly adopted. The stress test 
aims to verify whether nuclear power plants can remain stable under 
extreme conditions, and major items for evaluation include earthquake, 
tsunami, other natural disasters, loss of safety function in electricity 
system, management of sever accident, and emergency response, etc. 
According to paragraph ④ of Article 36 of the Nuclear Safety Act 
Enforcement Decree, in order to extend the lifespan of a reactor, the 
nuclear reactor operator, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) shall 
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submit a written assessment within two to five years before the record 
date of assessment which is the date on which the lifespan of design 
comes to an end (including the dates on which ten years elapse every ten 
years thereafter). Once the KHNP submits application to the NSSC, Korea 
Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) initiates evaluation, then an evaluation 
report approved by the expert committee is submitted to the NSSC. As 
for the stress test, the stress test report submitted to the NSSC by KHNP 
undergoes an expert group review, and verification technical consultation 
group consisting of 4 members from the KINS and 4 private independent 
members will draft and disclose a relevant comprehensive report. Then 
the expert committee reviews this comprehensive report and submits it to 
the NSSC. 
The NSSC was launched with the growing need for safety regulations 
on nuclear energy after the 2011 Fukushima accident. Since then, the 
role of the existing nuclear commission on use and promotion of nuclear 
energy was left to the realm of the Atomic Energy Promotion Council, 
and the nuclear safety management issues were to be separated and 
governed by the NSSC. The NSSC first began as an independent central 
administrative agency under the Presidential office in 2011, given the 
importance of nuclear matters. However, after President Park Geun-
hye was elected, the Presidential Transition Committee wanted to make 
the NSSC an umbrella organization of the Ministry of Science, ICT and 
Future Planning just like in the past. However the civil society and the 
opposition party opposed to this proposal and pursuant to Article 2 of 
the Government Organization Act, the NSSC became an independent 
central administrative agency under the Prime Minister’s Office, and the 
chairman of NSSC was deemed as vice minister. The NSSC consists of 
9 members including the chairman: that is 1 chairman and 1 secretary 
general who are standing members and 7 other non-standing members. 
The chairman is appointed by the President of Korea recommended 
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by the Prime Minister. The four members including the permanent 
member are recommended by the chairman and the other four members 
are appointed by the President of the Republic at the recommendation 
of the National Assembly. After consulting with the government, the 
National Assembly decided that from the second term of the NSSC, the 
ruling party and the opposition party would recommend two candidates 
respectively. After facing public criticism that that first term of the NSSC 
included solely pro-nuclear members, the opposition party, taking note 
of the public opinion, proposed that both the ruling and the opposition 
party recommend the same number of candidates, and as a result, two 
anti-nuclear members could be included in the commission. The second 
term of the NSSC is on-going, and excluding the two members of out 
nine recommended by the opposition party, the other members consist of 
scholars and government officials who endorse nuclear development. (See 
Table 5). Such constitution of members undermines the civil society’s 
trust vis-à-vis the objectivity and fairness of the NSSC decisions. 
Table 5: Constitution of Members of the Second Term of the Nuclear Safety & 
Security Commission
Title 
Type of 
Recommendation
Affiliation (Position)
Standing 
member
Ex-officio (2)
Chairman (honorary professor, department of nuclear 
engineering, Seoul National University 
Secretary General (former director of the nuclear energy 
bureau, Ministry of Science and Technology)
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Non-
standing 
member
Ruling party 
recommended (2)
Chair professor at safety school, Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Safety (KINS), Inviting professor department of nuclear 
engineering, KAIST)
Opposition party 
recommended (2)
Professor of microbiology at Dongkuk University of 
Medicine, chairman of energy and climate committee of the 
Korean Federation of Environmental Movement 
Government 
recommended (3)
Attorney at law firm Logos, professor at Bangmok College 
in Myongji University, Professor at college of mechanical 
engineering at Sungkyunkwan University 
Source: Compiled from the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission
The second term of the NSSC reviewed the application for extending 
the license of Wolsong Reactor 1 and approved an extension of 10 years. 
The design life of Wolsong 1 is 30 years, which expired in November 20, 
2012, 30 years after November 21, 1982 which was the initial criticality 
day. The operator KHNP filed an application for the continuous operation 
of Wolsong 1 in December 30 in 2009 and received the NSSC’s green 
light for the continuous operation in February 27, 2015. Today, Wolsong 
1 will be operational until November 20, 2022. 
However the NSSC’s decision to extend the lifespan of Wolsong 1 
failed to earn social support and trust. Of course, member constitution 
was the source of controversy but also its decision-making process. 
An expert group and private independent group conducted a review 
on the stress test results submitted by the KHNP, and their opinions 
were divergent. The expert review group consists of KINS specialists 
whereas the private independent group consists of local autonomous 
and environmental groups. The independent group provided a negative 
review that continuous operation would not ensure safety whereas the 
KINS review group evaluated that the stress test guidelines satisfied 
the evaluation criteria. The independent group identified 32 items of 
improvement and provided the opinion that safety operation of Wolsong 
1 is only possible when all of these improvements are made. The KINS 
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group identified and proposed 19 items of improvement, which were 
not mandatory improvements before the re-activation but rather tasks to 
be dealt with in the future. On the other hand, the independent group 
focused on securing public acceptance before applying for the continuous 
operation which was a newly included provision in the amended Nuclear 
Safety Act and stressed that when deciding the continuous operation 
of Wolsong 1, it was crucial to actively incorporate the opinion on the 
public acceptance of local residents. This is was because when the public 
hearings on the stress test results were held in June 2014 and December 
2014 for the Gyeongju Wolsong residents where Wolsong 1 is located, 
the local residents voiced against expanding the lifespan of the outdated 
Wolsong 1, and yet their views were completely ignored during the 
decision-making process. 
The decision-making process per se of the NSSC was also under 
criticism. The NSSC held three meetings in January 15, February 12, 
and February 26 in 2015. The members engaged in intensive discussions 
from 10 am on February 26th to 1 am until the next day. The members 
not only disagreed on the 32 improvements identified by the independent 
review group but also on how to interpret the mandatory provision on 
securing the public acceptance before the application for the continuous 
operation.3 The amended Nuclear Safety Act mandatorily required public 
3	 	The revised Nuclear Safety Act included a new provision on mandatorily securing 
public acceptance before applying for a continuous operation. Article 103 stipulates 
that “each person wanting to receive approval for modification….to continue to 
operate generational reactors or relevant facilities even after the end of their lifespan” 
shall seek public consensus by “disclosing the draft of the radioactive environmental 
impact report or holding a public hearing”, and attach it to the radiation impact 
evaluation. The opposition party-recommended members argued that result of the 
public acceptance through public hearing should be included in the deliberation of 
the NSSC incorporating the founding vision of the Nuclear Safety Act, however, the 
government-recommended members argued back that the public acceptance can be 
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acceptance not only for constructing new nuclear plants but also for 
obtaining approval for changes such as extension of lifespan of outdated 
power plants. However, the NSSC argued that the amended law could 
not be retroactively applied with the application review pending, since 
the application dossier for Wolsong 1 had been submitted back in 
2009. The NSSC proceeded with vote after 1am on February 27, and 
with 7 pros and 2 blank ballots, it was decided to extend the lifespan of 
Wolsong 1. The two opposition party recommended NSSC members 
voiced that the safety issues raised by the independent review group had 
not been addressed, therefore refused to proceed with the vote. When 
the chairman went ahead with the vote anyway, they walked out as a sign 
of protest. Therefore the voting was held without these two members 
present. Despite the much conflicts and controversies surrounding 
the extension of the life of Wolsong 1, the application for extension 
was finally approved. According to the NSSC rules, an application for 
deliberation can be passed when the majority (5 out of 9 ) votes saying 
“yes”, therefore the walk-out of these two members did not have any 
impact on the vote outcome. As of today, and a network for lawyers 
advocating democratization (Minbyeon) has already filed a suit regarding 
this issue, claiming that the NSSC’s decision was unconstitutional. 
Other than Kori 1 whose permanent life end is confirmed for 2020, 
11 other reactors will also need to apply for extension according to the 
aforementioned procedure. Therefore, it is highly likely that the same 
conflicts and controversies will be repeated with much intensity. In 
particular, if the NSSC members mostly with pro-nuclear inclination 
continue to make decisions on the deliberation of applications, without 
securing any channel to embrace the views from the local residents 
incorporated just before the actual operation by the KHNP after deciding first on the 
lifespan extension by the NSSC. 
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and the civil society, then it will become more difficult to seek a social 
consensus and support on the deliberation outcome. Moreover, another 
issue for Korea to resolve is that there is no specific plan after the nuclear 
power plants permanently halt operations. 
2) Construction of New Nuclear Power Plants
Another heated debate involves building new nuclear power plants. 
In the beginning of the 1980s, the Korean government designated and 
announced nine regions as candidate sites for new nuclear power plants. 
However with the 1986 Chernobyl accident and protests against nuclear 
waste treatment facilities, residents living in the candidate sites strongly 
opposed to the government’s plan, and potential sites near the existing 
nuclear power plants such as Ulchin-gun Geunnam-myeon Sanpo-ri 
were partially delisted from the candidate site list whereas plans for the 8 
remaining sites were completely cancelled in December 1999 (Hankyoreh 
Newspaper, 1999/12/30). As for the Gyeongbguk Ulchin-gun Geunnam-
myeon Sanpo-ri, the Ulchin-gun went ahead and proposed to have its 
name taken off the potential site list once it finds a replacement site in the 
vicinity of the existing Ulchin Nuclear Reactor 3 & 4 until January 2000. 
Delisting of Ulchin-gun was possible because the Ulsan Metropolitan 
City’s Ulju-gun, which was not originally included among the 9 candidate 
sites, announced that it would accommodate nuclear reactors in its 
region by bidding for the project under the name of the district head 
in November 1999. Ulsan city’s Ulju-gun Seosaeng-myun is referred to 
as the Shin Kori region, and Shin Kori 1 & 2 are currently operating as 
of September 2015, and Unit 3 & 4 are under construction with 5 & 6 
planned for construction. 
Until now, Korea constructed 5 units in 1970s, 6 in 1980s, 9 in the 
1990s and 6 more after 2000. (See Table 3 above). Also commercial 
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operations of 8 reactors began in the 1980s, 7 in the 1990s, 4 in the 
2000s and 4 in the 2010s. Since it became difficult to attract nuclear 
power plants in new sites, the government adopted the approach of 
adding new ones in the existing regions. As a result, from minimum 6 
reactors up to 10 reactors were built in one nuclear power plant site, 
which gave rise to the development of a nuclear power plant complex 
(Yun Sun-Jin, 2015). However, such complex means concentration of 
risky facilities, which may give rise to safety issues. Multiple reactors are 
exposed to the same natural disasters or terror attacks, making problems 
in one single reactor to have a great impact on other reactors in case of 
accidents or emergencies. This can pose a serious threat to the stable 
supply of electricity. 
The nuclear reactors that the Korean government and KHNP 
intend to additionally construct can no longer be built in existing sites 
since the sites are limited in space. The KHNP intends to secure two 
new sites by 2012 to build over 4 APR1400 type reactors and began 
the search in earnest since November 26, 2010. The KHNP planned 
that, after receiving voluntary applications, it would review the safety, 
public acceptance, environmental impact, and construction feasibility 
through the Site Selection Committee and based on the results select 
two candidate sites by June 2011 and designate the sites as the Energy 
Development Business Zone pursuant to the “Energy Development 
Promotion Act” until 2012 for final confirmation.
Consequently, the KHNP commissioned a project to implement 
the policy to secure the sites for new nuclear constructions in 2009, 
and based on the results, identified Gangwon Samcheok-si, Chonnam 
Goheung-gun and Haenam-gun and Gyeongbuk Youngdeok-gun as 
the four sites with the potential to host the new nuclear power plants, 
thus requesting these sites to file an application. As for Samcheok-
si, Geunduk-myeon Deoksan-ri area was selected as the candidate site 
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in 1999 for nuclear reactors, and Wondeok-eup Yicheon-district was 
chosen as the candidate site for nuclear waste treatment facility in 2005, 
however, with fierce opposition from the local residents, the projects 
were completely cancelled. (Yonhap News, 2010/12/16). In case a local 
government wishes to apply for the nuclear power plant site, its chief 
head must submit an application dossier to the KHNP by attaching 
the approval document of the local council. That is, the supporting 
document is not the public referendum results but the city council 
approval. Moreover, if there are regions other than these four wishing to 
additionally accommodate nuclear power plants, their inclusion would 
be determined after reviewing the site feasibility study. As of February 
28, 2011, Samcheok and Youngdeok had submitted applications. The 
Samcheok city council was pressed for time to meet the deadline, so they 
passed the nuclear power plant site application with unanimous decision 
on condition of holding the public referendum later on, which was a 
request made by then Anti-Samcheok Nuclear Power Plant Committee. 
However, not long after filing the applications, the Fukushima 
accident occurred, aggravating concerns over nuclear safety issues. 
Nevertheless, the KHNP selected Samcheok and Youngdeok as the 
candidate sites for the new nuclear power plants in December 23, 2011, 
and the government designated and announced these two sites as the 
candidate sites for new nuclear constructions in September 14, 2012. 
However, Samcheok residents strongly opposed and refused to accept 
the government’s decision, claiming that the public opinion should 
be considered by holding a referendum as had been requested by the 
local council. Moreover, when it was found that the document on the 
referendum results indicating 96.6% agreement by the local residents 
submitted by the former Samcheok mayor actually included false 
signatures of residents, the Anti-Samcheok Nuclear Project Citizens’ 
Alliance called on the government to cancel the designation of the 
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Samcheok region as candidate site. Samcheok residents conducted a 
referendum to vote on the subpoena of the former mayor who did not 
keep promise on the referendum and the referendum with new nuclear 
construction with the new mayor. However, due to the obstructions from 
the Samcheok city, the voting rate turned out to be 25.9%, failing to get 
1/3 votes required for subpoena, thus neutralizing the plan. However, 
during the regional elections held in June 2014, mayoral candidate 
Kim Yang-ho won the elections with 62.4% of votes, becoming the 
first candidate in Korean regional elections history to promise a fight 
against construction of nuclear power plants. After his inauguration, 
the Samcheok mayor requests the National Election Commission to 
oversee the referendum asking residents’ opinion on the new power 
plant, however, the Commission refused to do so saying that nuclear 
power plant site selection is a national affair and therefore not subject to 
referendum. Therefore, the referendum was held by the private sector 
led by the “Commission on Referendum on Samcheok Nuclear Power 
Plant” in October 9, 2014. As a result, 68% (48% of the total voters) 
of those listed on the register voted, with 85% voicing against the 
nuclear power plant in their region. Based on the referendum results, 
the current Samcheok mayor requested that the designation of the 
Samcheok site to be cancelled. However, the government argued back 
saying that application was made legitimately by the Samcheok-si and 
that the referendum of Samcheok was legally invalid. The government 
still presents Samcheok as the new candidate site for the nuclear power 
plant in the 7th Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply, however, 
Samcheok continues to strongly disagree with such plan. 
The referendum in Samcheok also had an impact on Youngdeok. 
There is a chance that Shin Kori 7 & 8 planned for construction in 
Ulju-gun and 2 additional reactors will be constructed in Youngdeok. 
However, it was found that the application of Youngdeok-gun filed 
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in 2010 did not include any public hearing or public meeting results, 
seeking no consensus from the public, and it too is gaining strong 
protest from the residents. With the initiative of Anti-Youngdeok 
Nuclear Power Plant Construction Committee, Youngdeok residents 
are strongly requesting that the decision should be made based on a 
referendum, which deserves the public’s attention. As such, building new 
nuclear power plants accompanies serious social conflicts, which cannot 
guarantee the continuity of Korea’s current pro-nuclear development 
policies. 
3)  Construction of Massive High-Voltage Transmission Lines 
Essential for Nuclear Generation 
Social conflicts surrounding the Miryang transmission tower has been a 
hot issue in Korea for the past few years. In fact, this incident dates back 
to the beginning of the year 2000. In January 2000, the government 
announced the fifth long-term plan for demand and supply of electricity, 
and in May 2001, KEPCO selected the sites where the 756 kV Shin Kori 
Nuclear Power Plant-North Gyeongnam transmission line (to build 161 
transmission towers spanning 90.5km across 5 sis and guns including 
Ulsan Ulju-gun, Busan Kijang-gun, Gyeonggnam Yangsan, Miryang-si 
and Changnyeong-gun) would pass through and commissioned a study 
on its environmental impact. In August 2005, KEPCO completed the 
environmental impact study and conducted a public hearing in Miryang 
regarding the project to install transmission lines. By the beginning of 
2006, there was a growing opposition movement in Miryang, and an 
Anti-Transmission Line Committee was launched in Miryang, where 
the transmission tower was originally scheduled to be built. In July 
2007, Miryang city council called for the complete cancellation of the 
project on transmission lines, however, in November the same year, 
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the government approved the project which intend to connect lines 
from Shin Kori to North Gyeongnam. Despite the opposition from local 
residents, the KHNP began the project in August 2008. Ever since, the 
local residents continued to voice their opposition through the anti-
project committee and waged diverse protests from hunger strikes and 
through demonstrations in Seoul, and numerous law suits between the 
constructor KEPCO and local residents were also filed. 
However, despite such wrangling, the project was carried out as 
planned, and many conflicts surrounding the construction of high-voltage 
transmission towers in Miryang failed to gain sufficient public attention. 
However, when a 70 year old resident Lee Chi-woo committed suicide 
by setting himself on fire in January 2012, in February 2012, a special 
task force was launched bringing together a coalition of nationwide 
civil society associations and the political circles, place this issue on the 
list of national agenda. In September 2012, as the National Assembly 
requested to stop the construction of Miryang transmission tower, the 
project came to a halt. However, in May 2013, KEPCO announced that 
it would resume the project, attempting to resume construction, which 
led to physical fights with the local residents who were in confrontation, 
aggravating the situation. In the end, in May 29, a consensus was made 
between KEPCO and the Miryang residents to temporality stop the 
construction and seek an alternative study through an expert consultation 
group. Therefore, in June 5, expert consultation body was launched with 
three members recommended from KEPCO members and the resident 
group respectively. In July 8, however, the chairman, without seeking any 
consensus from members, submitted a consultation report indicating that 
there was no alternative but to build the transmission tower in Miryang, 
which was finally not adopted with the resistance from the opposition 
party. Ever since, the project constantly faced fierce protest from Miryang 
residents, however, in June 11, 2014, the government, through its 
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administration execution proxy, pulled down the anti-transmission line 
protest sit-in sites and KEPCO initiated the construction on all 69 areas 
for Miryang transmission tower, thereby completing the construction 
by the end of September, with the tower going into pilot operation from 
December 28, 2014. 
These transmission lines were built to transfer electricity generated 
from Shin Kori 3 to consumers and are especially related with the nuclear 
reactor construction project commissioned by the United Arab Emirates. 
Shin Kori 3 is the first commercialized model of Korea’s independently 
developed APR1400 type pressurized water reactor. The contract with 
the UAE signed in 2009 provided that Shin Kori 3 (the same as the UAE 
model) undergo a commercial operation until September 2015 to prove 
its safety and in case Shin Kori 3 is not operational after the completion 
date, a penalty equivalent to 0.25% of the monthly construction fee 
will be charged for the period of delay. It was due to this reason that 
the project to build Miryang transmission tower was enforced without 
seeking proper consensus from residents by giving an excuse that it was 
actually to transfer electricity produced from Shin Kori 3. However, with 
scandals surrounding the falsification of the quality control certificates 
of power plant parts, replacement of cables and death of workers, 
the construction of Shin Kori 3 itself was postponed. And through 
the transmissions lines connecting Shin Kori and North Gyeongnam 
currently under test, the electricity produced from Shin Kori 1 & 2 and 
not Shin Kori 3 & 4 will be transferred. 
As a result, the social conflicts surrounding the Miryang transmission 
tower resulted from not only the compelled execution of the project 
without seeking public consensus but also fundamentally due to the 
mismatch between the power production site and consumption site 
under the centralized system extremely dependent on massive coal-
fired or nuclear power generation. Without the structural change of the 
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power system, another struggle just like that of Miryang transmission 
towers can occur anywhere in the country. Nuclear generation produces 
massive electricity, however, the fundamental risks that it holds make 
it difficult to locate nuclear generation facilities around the sites where 
many consumers inhabit. That is why, nuclear generation requires 
large scale transmission facilities. The utility provider KEPCO wants to 
increase the voltage up to 765kV in order to minimize the energy lost in 
transmission, however, any site or region concerned will very likely refuse 
to accommodate such facilities due to economic, environmental and 
health reasons. As such, nuclear-centered power system is regenerating 
social conflicts and with chances of these social conflicts aggravating will 
be high, which makes it unclear whether Korea’s pro-nuclear policies will 
be successfully implemented. 
4) Processing of Spent Nuclear Fuel 
Nuclear generation holds a very huge challenge that cannot be addressed 
with the current technology: processing of spent nuclear fuel. For the 
spent nuclear fuel to become completely harmless to human body and 
the environment so that the radiation toxicity will not be an issue, it 
should be safely managed and preserved for at least 100,000 years. 
However, as of today, Korea does not have the technology to process or 
the place to store spent nuclear fuel and still lacks proper policies on the 
management of spent fuel. The only approach until now had been the 
“wait and see” approach. However, with the increasing volume of spent 
fuel stored within power plants, we have now arrived at a saturation 
point. Initially, the Korean government announced that the Kori Plant 
will be saturated starting from 2016, Hanbit and Wolsong by 2019 and 
Hanul Plant in 2026. However, with the saturation drawing nearer, the 
government, through an externally commissioned study, announced that 
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it would be possible to prolong the saturation time as seen in Table 6 
through high density storage of cross-reactor transfer. Given the extended 
storage capacity, as of June 2015, the saturation rate for Kori is 84.4%, 
Hanbit 61.6% and Hanul 67.7% respectively, and 79.2% for the heavy 
reactor and 24.7% for the light reactor, respectively.
Table 6: Spent Fuel by Nuclear Power Plant (2Q, 2015)
Storage 
Capacity
(Bundle)
Total 
Accumulation
(Bundle)
Saturation 
Rate
(%)
Rescheduled 
saturation 
time
Original 
saturation 
time
Kori 6,494 5,478 84.4 2028 2016
Hanbit 9,017 5,551 61.6 2024 2019
Hanul 7,066 4,786 67.7 2026 2021
Wolsong
PHWR 499,632 395,801 79.2 2026 2019
PWR 523 129 24.7 2038 2020
Source : excerpt from KHNP website
However, the prolongation of saturation time by expanding the 
storage capacity cannot be the real solution to the problem. The Korean 
government launched the Public Engagement Commission on Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Management from October 2013 to bring the issue to the 
public’s attention and focused on seeking solutions to properly manage 
spent fuels by the end of 2014. However, the Commission failed to come 
up with measures within the given time and extended the duration of its 
mandate until June 2015, and in June 2016 submitted a report entitled 
“Recommendations on Spent Fuel Management” before completing 
its mandate. In this report, the Commission suggested “principles of 
public safety as the first and foremost priority” and suggested to move 
the spent fuel currently stored in the in-house temporary storage sites 
to more safe storage facilities before the storage capacity becomes 
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saturated or before the reactor operation license expires. Moreover, the 
Commission recommended that the disposable facilities be operated by 
the government until 2015 and proposed that the Underground Research 
Laboratory (URL) site be selected until 2020 in the existing treatment 
facility site or sites with similar conditions, and that an empirical 
research be initiated from 2030. The Commission also proposed that the 
construction of the pre-disposal storage facilities should begin from 2020 
on the URL site even before operating the disposal facilities so that spent 
fuel can be stored until disposal, and in inevitable cases, that temporary 
storage facilities be installed within each power plant and temporarily 
store the spent nuclear fuel. 
However, despite the Commission’s recommendations, no decisions 
have yet been made regarding the management of spent nuclear fuel. 
Moreover, there have not been any social discussions on the feasibility of 
the Commission’s proposals. Nuclear energy continues to produce spent 
nuclear fuel, however, Korea only focuses on expanding nuclear energy 
and has failed to come face to face with the issue of how to manage spent 
nuclear fuel. This issue will serve as the detonator for the government’s 
pro-nuclear development policy. 
5) Post-Nuclear Movements 
Above all, the future of Korea’s nuclear development policy depends 
on the post-nuclear movements According to the technological system 
or socio-technical system advocated by Thomas Hughes (1984, 1987), 
the socio-technical system does not exist only as an artificial object or 
technical element related to the outcome of technology or technologies 
but encompasses organizations including producers, installations 
providers, investment banks, scientific elements including books, theses, 
university lectures and research plans as well as social elements including 
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laws, regulations and policies. The socio-technical system is formed as 
technical elements are formed in a given social context and as new social 
organizations, systems and structures required to develop these elements 
are formed. As such, nuclear energy generation, since it constitutes 
specific energy technologies, also shows characteristics of a socio-
technical system (Yun Sun-jin et al,, 2011). Since the socio-technical 
system is not only based on the physical structures and social elements 
that have been long maintained and that the relevant stakeholders 
also have interest in maintaining that specific system, it tends to be 
continuously sustained, preserved and strengthened. Such tendency is 
referred to as “momentum” (Hughes, 1984). However, this momentum 
of socio-technical system does not last forever. As one socio-technical 
system is expanded and reinforced, there are critical problems that 
impede the system’s maintenance and growth and also other elements 
that lag behind or fail to interact with other elements tend to occur. And 
if these problems are not addressed within the socio-technical system 
itself, it is very difficult to preserve this momentum. Hughes dubbed such 
critical problems the “reverse salient.” As seen from Hughes’ example, 
anti-nuclear movement can indeed serve as the most powerful reserve 
salient (Yun Sun-Jin, 2015a). 
The construction of the first reactor for each site began in fact 
before the 1986 Chernobyl accident for all nuclear generation sites in 
Korea, therefore back then, people did not know much about nuclear 
development, and nuclear power plant construction projects were 
considered as a means to seek local development, thus facing not much 
resistance from local residents (Lee See-jae 2005; Yun Sun-Jin, 2015b). 
In fact, there was a prevalent perception that nuclear development would 
ensure stable supply of affordable electricity, fostering development 
of industries and progress of civilization. According to a survey on the 
awareness of Hanbit nuclear power plant site residents, at the time of 
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building Hanbit, majority of people were not aware of the risks associated 
with nuclear energy development and merely thought a “plant generating 
electricity” was going to be built in their region and expected that their 
local economy would grow once the power plant is put in place (Yun 
Sun-Jin et al. 2013). The same was for Youngkwang. Residents in other 
nuclear sites also showed similar awareness, which resulted in no anti-
nuclear organizations being formed by residents at the construction of 
initial nuclear power plants. Moreover, at the time, the Korean society 
was under military dictatorship, thus the social conditions were not 
met to form an anti-nuclear organization. However, with the Chernobyl 
accident in 1986, questions surrounding nuclear safety were raised, and 
with the democratic uprising in June 1987, the conditions for political 
opportunities were created. Moreover, as thermal discharge issues due 
to nuclear operation aggravated and many cases regarding radiation 
damages were reported, anti-nuclear movements began to take shape. 
As Youngkwang residents in 1987 greatly suffered from the thermal 
discharge, they fought hard to receive compensation for their affected 
fishery business. 
After the 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident, anti-nuclear movements 
became the mainstream, as there were calls for compensations in the 
existing nuclear sites and protests against building new nuclear power 
plants. These included compensation for the damages due to thermal 
discharge, resistance to accommodate new nuclear power plants and 
nuclear waste treatment facilities, etc. The anti-nuclear movements mostly 
occurred in the sites where nuclear generation facilities were located or 
sites planned to build nuclear waste treatment facilities, and mostly the 
relevant site residents and environmental groups took part in the anti-
nuclear movements. Through such protests, there was a slight delay 
pursuing the construction of new nuclear power plants and the attempts 
to locate nuclear generation facilities in new sites were foiled, however, 
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in 2005 since the low to intermediate radioactive waste treatment facility 
was finally built in Gyeongju, Korea’s anti-nuclear movement entered 
a quiet stage. Until 2005, protests against nuclear waste treatment 
centers were at the core of Korea’s anti-nuclear movements. As it became 
difficult to build nuclear power plants in a new site, the government 
decided to build additional facilities in the existing sites whose reactors 
had already been installed before the Chernobyl accident. This allowed 
the continuous construction of nuclear power plants. Attempts to build 
nuclear waste treatment facilities were made after the 1986 Chernobyl 
accident however, the plan had been cancelled 9 times until 2004. In 
2005, the government newly designed the policy regarding the site 
selection process, and the nuclear waste treatment center became the 
subject of bidding competition among different sites. Since then, the anti-
nuclear movements went into a quiet stage again (Yun Sun-Jin 2006). 
When selecting the site for the nuclear waste treatment facility in 2005, 
the Special Act on Assistance to the Locations of Facilities for Disposal 
of Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste aimed to limit the 
scope of waste to low and intermediate level radioactive wastes, increase 
more assistance to the host site and also hold referendum to seek public 
consensus. As a result, radioactive waste treatment facility was no longer 
subject to avoidance, but to competition. As a result, four sites applied 
to host the facility, and following a referendum, Gyeongju was finally 
selected. Since the anti-radioactive waste treatment center was at the core 
of anti-nuclear movements, following 2005 when the risks were mitigated 
through financial assistance, the anti-nuclear movement relatively lost its 
ground and declined again. 
However, after the Fukushima nuclear accident, in Korea, the term 
anti-nuclear movement was replaced with post-nuclear movement, 
and the latter became very diverse and rich in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms. “Verwandlung, metamorphosis” through “emancipatory 
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catastrophism” proposed by Ulich Beck (2015) can be found in many 
places of the Korean society. The movement is seeing a shift where 
unlike in the past merely opposing to host a certain facility, now it 
has transitioned into providing alternatives. And it has evolved from 
a movement taking the intermittent and explosive forms of protests 
and resistance towards a movement that is consistently taking place in 
our daily lives seeking changes. Moreover, it does not stop at merely 
criticizing the power demand and supply scenario presented by the 
government, but goes further to present an alternative energy scenario. 
The number of experts actively engaged in post-nuclear activities by 
forming “post-nuclear energy professors group” “post-nuclear legal 
experts group, sunflower” and “post-nuclear doctors’ group” is on the 
increase. Some national assemblymen have organized “parliamentarians’ 
group for post-nuclear energy transition” or “parliamentarians’ study 
group for nuclear-free world for our children”. The mayor of Seoul is 
implementing a policy on “reducing one nuclear power plant by Seoul” 
since April 2012, and 46 local government heads have endorsed the 
“Municipal Declaration on Post-Energy Transition” in February 2012 
and have implemented many activities to this end. In the past, the post-
nuclear movements were perceived to be in the realm of environmental 
groups, however nowadays, many civic groups and religious groups are 
also taking part. Moreover, average citizens are also making meaningful 
changes in their lives. (Yun Sun-Jin, 2015b). 
Despite all that, the post-nuclear movement still lacks power to 
neutralize the pro-nuclear development policies. In Korea, even though 
the public’s support for nuclear energy has slightly decreased, it still 
remains relatively high. According to a national survey on the nuclear 
awareness conducted by the Korean Nuclear Energy Foundation as seen 
in Table 7 in July 2015, 82.9% of respondents answered that nuclear 
163
Sun-Jin Yun
energy generation was still needed.4 Less people agreed to nuclear power 
generation than the 89.4% of the 2010 survey however, 8 out 10 agree to 
it, which is relatively high. The percentage still remains high even though 
only 32.8% respondents consider nuclear energy to be safe. Regarding 
nuclear safety, still even to this day 50.1% of people believed that nuclear 
energy generation was not safe but necessary, which is lower than the 
53.1% before the Fukushima accident. Moreover, 72.4% of respondents 
answered that the nuclear generation capacity should be either increased 
(29.5%) or maintained as status quo (42.9%). 24.9% agreed to the 
reduction of capacity which was twice higher than 11.1% before the 
Fukushima accident, however, 2.5 times the number of those agreed to 
reduction supported expansion and maintenance. The survey findings 
compared to the initial ones of October 2011 illustrate that there was a 
growing perception regarding the need for nuclear development from 
78.3% to 82.9% whereas as the perception that we should reduce nuclear 
development remained quite similar at 24.2% and 24.9% respectively. 
Table 7: Trends of Public Awareness on Nuclear Development 
(Unit: %)
Year ’95 ’00 ’08 ’09 ’10 ’11.10 ’12.11 ’13.10 ’14.11 ’15.7
Need for nuclear energy 
generation 
85.5 84.4 89.8 83.7 89.4 78.3 87.8 83.5 81.7 82.9
Safety on nuclear energy 
generation 
30.5 33.6 58.3 61.1 53.3 48.8 34.8 31.2 26.2 36.2
Safety on nuclear waste 
management 
22.8 23.4 64.6 59.6 53.1 29.5 24.2 25.6 27.6 32.8
4	 	Korea Nuclear Energy Foundation conducts a national awareness survey three to four 
times a year. About 1000 people of 19 years of age or older are surveyed through mobile/
fixed-line phones or individual interviews. The confidence level is 95%±3.1%. 
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Construction 
of nuclear 
power plant
For 
expansion
55.5 48.3 41.4 50.6 45.9 37.4 39.5 40.3 31.5 29.5
Maintain 
status-quo
27.1 34.0 51.2 39.7 43.0 38.4 47.8 34.9 39.4 42.9
For 
reduction
17.4 17.7 7.4 9.7 11.1 24.2 12.7 21.7 24.9 24.9
Acceptance on hosting 
nuclear power plants
12.4 10.9 23.7 26.9 27.5 21.0 18.4 35.7 36.0 31.3
Source: Korea Nuclear Energy Foundation 2013, 2014, 2015.
The trend of survey findings can be explained by Anthony Downs 
(1972)’s “Issue-Attention Cycle”, which consists of 5 stages. The first 
stage is the pre-problem stage. During this stage, some undesirable 
social situations exist and few experts and small group stakeholders are 
already aware of these issues, yet not the general public. The second 
stage is the phase full of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm. 
As the aggravated social problems are revealed dramatically, the public 
becomes aware of these issues and feels alarmed. In this stage, the general 
public becomes passionate and confident that such impending issues 
can be resolved by mobilizing social strength. The third stage is when 
realizing the cost of significant progress. In this stage, we realize that the 
costs of addressing the problems are quite high. We come to realize that 
problems actually occurred in the process of benefitting so many people, 
and the resolution of those problems is only possible through the sacrifice 
of the population and restructuring of the social structure. The fourth 
stage involves the gradual decline of intense public interest. Transition 
from the third stage to the fourth stage takes place unnoticed, and in this 
period, the public interest in the problem gradually decreases. As growing 
number of average citizens begin to realize that resolving such problems 
is very difficult and incurs huge costs, three types of reactions can be 
found. Some become low-spirited or discouraged. Others feel threatened 
by thinking about these problems, thus try to suppress those thoughts. 
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There are also those who feel tired about all these issues. The majority of 
people experience a combination of these three. And in this stage, other 
important issues have already entered the second phase, newly attracting 
the public’s attention. Lastly, the fifth stage is the post-problem stage. In 
this stage, the issues are no longer at the center of the public’s attention 
and move into the limbo stage, thus entering into the less important 
realm and intermittently re-emerging at the center of the public’s interest. 
However, this problem compared to the pre-awareness stage, has formed 
another relationship with the public, therefore new systems, programs or 
measures have been already established to address this problem. These 
tools persist even after the public’s interest has moved elsewhere. 
The Korean public has passed the euphoric enthusiasm to address 
issues through the Fukushima nuclear accident; however, as they realized 
that addressing these problems cost a lot, they may have stopped being 
interested in these issues. Therefore it is important to make the public 
realize that the costs associated with nuclear plant reduction are much 
less than those associated with nuclear accidents and that post-nuclear 
world is indeed possible. The future developments of post-nuclear 
movement will definitely determine the future direction of the pro-
nuclear development policy in Korea. 
IV. Concluding Remarks
The nuclear development policy in Korea is being implemented without 
much change despite the nuclear accident in the neighboring country 
Japan, which used to have a global reputation as a safe nuclear country. 
In Korea, social acceptance on nuclear energy has declined somewhat 
compared to pre-Fukushima accident, despite the intensifying social 
conflicts surrounding the construction of new nuclear power plants or 
high-voltage transmission lines, these trends fall short of undermining 
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the policy oriented towards expanding nuclear energy. Nevertheless, 
since the wave of changes has begun, we cannot ascertain that the Korean 
government’s nuclear expansion policy will remain unwavering. Korea 
is indeed standing at the crossroad. And all the aforementioned issues - 
including construction of new nuclear power plants, construction of high-
voltage transmission lines, management of spent fuels, and life extension 
of outdated reactors - depend on how we address the impending issues 
and also how the post-nuclear movements provide active solutions to 
change the course of the current situation. These problems are closely 
linked to how we will ensure the nuclear safety. 
The Korean nuclear development policy is not just a matter of Korea. 
The impact of Korea’s nuclear policy will go beyond its borders to have 
ramifications around the world. Many developing countries consider 
Korea as a benchmark case, and Korea has the ambition to expand into 
the global market by presenting the nuclear development technologies 
as the new growth engine for the future economic growth. Moreover, 
if Korea experiences a nuclear accident just like the one in Fukushima, 
radiation risks may cross the national administrative borders and spread. 
As of September 2015, Korea ranks the 6th in terms of nuclear installed 
capacity and the number of nuclear reactors. It ranks no.1 in nuclear 
generation density and plans to seek further expansion of its nuclear 
power plants, which will naturally lead to more risks inherent in nuclear 
development. In this situation, there is a growing number of citizens 
transitioning into energy producers while fostering energy citizenship, 
politicians providing relevant support and experts adding expertise to 
these efforts in achieving energy transition. However, such changes are 
yet to become the mainstream in Korean society. Small cracks are being 
formed to the existing powerful energy regime overly dependent on 
nuclear energy, however it is difficult to determine whether such cracks 
will become closed with time or drive the fall or decline of the existing 
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energy regime. 
When nuclear development is accepted as a risk-bearing technology 
that is inevitable for the economic growth and the immediate convenient 
and easy use of energy, even though it is not safe, and especially when 
the majority of the population agrees to or supports this idea, then post-
nuclear movement and energy transition will be difficult to realize and 
Korea will be locked up in its existing pro-nuclear expansion policy. 
To achieve post-nuclear stage and energy transition, we need more 
and more direct stakeholders making a living with the changed energy 
regime and citizens with energy citizenship. When they all successfully 
implement and expand the transition strategies in their regions, chances 
for realization will be high. Furthermore, more in-depth discussions and 
practice are needed to identify who are the groups advocating the status 
quo amidst the current nuclear-dependent energy regime that fails to 
ensure sustainability and what should be done and how to transition to 
a new energy regime. Individual members of the society seeking change 
and improving systems and structures that prevent such change…these 
are the two keys to success. 
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To more effectively utilize its existing green energy resources in the 
future, Korea needs greater contributions and efforts at a national level. 
These efforts can include growth-engines for economic development 
that also induce CO2 reductions for the next generation. Korea owns a 
considerable magnitude of green energy treasures, but the government 
seems unwilling to exploit its most obvious and economic feasible 
resources-in both the short and long term.
Here, some considerations concerning the current political strategies 
described in the 2nd Korea Master Plan, January 2014 are presented.
In the past decades, Korea`s economy has made considerable steps 
ahead, as macroeconomic data show a very positive development, the 
trade balance is ever increasingly positive, and the economic growth 
ranges 2% to 3% ahead of German figures. Globally, Korea has attained 
the 14th largest national economy, with a GNP per capita in 2014 
amounting to ca. US$ 35,000 (according to the World Economic Outlook 
Database 2015).
Korea however has one particular Achilles’ heel, i.e., its almost 
complete dependence on imported energy sources; crude oil and gas are 
predominantly imported from the Middle East. Korea was the 9th largest 
energy consumer in 2011. In 2013, Korea was the 4th largest importer of 
coal and the 2nd largest importer of LNG. In response to this situation, 
oil and gas companies are aggressively seeking to improve the national 
energy security by increasing overseas exploration and exploration in the 
Korea’s Green Energy - 
Potential
Gi-Eun Kim 
172
Korea’s Green Energy
Yellow Sea.
U.S Energy Information Administration
Prior to 2012, and indeed to date, green energy has yet to play a key 
role in providing electricity, heat, or biofuel to Korean consumers. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration
(For comparison, selected countries and their renewable energies as % 
of end energy consumption in 2012: Sweden 52%, no nuclear; Finland 
34%, no nuclear; Latvia, with capital Riga as one of three Baltic nations 
35%, no nuclear; Austria 32%, no nuclear; Denmark 26%, no nuclear; 
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Greece 15%; Spain 14%, nuclear exit; Germany 12%, nuclear exit; and 
France 13%, reduction of nuclear.) 
According to the Korea Energy Management Corporation (KEMCO) 
website, the governmental agency responsible for the implementation of 
energy conservation, policies, and energy efficiency, improvements in the 
development of green energy production in Korea can be described as 
follows. 
The role of green energy has improved marginally from 2008 to 2015 
in relation to conventional primary energy forms. Given the fact that 
these numbers include energy from waste treatment and hydro power, in 
terms of overall energy production, Korea’s green energy was only 0.3% 
in 2008 and < 2% in 2015.
Status NRE acc. KEMCO
 2008 2010 2015
Classical Green Energy Thou. TOE 725 1498 4343
 Solar thermal 33 40 63
 PV 59 138 313
 Wind 106 220 1084
 Bioenergy 518 987 2210
 Geothermal 9 43 280
 Marine 0 70 393
Additional Korean count
 Hydro 946 972 1071
 Waste 4688 5097 6316
Total Korean Count 6359 7567 11730
 
Primary Energy Thou. TOE 247000 253000 270000
Classic Green Energy Share % 0.29 0.59 1.61
Green Energy Share Korean Count % 2.57 2.99 4.34
KEMCO Presentation
The overall energy situation of Korea is less than promising, especially 
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with respect to energy security and CO2 reduction activities.
The World Energy Council (WEC) published an index (Energy 
Trilemma Index) comparing the sustainability of the energy supply in 129 
counties; Korea ranked 54th overall in 2014. However with respect to 
energy safety Korea ranked 98th (below Armenia, Latvia, and Thailand), 
and with respect to sustainability Korea ranked 85th (below Greece, the 
US, and Nigeria).
With respect to carbon dioxide emissions (2013), in a per capita 
emissions survey of over 200 nations, Korea place 22nd at ca. 12.3 t CO2 
and displayed a strong increasing tendency (Germany placed 36 with ca. 
9.4 t CO2 per capita with a tendency for reduction).
In 2008, low carbon green growth was proclaimed by former 
president Lee Myung Bak and in 2009 the target to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions by 30% until 2030 was pronounced, and in the “Act on 
Low Carbon Green Growth” three main objectives were described:
• effectively deal with climate change and attain energy independence
• create new engines of green growth
• improve the quality of life in Korea
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The succeeding president Park Gun Hye (February 2013) outlined 
major changes in the energy policy during the WEC that was held 
in Daegu in October 2013, and in stating that she acknowledges the 
challenge of the energy trilemma, she outlined ideas reflecting a move 
towards a creative economy, which means energy conservation and 
environmental protection by using ICT and new technologies.
A creative economy is a model that combines creative ideas, science, 
technology, and IT to achieve economic growth.
How is the present (i.e., Park Gun Hye) government dealing with this 
situation? Here is an outline of some of its more important aspects and 
measures. Notably, however, green energy as a means for energy supply 
and energy safety is not a focus of the government, as other issues play a 
more dominant role. 
It is the present political strategy to accept a rise in overall yearly 
energy consumption. 
Given the expectation of a annual economic growth rate of 2.8%, 
a sharp increase in single households from 24% to 34%, and a small 
growth in population of 0.17% p.a., the government expects a “business 
as usual scenario” with an increase in total primary energy of only 1.32% 
or of only 0.88% end energy (all consideration were made on oil prices 
of US$ 100/barrel and higher). The highest increases are expected in 
electricity demand and heat energy, followed by city gas. The government 
explains that their measures and targets include how to moderate 
the yearly increase of energy consumption to less than 0.3% p.a. The 
government does not intend to reduce primary energy consumption, and 
no attempt has been made to find a solution for reaching an energy peak 
point.
The final value for green energy portion in the end energy is not 
explicitly expressed, though it can be estimated by adding the two values 
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of 10% green electricity production (= ca. 6.0 Mio Toe) with 8.8 Mio 
Toe from other renewables. This total of ca. 14.8 Mio Toe should then be 
corrected by a significant portion of energy that is gained through energy 
processes.
The final order of green energy in the year 2035 will presumably range 
between 5% and 6% in terms of the end energy form.
Korea Energy Master Plan outlook and policies January 2014 (MOTIE)
Business as Usual Model Demand target
Total Primary Energy (Mio Toe) End Energy (Mio Toe) in End Energy
 2011 2035  2011 2035
Political agenda: 
improved 
demand, 
management, 
price, tax 
adjustment, 
R&D expansion
2035
Coal 83.66 112.4 Coal 33.5 38.6 34.4
Oil 105.1 101.5 Oil 102 99.3 80.3
Natural gas 46.3 73.3 City gas 23.7 35.3 33.8
Hydro 1.7 2 Electricity 39.1 70.2 59.9
Nuclear 32.3 70 Heat energy 1.7 3.3 3.2
Renewables 6.6 18.8
Renewables not 
electricity 5.8 7.4 8.8
Total 275.7 378.0 Total 205.8 254.1 Total 220.4
1.32% yearly increase 0.88% yearly increase 0.29% increase relative 
to 2011
Korea Energy Master Plan Outlook and Policies January 2014 (MOTIE)
On the supply side, Korean energy policies are almost fully focused 
on conventional energy sources and atomic power. An ever increasing 
demand is accepted and supply quantities will be increased with an 
increasing gap. 
Consequently, for future developments the main focus is on the 
self-sufficiency rate for LNG (natural gas) and crude. Korea strongly 
supports overseas exploration activities through the Korea National Oil 
Corporation, the Korea Gas Corporation, and private companies. There 
is a strong regional focus on North East Asia, America, and Europe. 
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Dependency on the Middle East will be decreased. Efforts are also on 
ways to obtain a gas pipeline from Russia through North Korea to South 
Korea.
To motivate private investments in overseas resource developments, 
the government provides strong incentives and a fund that exceeds EUR 
3 billion until 2017. 
On the demand, side Korea has undertaken numerous actions to 
increase supply security by strongly increasing capacities in all disciplines, 
i.e., thermal/coal power plants, atomic power plants, LNG powered 
plants. To further increase the security and public acceptance for atomic 
power (electricity production and atomic power technology as a core 
business for the export of atomic power plant technologies) more efforts 
and resources will be allocated to this task.
Electricity Supply
The key roles for electricity generation shall be played by coal and nuclear 
power plants. Interestingly, however, though no detailed discussions 
about the future role of coal-fired power plants are given in the 2nd 
master plan, the 6th plan can serve as a rough guideline. 
The high proportion of green energy (20%) given in the 6th plan in 
2013 is overruled by the new policy.
C. Generation Mix Outlook
Installed capacities in MW, (6th basic plan for long-term electricity supply and demand, 
2013)
  2012 % 2027 %
Coal  24534 30 45444 28.7
Nuclear 20716 25.3 35916 22.7
LNG 20116 24.6 31794 20.1
Oil 4888 6.0 1249 0.8
178
Korea’s Green Energy
Pump Hydro 4700 5.7 4700 3.0
Renewables 4084 5.0 32014 20.2
RCS 2768 3.0 7434 4.7
 TOTAL 81806  158551  
(6th basic plan for long-term electricity supply and demand, 2013)
At present in the US and China, there has been a strong decline in the 
use of coal as an energy resource between 2005 and 2013, about 10.0% 
of the power market. In the US, natural gas has become comparatively 
inexpensive and energy from wind and solar installations is gradually 
getting cheaper, and as such several major coal-related companies 
went bankrupt in 2013 and 2014. The US government is planning to 
further reduce the capacities of coal power plants in 2015 by 13 GW. 
China has also achieved a major step towards a more sustainable future, 
and its proposed increase of electricity consumption of over 7% coal 
consumption was reduced by nearly 3%. Worldwide, a decline in use of 
coal is expected as coal-fired power plants will no longer be deemed cost-
effective. However, the measures for CO2 storage described in the 2nd 
master plan are not yet commercially viable.
Examples for intended new power plants 
Coal-Fired Power Plants According to Capacity in MW
Dangjin 9, 10 12/2015 – 6/2016 2 × 0.020
Samcheok 1, 2 12/2015 – 6/2016 2 × 1,000
Bukpyeong 1, 2 2/2016 – 6/2016 2 × 595
Taean 9, 10 6/2016 – 12/2016 2 × 1,050
Yeosu 1 02/2016 350
Dongbu Green 1, 2 6/2016 – 12/2016 2 × 550
Sinboryeong 1,2 6/2016 – 6/2017 2 × 1,000
Yeongheung 7 12/2018 870
Sinseocheon 1, 2 12/2018 – 9/2019 2 × 500
G-project 1, 2 4/2019 – 10/2019 2 × 1,000
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Tongyangpower 1,2 12/2019 – 7/2021 2 × 1,000
(6th basic plan for long-term electricity supply and demand, 2013)
The intensive and aggressive increase of installed capacities (coal, 
LNG, atomic power) aims at providing for future summer and winter 
peak demands and the creation of sufficient reserve capacities.
To moderate the effects of greenhouse gas emissions by coal-fired 
power plants, the government intends to implement the latest power 
plant technologies, i.e., ultra-supercritical technologies (USCs), which 
is ultimately more a question of economics than of environmental 
protection and carbon capture storage technologies (CCSs).
In terms of CCSs, no data are provided in the 2nd master plan 
concerning the implementation of CCSs in Korea. 
LNG Power Plants Capacity in MW
Jangmun 1, 2 3/2015 – 5/2015 2 × 900
Dangjin 5 12/2015 950
Yeongnam 6/2016 400
Seoul 1, 2 9/2016 2 × 400
Daewoopocheon 1 10/2016 940
Yeoju 6/2017 950
Sinpyeongtaek 3 11/2017 900
Atomic Power Plants Capacity in GW
Shin Kori 5, 6 12/2019 – 12/2020 1.4
Shin Hanul 3, 4 6/2021 – 6/2022 1.4
Shin Kori 7, 8 ca. 12/2023 1.5
(6th basic plan for long-term electricity supply and demand, 2013)
Despite the disaster at Fukushima, and the exit from atomic power of 
countries such as Germany, Switzerland, etc., the importance of atomic 
power remains strong. Indeed, Korea will increase its capacity by ca. 29% 
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until 2035; in terms of total end energy consumption, the ratio will be 
about the same as today.
Numerous actions will be taken to improve the public image of 
nuclear power. In particular, investment into safety and safety related 
R&D will be continuously increased by 60% until 2023. 
The safety first policy also applies to nuclear power plant (NPP) 
operation systems to improve planned preventive maintenance, the 
preemptive replacement of parts, the number of monitored items, and 
increase the standard maintenance period from 30 days to 35 days.
As an NPP exporter, Korea intends to develop world`s highest security 
level NPPs, using relevant quality tests and verification procedures. To 
this end, new APR 1400 reactors are now being constructed and next 
generation reactors (APR+) will be developed.
A number of measures have been outlined in order to enhance the 
transparency and safety in state-owned organizations
A major aspect in the policy is the shift from feed-in tariffs to a 
renewable portfolio system (RPS-System) by which major suppliers 
(at present, 13 companies having installed capacities over 500 MW) of 
energy are obligated to provide a portion of green energy. A company 
can comply by the generation of green energy, buying green energy, or 
by acquiring green energy certificates. At the moment, however, some 
companies prefer to pay moderate penalties rather to comply with this 
regulation. 
In dealing with the rising future demand in electricity, the Korean 
government intends to build numerous new coal-fired power plants 
based on latest technology; these high efficiency plants will be able 
to moderate CO2 impact considerations and CO2 storage capacities 
in line with how Canadian power plants are made, and efforts will be 
undertaken to develop a smart grid.
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NRE Development According to 4th basic plan for NRE September 2014
 2012 2014 2020 2025 2030 2035
NRE as % of total primary energy 3.2 3.6 5.0 7.7 9.7 11.0
Solar thermal 0.3 0.5 3.7 7.9
Solar PV 2.7 4.9 12.9 14.1
Wind 2.2 2.6 15.6 18.2
Biomass 15.2 13.3 19.0 18.0
Hydraulic 9.3 9.7 4.1 2.9
Geothermal 0.7 0.9 4.4 8.5
Offshore 1.1 1.1 1.6 1.3
Energy to waste 68.4 67.0  38.8  29.2
6th basic plan 2012 NRE share   8.4 11.3 12.3% (2027)
4th basic plan for NRE, September 2014
By comparing the 4th basic plan for new and renewable energies 
September 2014 and the prior 6th basic plan for long-term electricity 
supply and demand (2012) it becomes clear that the present government 
has given up the target of green growth (compare differences in table 
above). At current rates, a major portion (67% in 2014) of the so-
called green energy in Korea will be provided through waste to energy 
processes; hereafter, the role will be still significant. By correcting the 
target value of 11% by the portion provided through waste to energy, the 
final target value for green energy will be below 8%, and in the coming 
20 years Korea will actually increase its greenhouse gas emissions.
Moderation of annual energy demand
The government is essentially attempting to maintain a cheap energy 
policy in combination with moderation of imparities between different 
kinds of energy sources by using new taxation principles, while also 
trying to moderate the increase of negative environmental effects by using 
a number of measures. In addition to the RPS, among the most note-
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worthiest include the following:
a.  Enhancing the distributed power generation, replacement of aged 
CHP, and installing large-scale facilities in suburbs of the capital, 
and improving the heat and electricity ratio. No considerations 
have been made to promote ORC processes that could effectively 
utilize waste heat in existing facilities.
b.  Launching new R&D initiatives, identifying more commercially 
viable R&D projects having a high potential for commercialization, 
cost-reductions, and diversification in the areas of geothermal, 
solar, and off-shore energies. Especially in the EU, technologies 
in these areas have already been developed, thus programs for 
effective cooperation would have a more immediate impact; for 
example, the development of large-scale biogas plants.
c.  To moderate the effects of climate change, the government 
intends to deploy the most efficient power plant technologies 
available. In the case of coal power plants, ultra-supercritical 
technologies shall be utilized, with carbon dioxide storage 
technologies (CCS) mentioned as a real future possibility; 
presumably, however, much higher costs for generation (+100%) 
must be envisioned.
d.  Fuel in Korea shall contain a minimum of bio fuel (2%), though 
it is questionable whether Korea can provide the necessary 
quantities by using national agriculture initiatives, or whether 
large quantities of biofuel will have to be imported.
e.  Under the expressed ROH renewable heat obligation, requirements 
shall be set for new buildings to use a share of heat from renewable 
sources. A first requirement (10%) for buildings with more than 
10,000 m2 in total floor space (except for residential and public 
buildings) will be set. (comment: no measures below 10.000 m2)
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  Produced by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE), 
the english.motie.go.kr website states the following: the use of zero-
energy buildings, which minimize power consumption through 
maximum insulation and achieve energy sufficiency by producing 
renewable energy, will be mandated for market-based public 
enterprises from 2017. This requirement will be extended to small 
administrative organizations such as community centers and post 
offices from 2020 for all public buildings, and from 2025 all private 
buildings shall be integrated. However, this is a very slow approach 
to an old and existing technology, and it remains to be seen 
whether these standards for the construction of zero-energy houses 
will provide advantages in the overall economics of buildings and 
whether public acceptance will create a higher standard of living in 
combination with reasonable costs for construction.
f.  In 2015, the MOTIE will implement a program to expand the 
market for eco-friendly vehicles and EV-related services. At 
present, the overall infrastructure for charging stations (EV 
charging station, electric recharging point, charging point) in 
Korea is absent; the MOTIE intends to install 5000 more charging 
stations in Seoul and Jeju Island. A total of 500 cars p.a. shall be 
sold to the public sector.
  Subsidies will be available to private owners (ca. EUR 8000 / 
KRW 10 Million), with further tax reductions of up to KRW 4 
Million.
g.  An interesting aspect of future energy policies is the intention of 
the government to introduce a customized electric rate system for 
the promotion of energy storage systems (ESS) and EV industries. 
An example is given for rate discounts during times of lowest 
power consumption.
f.  Finally, the government intends to install a demand management 
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system. Among other features, electricity savings will be treated 
as resources, which will allow management firms to participate 
in the electricity bidding process. Under this proposal, buildings 
and factories can generate income by selling conserved energy 
to demand energy companies, inducing savings in the electricity 
market.
All intended measures have only been described in brief, no quantified 
data have been provided concerning the effects on CO2 emissions or on 
energy savings potential.
Despite its numerous activities and programs, and given the target 
values of Korea’s energy policies, it becomes clear that neither energy 
reductions nor CO2 reductions can be expected. The main target has 
been to increase energy security, but this target will only be achieved by 
accepting higher CO2 emissions in the future-Korea’s position in terms of 
international rankings will most likely worsen in the coming years.
Korea, however, has not made effective use of existing opportunities, 
which include the aggressive use of thermal solar energy in existing 
buildings and the use of private initiatives to upgrade the energy levels 
of existing apartments or buildings. Another area of particular need 
and urgency is the utilization of the huge amounts of biogenic waste 
(food waste, agricultural waste, etc.) originating from sludge from city 
wastewater treatment plants.
It is recommended that the international community should address 
the energy issues in Korea with more attention, as Korea is an export 
driven economy. The effects of poor energy performance are therefore 
also exported with every piece of goods shipped abroad.
A significant improvement in energy security and the simultaneous 
reduction of CO2 emissions can be quickest to achieve by two measures, 
even in the very short term; i.e., the systematic management of biogenic 
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waste and improving the energy value of existing homes.
In a longer view, Korea has a very interesting tidal flow potential, as 
Korea belongs to an area in the world where tidal energy could be easily 
harvested, due to its shallow western coastline and high tidal range.
Biowaste in Korea – a wasted opportunity
Korea has a population of ca. 50,000,000 producing ca. 250 g of food 
waste per day, and this waste is presently collected separately. Food 
waste is rich in energy and can be easily converted into biogas/methane 
via reliable technologies currently available in Europe. As such, a biogas 
plant in Korea would be an interesting investment opportunity given the 
high prices for the disposal of food waste (50 to 100 EUR/t).
A payback of 4 to 5 years for the installation of a plant capacity of 
200 t/d could easily be achieved. Together with other organic waste from 
slaughterhouses, fisheries, food processing, pig and cow manure, and 
sludge from city waste water treatment plants, within several years Korea 
could produce ca. 7–10 Mio Toe of methane, which corresponds to ca. 3% 
to 4% of the total primary energy of Korea.
Interestingly, the biogas process is accompanied by the production of 
substantial quantities of organic fertilizer. As such, the conversion of food 
waste alone would yield more than 200,000 t/a of fertilizer.
A further benefit is that there would be no disposal of food waste 
(organic waste from households, restaurants etc., which is collected in 
Korea separately) into landfills required.
Existing buildings a huge potential for generation of private 
and individual initiatives
Most existing buildings have a high potential for energy improvements, 
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which can be achieved in each and every apartment by initiative of the 
owner or tenant/renter. Typical measures include the installation of new 
windows, new entrance doors, or indoor wall insulation.
With these simple measures, energy costs can be reduced by over 50% 
p.a. in old apartments, but this effect would not be sufficient to justify 
private investment. Private investment must be triggered by a system and/
or combination of incentives (funds, low interest rates, VAT exemptions, 
and income tax deductions).
Korea enjoys a much higher rate in solar radiation (20%) compared 
to Germany, and most notably also attains significant energy gains in 
winter-a situation that is very favorable for the installation of thermal 
solar panels. Many existing roofs are horizontal/flat, which makes 
installation cheap and highly cost effective, and integration into existing 
heating systems does not pose a significant technical problem.
Whichever program for existing buildings is created, the overall 
impact on the quality of living, CO2 reduction, and most importantly 
on the labor market in Korea would be huge. The refurbishment of 
existing apartments or buildings requires skilled trades workers and is a 
significant opportunity for small entrepreneurial activities. 
The international community shall address these matters, as the need 
for CO2 reduction in Korea remains in place, and economic exploitation 
is possible. Indeed, the labor market in Korea would profit from some 
adjustments that could be easily added to the present policies and 
direction.
Conclusions
The Korean economy will continue to further grow in the near future, 
and as such energy demands will also increase. Based on existing energy 
plans and strategies, there are also suggestions that the dependency on 
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coal, nuclear power, and natural gas will be stronger. Within next the 10 
years, is it expected that there would be no significant expansion in green 
energy; consequently, there are no signs that greenhouse gas emissions 
will decrease.
The energy policy in Korea intends mainly to secure the energy supply 
by two measures: 1) to increase the self-sufficiency rate in oil and natural 
gas, and 2) to increase capacities in electricity production.
Korea cannot create a home market for green technologies by 
itself. Private investment and the concurrent development of Korean 
green technologies for Asia or the world market is not feasible for 
small companies to undertake without government support. For this 
reason, green technology as a business field remains in the domain of 
international players, with chances to create business opportunities for 
small or midsize companies not provided on a broad level, especially in 
times with moderate oil prices.
The present energy policies in Korea are not suitable for mobilizing 
private initiatives to build green power plants, as is the case in Germany 
in which over 50% of all green energy installations are in private 
ownership or accessible to citizens with smaller income via funds and 
other capital means.
It remains to be seen whether it will become possible for private efforts 
or governmental programs to moderate the yearly increase of primary 
energy consumption to 0.3% at an economic growth rate of 2.8% p.a.
No significant potential can be anticipated with the present master 
plan for electricity production from biowaste in Korea, especially in terms 
of immediacy at low cost. However, the construction of biogas plants 
would fit into existing energy policies to ensure higher security in the 
grid, increasing the peak time capacity. In addition, biogas plants would 
create new jobs and, above all, biogas plants with an investment volume 
of EUR 10 to 20 million could be an opportunity for further private 
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investment.
On a longer term, the support for research in tidal flow conversion 
technologies could tremendously profit from improvements that could be 
applied directly on its coastline, as the geographic conditions in Korea are 
quite unique in the world.
The present Korean way will not lead to a sustainable national 
energy supply system or CO2 reduction, as could be expected from an 
industrialized country that has a huge trade surplus and a low national 
debt. Nor will this path lead to the development of a broad range of new 
energy-efficient and sustainable technologies that are ready for export 
and international competition. Other key elements that are missing 
from existing national policies include the possibility to democratize the 
energy sector, the chance for broader small size entrepreneurship to be 
utilized, and incentives and education for private people to reduce energy 
consumption. 
In summary: Korea continues to attempt to secure a more self-
sufficient energy future by maintaining a similar conventional energy 
mix as in the past while operating in a more creative industrial economy 
system, working to maintain low costs for consumers/industry but at a 
higher cost for the environment.
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